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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION
AN ANALYSIS OF THE FACTORS THAT INFLUENCE
REGIONAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION
by
Terence Murphy
Florida International University, 2013
Miami, Florida
Professor Allan Rosenbaum, Major Professor
This dissertation is a comparative case study of regional cooperation in the field
of economic development. As citizens have developed a greater appreciation for the fastpaced dynamics of the global economy, proponents of regionalism have put forth fresh
arguments to improve the competitive advantages of a region through collective action.
There is a growing regional movement in the economic development arena. A regional
approach to economic development activity, however, presents a classic social dilemma:
How is it possible to commit resources to improve the economic prospects of a region,
and remain autonomous to act in the best interest of the local community? My research
examines the role of social capital in overcoming this social dilemma.
Three Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs) with different degrees of regional
cooperation form the empirical basis of this research. The Houston MSA has
institutionalized regional cooperation very well, the Atlanta MSA is at the intermediate
stage with capacity to function regionally for economic development purposes, and the
Miami MSA has very little regional economic development cooperation. The dissertation
seeks to explain why this is so, in order to obtain insights into the process by which

v

regional economic cooperation evolves. The hypothesis is that accrued social capital is
crucial to obtaining economic development cooperative agreements.
In his explanation of regional cooperation, Richard Feiock argues for the
importance of observable community characteristics such as charter provisions for
electing officials, heterogeneity in the structure of local governments; socio-economic
characteristics, and information asymmetry across jurisdictions. Elinor Ostrom has
suggested that experiences of reciprocity, reputation, and the level of trust among the
stakeholders positively influence the outcome of negotiations.
My dissertation extends the literature by focusing on the quality of the relations
among the stakeholders. Social capital assessments gathered through surveys and
interviews of civic leaders, public officials, and business executives of each region
provided the basis for comparison. The study concludes that the significant factors
associated with successful regional economic development cooperation are the actions of
state executives and the policies adopted by state legislatures to incentivize regional
cooperation.
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CHAPTER 1.
SCOPE OF THE RESEARCH STUDY
1.1 Research Problem
Regionalism has once again emerged as a solution to the limited ability of local
jurisdictions to effectively address a particular problem. In light of the challenges of a
global economy, local officials are being encouraged to engage in collective action to
improve the competitive posture of the nation’s regions. My dissertation is a comparative
study of efforts to regionalize economic development activity in metropolitan areas of the
United States.
The present study maps regional economic development cooperation in three (3)
Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs) to discern the factors that most influence the
cooperative process. Extant literature shows that the likelihood of achieving regional
collective action, an agreement to address regional concerns, is linked to community
profile characteristics (Feiock, Steinacker, & Park, 2009) and reserves of social capital
among the participating parties (Ostrom, 1998) (Olberding, 2002b).
The research concentrates on social capital among the key stakeholders engaged
in economic development activity, and maps other contributing factors that have shaped
economic development cooperation, as it exists in the three subject regions of my study.
If a regional approach to economic development policies is indeed warranted, as the
advocates of regionalism suggest (Fehr, 2010; Peirce, Johnson, & and Hall, 1993; Porter,
2001), greater knowledge of the factors that influence regional economic development
cooperation is needed.

1

The move to regionalize economic development activity is being pushed by
federal authorities as a strategic response to the challenges of global economic
competition. President Obama recently declared, “Strong cities are the building blocks of
strong regions and strong regions are essential for a strong America” (Fehr, 2010).
Regional economic development cooperation is not simply an altruistic idea being
promoted to encourage prosperous communities to assist the less fortunate neighboring
jurisdictions. The federal government is encouraging regional cooperation as a strategic
domestic policy to improve the overall global competitiveness of the national economy.
Some economic development experts argue that that there is a correlation between
vibrant regional economies and macro-economic growth (Porter, 2001; Drabenstott,
2006). The importance of improving the performance of the regional economies is
underscored by the fact that 90 percent of the U.S. Gross Domestic Product is produced
within the metropolitan areas (Panek, Baumgardner, & McCormick, 2007).
To what extent must local jurisdictions within a region cooperate to improve
economic prosperity? Is it necessary to centralize the economic development functions
for the region in one agency? Should all prospective employers interested in locations
within the region be facilitated by a single economic development organization? Should
one agency allocate incentive packages throughout a region? The complete consolidation
of economic development powers in one regional agency is highly unlikely.
The push for this type of regional consolidation of government services by
metropolitan reformers dissipated before it was able to become a movement (Norris,
2001). There are remnants of the metropolitan reform movement throughout the United
States. Region-wide structural reform was embraced in Portland and Minneapolis. There
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are unified county-municipal governments of Indianapolis, Indiana and Jacksonville,
Florida. Miami-Dade County, a local jurisdiction included in this study, is often cited as
an example of a two-tiered regional government.
The arguments advanced by the metropolitan reformers were focused on the
concepts of efficiency and the cost-saving benefits of providing aggregated services
associated with economies of scale. Over the last 50 years, these rational arguments have
been effectively subverted under by the characteristically American preference for local
control and autonomy (Norris, 2001). The new regionalist proponents have shifted the
argument away from efficiency and equity and have couched the discussion of
regionalism in terms of global competitiveness (Peirce et al., 1993).
From the new regionalist perspective, regional economic development
cooperation involves a strategic alignment of the key agencies and entities capable of
improving the economic functionality of a region. A coordinating agency overseeing the
full range of economic development activities in a region might be considered ideal. The
definition of regional cooperation in my research is not framed in legal, structural and
organizational terms, but rests solely upon evidence of cooperation: Regional economic
development cooperation is manifested when there is utilization of region-wide economic
data in support of a unified cross-jurisdictional marketing strategy. As defined, regional
economic development cooperation may be a fleeting thing, or it could be embedded in
an institutional framework. The main focus of my dissertation is not dissecting the
governance form that ‘regional cooperation’ takes; my research concentrates on the
factors that influence whether or not ‘regional cooperation’ occurs at all.
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From the federal perspective, a regional approach is an efficiency measure to
improve the performance of the national economy. From the local perspective, a regional
approach to economic development activity is a classic social dilemma. For local
jurisdictions to collectively embrace a regional approach to economic development
activity, each jurisdiction must be prepared to occasionally relegate its own interests to a
subordinate position.
Traditionally, local economic development activity has entailed competition
among neighboring jurisdictions. Adopting a regional approach to economic development
is a sea change for many local economic development practitioners. To fully regionalize
economic development activity, local competitors would have to become regional
confederates in a common endeavor to increase prosperity for the greater good. Such a
scenario presents a real social dilemma.
The social dilemma inherent in any collaborative economic development program
is not usually of compelling public urgency to ordinary citizens. Engaging in a regional
economic development social dilemma is largely a matter of choice, dependent upon the
good will and vision of public officials, civic leaders and the business community. For
local public officials, the political benefits of acting regionally lie somewhere between
marginally better than zero to negative. Local officials are more likely to engage
regionally if there are incentives embedded in state and federal policies (Gordon, 2007).
By and large, though, regional cooperation for economic development purposes is a
uniquely voluntary act.
Clearly, cooperation for regional economic development is a difficult task. There
are political risks associated with cooperation. Public officials who enter into such
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agreements may have to endure criticism from local constituents. Despite the
uncertainties and risks inherent in this voluntary process, more than 100 economic
regions across the nation have addressed this social dilemma and creatively structured
organizations to conduct regional economic development activities (Olberding, 2002a).
The structures of the organizations include varying degrees of public-private partnerships
(Olberding, 2002).

1.2 Research Background
While federal officials may encourage regional cooperation to advance national
prosperity, and economic studies may provide evidence of regional prosperity linked to
cooperation, a collective decision to cooperate is a complicated transaction for economic
development stakeholders in metropolitan regions. Cooperation is conceptually at odds
with the historic competitiveness among the political jurisdictions and economic
development organizations of a region.
Smokestack chasing, a phrase coined to describe the competitive practices honed
by officials during the last century in the American South to lure northern manufacturers,
is an enduring practice today (Fredriksson, List, & Millimet, 2004; Boothroyd & Davis,
1993). Extreme examples include the incentive package worth over $300 million that
Alabama used to lure a Mercedes sports utility vehicle plant; Tennessee offered similar
conspicuous packages to attract Nissan and Saturn plants (Fredriksson et al., 2004).
An inducement-based economic development strategy relies on a sound, rational
economic proposition: employers will choose a location in a jurisdiction that offers the
most attractive incentive package. Site selection consultants representing prospective
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employers routinely search for and negotiate the most lucrative combination of tax
breaks, economic incentives, subsidized labor, free land, and donated infrastructure that a
local jurisdiction can afford. In more colorful language, site selection consultants and
their footloose clients have been described as an “international jet set of con artists,
charlatans, and plain crooks who demand grants, incentives, and tax advantages to set up
plants that employ workers at low wages. They move in, skim off the cream, then move
on to another ‘disadvantaged’ area” (Lotz, 1977).
Whether or not a jurisdiction can truly afford to offer such incentives, and
whether the return on investment warrants such public largesse, are issues open for
debate. There is even continuing debate about the best approach to calculate the costbenefit analyses for smokestack chasing policies. There is no consensus in the literature
regarding the best methodology for calculating the costs and benefits associated with tax
incentive policy (Buss, 2001). Geographically focused tax incentive studies invariably
yield conflicting results. As benefits and costs vary with each project, and there is no
agreed upon method for calculating the benefits and costs, broad generalizations about
the efficacy of the policies are simply not defensible (Bartik, 1994).
However, there is consensus among economic development professionals that
incentive packages will remain a fundamental component of state and local programs
(Morfessis, 2011). There is one compelling argument for continuing this dubious practice
that has been labeled ‘corporate welfare’ by critics: no state or local jurisdiction can
afford to unilaterally discontinue offering incentives. Unless the courts or federal
legislation ban smokestack chasing and declare such tax incentive policies illegal,

6

incentive package competition will continue among the states and local jurisdictions all
across the nation.
For the proponents of regional economic development cooperation, finding
common ground for cooperation among competing jurisdictions presents an obvious
challenge. If there is a history of intense economic development competition between the
local jurisdictions of a region, the capacity to cooperate may be quite limited. The
problems inherent in any effort to institutionalize regional economic development
cooperation are myriad. Stakeholders do not necessarily share a common understanding
of the competitive dynamics of a global economy, nor are they uniformly infused with an
urgency to improve a region’s competitive posture.
Stakeholders must be convinced of the benefits of aligning programs regionally,
and be assured of the equity of those benefits. And, in light of the persistence of
‘smokestack chasing’ practices, mutual commitments for cooperation must be designed
to preserve the ability of regional partners to occasionally compete with each other for
prospective employers. My study concentrates on the factors that influence the ability of
stakeholders to overcome jurisdictional constraints and engage in some form of intraregional cooperation for economic prosperity. The dissertation begins by recognizing the
difficulties of crafting meaningful regional economic development cooperation
agreements across local jurisdictions, and seeks to determine if accumulated social capital
among the stakeholders of a region is a critical and catalytic ingredient in the formulation
of such cooperative agreements. (Feiock, Steinacker, & Park, 2009)(Olberding, 2002a)
Ostrom, 1998).
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1.3 Research Purpose and Significance
The purpose of this study is to determine if social capital influences the capacity
of stakeholders to cooperate in establishing protocols for regional economic development
cooperation. Social capital factors are examined in concert with the community profile
factors such as demographics and political fragmentation, which have been highlighted in
extant studies to influence the likelihood of achieving cooperation (Feiock, Steinacker, &
Park, 2009). Methodologically, the dissertation uses a comparative case study approach,
mapping the factors that have influenced the current state of regional economic
development cooperation within each subject region.
The research addresses a deficiency in the literature pertaining to social capital
among the stakeholders of regional economic development cooperation. The extant
research indicates social capital variables are contributing factors that merit greater
consideration, but there has not been a systematic effort to directly measure the influence
of social capital variables among the essential network of individuals involved in
regionalizing economic development activity. Olberding’s (2002, p. 486) large-scale
analysis of regional economic development cooperation finds “some support of the
hypothesis that cooperative norms are positively related to the formation of regional
partnerships for economic development.” By narrowing the research focus to the essential
network of individuals, this study is designed to directly test the influence of social
capital among the stakeholders of regional economic development.
My research also extends the work of Feiock (2009), who has argued that there is
a correlation between community profile variables and the likelihood of intergovernmental cooperation. Feiock notes the explanatory power of the community profile
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variables is limited to scoring the likelihood of cooperation, and concludes that the
community profile variables do not adequately explain the inclination or aptitude for
regional cooperation. Feiock does suggest the prospects for cooperation are enhanced
through informal policy networks, which are the communication channels for building
social capital among participants (Feiock, Steinacker, & Park, 2009).
From a practitioner’s perspective, this research provides insights into the process
of regionalizing economic development activities. The analysis of the state of cooperation
in three metropolitan regions and the factors underlying their existing state of cooperation
may suggest a path for others to follow. For those who accept that regional economic
development cooperation is vital to the prosperity of the nation, knowing the factors that
most influence the cooperative process is important. At the outset, it is my contention that
a deeper appreciation of the role of social capital is essential.

1.4 Social Capital in Regional Economic Development
Social capital is not a fixed asset to be examined; it is an intangible form of
capital that is not easily defined. The concept has evolved and shifted within different
contexts over time. Portes (1998) distinguishes social capital from other forms in this
way: “Whereas economic capital is in people’s bank accounts and human capital is inside
their heads, social capital inheres in the structure of their relationships.” Relationships
exist between individuals, networks, communities and the citizens of a state. Social
capital, defined as a measure of trust, has been identified as a cultural commodity at the
level of nations (Fukuyama, 1995). Methodologies for determining the value of accrued
social capital range from the level of the individual to a community, or to a nation
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(Woolcock, 2004). In this study, social capital is measured collectively among the
economic development stakeholders of a region.
Social capital has become commonly associated with measures of community
civic engagement following Robert Putnam’s seminal book, Bowling Alone (Putnam,
1995). My research uses Putnam’s concept centrally to explain regional cooperation. For
the purposes of this research, social capital refers to “the norms and relationships that
enhance people’s ability to collaborate on common endeavors” (Putnam, 2005). The
norms and relationships among the stakeholders of regional cooperation are defined in
terms of trust, reciprocity and reputation (Ostrom, 1998).
According to Ostrom (1998), the elements of trust, reciprocity and reputation are
the social capital variables that enable participants to resolve social dilemmas in ways
that often exceed rational expectations. She asserts that the rational choice models when
applied to social dilemmas routinely underestimate the willingness of parties to
cooperate. Given the potential inequities and uncertainties inherent in a social dilemma,
rational decision-making expectedly diminishes the likelihood of a resolution among the
parties. In many instances, however, the relationships among the respective agents, and
the clarity of the rules surrounding the particular problem, combine to produce better
cooperative results in social dilemmas than the rational choice models suggest.
In theory, trust, reciprocity and reputation influence the collaboration process by
enabling the capacity to cooperate to override legitimate concerns that arise during a
collective action transaction. Presence of associations that provide formal and informal
social interaction among stakeholders increases the likelihood of regional cooperation for
economic development (Feiock, Steinacker, & Park, 2009). Statistical analyses of
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regional economic development cooperative agreements have been conducted to broadly
test the influence of social capital. Olberding (2002) found that cooperative norms in
government, the private sector and among citizens positively influence the process of
establishing regional economic development organizations. Olberding measured social
capital as follows: the inverse ratio of political fragmentation among governments, the
number of business associations per capita, and the total number of membership
organizations per capita (Olberding, 2002b). Feiock (2009) and Olberding (2002)
generally confirm the theory advanced by Ostrom (1998) that social dilemmas are often
resolved with “better than rational results” due to the influence of social capital.

1.5 Research Questions, Hypothesis and Design
Drawing from the literature review, there are two main research questions and
related hypotheses in this study. These questions have not yet been dealt with in the
existing literature. They are as follows:
Question #1: Is accumulated social capital essential for regional economic
development cooperation to occur?
Hypothesis #1: For regional economic development cooperation to occur, a
reserve of social capital among the stakeholders is essential.
Question #2: Is regional economic development cooperation an endeavor that
requires the consent and approval of local public officials and civic leaders?
Hypothesis #2: Regional economic development programming is only possible if
the local public officials and civic leaders reach an agreement to cooperate.
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There are two categories of independent variables operationalized for this
research project: social capital variables and community profile variables. The social
capital variables are measured through a survey of the stakeholders and interviews. The
community profile variables are derived from the descriptive data and public records of
the counties that comprise each MSA. The dependent variable is the state of regional
economic development cooperation.
The following three (3) MSAs were selected to conduct this study: HoustonSugar Land-Baytown, Texas; Atlanta-Sandy Springs-Marietta, Georgia; and Miami-Fort
Lauderdale-Pompano Beach, Florida (American community survey 2009). For brevity, in
the remainder of this dissertation, the selected MSAs are referred to by their principal
cities, Houston, Atlanta and Miami, respectively. These MSAs are the focus of this study
primarily because of their similarity in population size. These metropolitan areas also do
not cross state boundaries, and are located in different states.
For each of the three metropolitan regions, existing databases were reviewed to
compile community profile data. This information afforded an opportunity to utilize
various data sets to gauge the similarities and differences that exist within and among the
counties of each region. Included in the community profile variables are demographics,
government structures, political fragmentation, industry cluster composition, as well as
the state constitutional provisions and statutory regulations that govern regional economic
development pursuits.
The social capital variables of trust, reciprocity and reputation were assessed
through the lens of a transaction cost model. The transaction cost model outlines the three
stages of a cooperative agreement: discovery, negotiation and conclusion (Coase, 1988). I
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measured the social capital variables at each stage of these cooperative transactions. In
this, I conducted a survey of stakeholders to determine the elements of trust, reciprocity
and reputation at each stage of the transaction. Examining the social capital variables
through the lens of the transaction cost model provides a good basis for comparison
across the three MSAs.

1.6 Justification of the Selected Regions of Empirical Study
Since federal policies encourage regional economic development cooperation, the
most populated regions across the country were examined to select the case studies. The
three comparable regions needed to meet the following criteria: 1) the MSAs had to be
entirely within the boundaries of a single state (to avoid conflicting state economic
development policies); and 2) the regions would be selected from three different states.
The MSAs of Houston, Atlanta, and Miami satisfied the study requirements.
MSA
New York-Northern New Jersey-Long Island, NYLos Angeles-Long Beach- Santa Ana, CA
Chicago-Naperville-Joliet, IL-IN-WI
Dallas-Fort Worth-Arlington, TX
Philadelphia-Camden-Wilmington, PA-NJ-DE-MD
Houston-Sugarland-Baytown, TX
Miami-Fort Lauderdale-Pompano Beach, FL
Washington-Arlington-Alexandria,
DC-VA-MDAtlanta-Sandy Springs-Marietta, GA
Boston-Cambridge-Quincy, MA-NH
Detroit-Warren-Livonia, MI
Phoenix-Mesa-Scottsdale, AZ
San Francisco-Oakland-Fremont, CA
Riverside-San Bernardino-Ontario, CA
Seattle-Tacoma-Bellevue, WA
Minneapolis-St. Paul-Bloomington, MN-WI

Population
19,069,796
12,874,797
9,580,567
6,447,615
5,968,252
5,867,489
5,547,051
5,476,241
5,475,213
4,588,680
4,403,437
4,363,094
4,317,853
4,143,113
3,407,848
3,269,814

Table 1. Population size of the 16 largest metropolitan areas in the United States
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In arriving at these three MSAs, I first identified the sixteen largest MSAs using
2009 census estimates (American community survey, 2009) [listed in Table 1]. Six of
these MSAs were not considered since they spanned multiple state boundaries. Regional
economic development cooperation in such areas is challenging because of the different
state economic development policies and regulations that the metropolitan areas would
have to undertake. Also, from a social capital perspective, the stakeholders in multiplestate regions are likely have fewer opportunities for social interaction as civic
organizations and professional associations are generally chartered to address the issues
of one particular state. To limit the complexities of multi-state regional collaboration, the
six MSAs were redacted from further consideration. The redacted MSAs include: New
York-Northern New Jersey-Long Island; Chicago-Naperville-Joliet; PhiladelphiaCamden-Wilmington; Washington-Arlington-Alexandria; Boston-Cambridge-Quincy;
Minneapolis-St. Paul-Bloomington.
Of the remaining ten regions, the Los-Angeles-Long Beach-Santa Ana, CA region
is quite distinctive in terms of its size, with over 12 million people. Hence it was not
selected. The next largest region is the Dallas-Fort Worth-Arlington, TX (Dallas) MSA,
but is significantly larger (standard deviation=456,479) than the next three MSAs of
Houston, Atlanta, and Miami. Another reason not to choose both Dallas and Houston is
that they are in the same state; Houston was chosen since it is closer to Atlanta and
Miami in population size. The standard deviation of the population among these three
MSAs is much lower (208,855).
The screening criteria that guided the selection yielded a group of MSAs with a
number of similar attributes. All three regions are served by major international airports
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and are globally recognized as commercial gateways to the U.S. domestic market. Each
region is well positioned to facilitate trade and commerce with Central and South
America and the entire western hemisphere. In many ways, history and geography have
combined to provide each of these regions competitive advantages in the global
economy. The three MSAs have diverse urban populations, fairly similar climates,
similar international cache, and prominence as key economic regions in the American
South. These common attributes serve to make these regions good candidates for
comparison in this study.

1.7 Identifying the Stakeholders of Regional Economic Development Cooperation
County governments are the first-tier political subdivisions of the state and
constitute the primary local jurisdictions that define MSA regions. MSAs are identified
by principal cities within the counties of the region, but the regional boundaries are fixed
along county lines. Just as MSAs are a composite assembly of county jurisdictions,
regional economic development cooperation requires the coming together of county
stakeholders. For the purposes of this research, the stakeholders of regional cooperation
for economic development in MSAs are considered as individuals who belong to either of
the following groups: 1) the elected and appointed county public officials, and 2) the
civic and business leaders on the boards of county economic development organizations.
The research’s focus at the county level does not preclude the participation of
municipal officials. Those city officials who are active on the boards of economic
development organizations (EDOs) are also considered stakeholders. All civic and
business leaders who are members of county EDOs, including individuals representing
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chambers of commerce, are considered vital stakeholders of any regional initiative for
economic prosperity.
There is not much distinction between civic and business leaders involved with
EDOs and chambers of commerce. The distinction, if at all, is a matter of function and
outlook. The civic and business leaders active with EDOs are focused on external affairs
that impact the economic vitality of a community. These EDO members engage
themselves in recruitment and retention efforts, and work to expand the capacity of the
local economy. Members of county EDOs are essential stakeholders in any process to
regionalize economic development activity.
Individuals from chambers of commerce mostly provide services to members and
advocate on local matters that directly impact the interests of its membership (Hanson,
2009). For this reason, membership alone in a chamber of commerce is considered an
insufficient qualifier for designation as a stakeholder for this study. But, as stated earlier,
chamber of commerce leaders who are also active on the boards of EDOs are included.
The civic and business leaders often play an important role in any effort to
regionalize economic development programming. If a downtown business community
sees advantages in regionalizing the economic development programming of a
metropolitan area, they are uniquely capable of activating a network of actors to
accomplish such a goal (Gainsborough, 2003). In this research, the downtown business
community is defined as those individuals active on the board of the local EDO.
I conducted a survey to measure social capital among the above stakeholders in
each region. A pool of stakeholders in each region was identified using the definitions
given above, and they were asked questions related to the social capital variables. The
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survey questions were specifically designed to gauge the availability of social capital at
the different stages of transactions (i.e. discovery, negotiation and conclusion). The
survey questions were the same across the regional economic development stakeholders
of the three MSAs, so that the social capital variables measured are the same in each
region.

1.8 Organization of the Dissertation
The scope of this research endeavor is covered in this present Chapter 1. This
research is a qualitative, comparative case study examining the contributing factors and
the state of economic development cooperation in three regional MSAs of the United
States. In Chapter 2, the theoretical framework and literature review relevant to this
research will be presented. Chapter 3 details the research design and methodologies
utilized in this dissertation. In the subsequent chapters, the findings of the study for each
of the MSAs are presented. Chapter 4 covers the Atlanta MSA. Chapter 5 is dedicated to
the Houston MSA. Chapter 6 coves the Miami MSA. Finally, Chapter 7 concludes with a
discussion regarding the comparative findings of the study, the validity of the research
hypothesis, and recommendations for the proponents of regional economic development
programs.
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CHAPTER 2.
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND LITERATURE REVIEW
2.1 Introduction
Coordinated regional initiatives for economic development purposes are relatively
new phenomena. Collaborative economic development initiatives across jurisdictional
boundaries involving private and public leadership have only recently become
commonplace. There is a substantial body of public policy literature examining the topics
of governance and regionalism. And, the broader topic of social capital and its influence
on various aspects of civic life has generated substantial interest and a wide range of
literature.
There is growing evidence that social capital plays an important role in the
collective process of regionalizing economic development activity. Research focused on
economic development collective action has certainly carved out a space for conjecture
about the role of social capital in this process (Feiock, Steinacker, & Park, 2009). Recent
contributions of targeted research have concluded that community attributes of social
capital do positively influence the cooperative efforts to regionalize economic
development activity (Olberding, 2002a). The comparative case study will contribute to
the research on this specific topic by specifically examining the influence of social capital
on the network of essential stakeholders involved in regional economic development
transactions.
In this study, the social capital variables among the network stakeholders of a
regional cooperative transaction are operationalized at each stage of a collective action
transaction. The three stages of the transaction are discovery phase, negotiation phase and
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conclusion phase (Fox, 2007). By doing so, the goal of the present study is to provide
critical knowledge to the economic development practitioners interested in improving the
prospects of regional cooperation.
Since this dissertation is focused on the influence of social capital on the
cooperative process of regionalizing economic development activity, I reviewed the
current status of domestic economic development policy. Regional cooperation for
economic development purposes requires local stakeholders to adopt new perspectives,
new policies and new programs. It is not sufficient to simply elevate the time-tested local
economic development programs of the past to the regional level. Toward this end, I
synthesize the evolving theoretical framework for regional economic development policy.
The discussion includes the theories that illuminate the dynamics of the transition to
regional cooperation.

2.2 Beyond Smokestack Chasing
Smokestack chasing, the practice of luring prospective employers with lucrative
incentive packages, has been an enduring public policy endeavor. Incentive-based
competition has been the core economic development strategy among state and local
officials in the United States for generations (Blakely, 2002) . Every instance of
competitive smokestack chasing between jurisdictions in a region could negatively affect
social capital among the regional stakeholders. Rather than collectively addressing the
challenges of global competitors, neighboring jurisdictions are then pitted as contestants
in the quest for increasing employment opportunities for their own residents.
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Critics of the practice of smokestack chasing mounted a legal challenge that went
all the way to the United States Supreme Court in 2006, but did not prevail. According to
Peter Enrich, the Northeastern University law professor who argued the case against
smokestack chasing, “the states are caught in an expensive and ineffectual competition
from which none can risk unilaterally withdrawing. Only enforcement of the
Constitution’s constraints by the courts can end this race to the bottom” (Vock, 2006).
The assessment by Enrich—that no jurisdiction can risk unilaterally suspending the
practice of offering tax incentives—is a view shared by many economic development
professionals (Morfessis, Motoyama, & Malachuk, 2011).
The problem confronting local economic development organizations today is that
smokestack chasing is now a global phenomenon. Over the past two decades, geopolitical
changes and the advent of the World Wide Web have dramatically expanded the
competitive playing field by lowering barriers to trade and commerce around the globe.
In the ‘flattened’ global market, production from early design to final assembly and
packaging may occur sequentially in multiple locations, domestically and internationally,
efficiently orchestrated using high-speed telecommunications. Companies can easily
assign research, low-end manufacturing, and high-end manufacturing to multiple
locations across the world (Friedman, 2005).
Manufacturing firms now have the ability to explore markets around the globe to
find locations that offer the lowest possible cost on all factors of production. As a
consequence of the worldwide geopolitical changes since the 1989 collapse of the Soviet
empire, the number of low-cost locations around the globe far exceeds the capacity of
locations in the United States to counter such offers (Friedman, 2005). According to
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Blakely (2002), it is now very unlikely that any local economic development organization
in the United States will significantly increase employment opportunities by attracting
new manufacturing industries.
As the economic development literature suggests, smokestack chasing is no
longer the most effective method of attracting and retaining major employers. As location
competition has expanded to global destinations, it is increasingly difficult for states and
local jurisdictions to assemble packages of incentives that are both competitive and
justified. Studies of ‘successful’ attraction and retention efforts suggest that there is little
evidence of positive or negative growth impacts once the tax breaks, financial incentives
and other inducements are taken into account (Fox & Murray, 2004; Hansen &
Kalambokidis, 2010; Weinstein, 1994) . In this context, new economic development
models for securing the growth and prosperity of states and local jurisdictions have
emerged.

2.3 Economic Growth and Innovation
The Council on Competitiveness, a non-governmental organization of corporate
executives, university presidents and labor leaders, published a report by Michael Porter,
a well-respected economist, to offer insights for economic development professionals
into the new competitive paradigm in the globalized context. The report, Clusters of
Innovation: Regional Foundations of U.S. Competitiveness, defined the relationship
between innovation and regional economic performance (Porter, 2001). To spur
economic growth and prosperity, the report encouraged economic development
professionals to identify, support, assist, and nurture the innovation clusters of a region.
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As the Porter study suggests, wealth creation will not be achieved by
concentrating solely on attracting manufacturing jobs; it is more likely going to be a
result of local entrepreneurs creating the next new thing—whether it is a product, process
or procedure. Erecting the socio-economic scaffolding to support greater interaction
among entrepreneurial innovators is essential to increase the competitive edge of the
regional cluster industries. According to Porter (2001, p.xvi), “successful regional
economies benefit from the contributions of a wide array of organizations. Organizing for
action entails arriving at consensus and creating the capacity for regions to implement
development strategies.”

2.4 Entrepreneurial Support and Economic Development
Judd and McNeil (2008) argue that entrepreneurs are the “critical drivers” of the
global economy. To advance this concept, they call for the adoption of a 21st Century
Economic Development model that has three pillars: 1) develop and support
entrepreneurs and small businesses; 2) expand and improve the local infrastructure; and
3) develop or recruit a skilled and educated workforce. Notably, they do not incorporate
retention and recruitment economic incentives in their model.
Dabson (2005) advanced a pyramid-shaped policy model, where the broad base
represents strategic programs to support innovation and entrepreneurship. Working up the
pyramid, the next tier of resources is dedicated toward support for and retention of
existing businesses. The top tier, representing the smallest allocation of resources, is
reserved for recruitment and attraction initiatives. The Dabson (2005) policy model
emphasizes a shift in priorities toward strategies that focus on innovation and
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entrepreneurship. Moving beyond simple smokestack chasing expenditures, the retention
and attraction of firms increasingly relies upon funding initiatives that improve
commercial networks, support entrepreneurship, and increase collaboration with
educational institutions. By creating an environment for innovation, the location decision
matrix is effectively modified (Dabson, 2005).
To the extent that resources are expended on economic incentives to attract firms,
Dabson (2005) stresses firm selections that complement the region’s overall competitive
strategy. The notion within this model is that vestiges of the long-standing economic
development policies of the last century will continue is both a plausible and acceptable
position. The model proposed by Dabson acknowledges that organizations, like
individuals, do not readily adapt to change.

2.5 Path Dependency of Institutions
Resistance to change within organizations and institutions is explained by the
theory of path dependency. The theory of path dependency postulates that contingent
events set into motion institutional patterns that are reinforced by the economic principle
of increasing returns (Mahoney, 2000). In other words, in response to an unexpected and
random occurrence, an organization will formulate a program to address the unexpected
situation. As long as the program produces the desired result, as long as there are
increasing returns, the organization will not alter its programmatic course. Viewing
economic development organizations (EDOs) through this theoretical lens provides
useful insight.
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The theory advanced by Mahoney (2000) is applicable not only to the
programming decisions of an EDO, but also applies to the circumstances surrounding the
formation of an EDO. According to this theory, an institution is formed at a critical
juncture in time when a contingent, random event impacts a jurisdiction. A contingent
event that results in the formation of an EDO might be a dramatic jump in unemployment
due to the departure of a major employer, a base closure, civil disturbances, or some other
local economic or political upheaval. Regardless of the exact nature of the contingent
event, the theory of path dependency subscribes that unique, random and unexpected
circumstances provide the context for the establishment of a new institution, such as an
economic development organization.
The theory of path dependency suggests an institution that is established as a
result of a random, contingent event is formed with a defined purpose, a strategic course
of action, and specific implementing steps. If the strategy works, if there are increasing
returns to the organization, the steps will be repeated and become a sustained institution.
As long as the patterned response continues to yield positive outcomes, the organization
will continue to travel down a defined path.
Dabson (2005) tacitly acknowledged the power of path dependency theory in the
construct of the pyramid economic development model. For those EDOs established as
an institutional response to an economic crisis, as long as successful projects are reported,
smokestack-chasing tactics will continue to be used to attract and retain firms. The
pyramid model advanced by Dabson (2005) accepts the continuance of smokestackchasing tactics and does not envision an abandonment of the practices.
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The theory of path dependency not only aptly explains the continuing adherence
to programs of dubious value, but also provides insights into the challenges associated
with the establishment of new institutions to address regional economic development
concerns. Broadly speaking, the global economy has not arrived in the doorsteps of most
American communities as an unexpected, contingent event. The realization of the need to
address the impact of global economic competition has been a gradual process.
The literature does not identify a precise calendar event when the phenomena of
global competition became a critical threat to the economic stability of local communities
in the United States. The theory of path dependency provides that absent a contingent
event that qualifies as a critical juncture where decisions must be made, change is
unlikely.
Though regional cooperation for economic development purposes is couched
within the literature as a direct response to the challenges of global economic
competition, it appears unlikely that global competition qualifies as a critical juncture to
spur such a substantial change in local economic development policy. Other unexpected,
random events that equate to a ‘critical juncture’ are more likely to serve as the impetus
for embracing a cooperative regional economic development strategy. A localized
economic downturn, the arrival of a bold civic leader with a grand vision for economic
prosperity, political upheaval arising from a deteriorating local economy, or the
unexpected attention of foreign investors might be events that spark the transformation to
regional cooperation.
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2.6 Transaction Costs for Regional Cooperation
When circumstances present an opportunity to pursue regional cooperation for
economic prosperity, when a region finds itself at a critical juncture, it is important to
appreciate the challenges of producing a cooperative agreement. Coase’s (1988)
economic theory provides an excellent framework for understanding the obstacles and
impediments that hinder the establishment of regional economic development
cooperative agreements.
Coase (1998) explains that firms expand to reduce the transaction cost involved in
procuring the means of production in a free market. In effect, a firm will purchase a
supply company and make it a subsidiary in order to reduce the transaction costs involved
in acquiring essential supplies. Consistent with this theory, public entities will ‘expand’
by entering into cooperative agreements if the transaction costs for doing so are low and
the expected benefits from collective action are high.
The transaction costs originally identified by Coase in his 1937 essay include: 1)
the cost of discovery, 2) the cost of negotiation, and 3) the cost of concluding the
agreement (Fox, 2007). In the present research, for each stage of the transaction cost
model, topics and issues relevant to economic development cooperation are identified.
The cost of discovery in the context of a regional economic development
agreement relates to the gathering and compiling of social and economic data, and
defining any potential legal constraints. The parties need to provide data about the
demographics, infrastructure, land-use patterns, educational assets, political structure,
existing business inventory, regulatory environment, industry clusters and other factors
necessary to determine the relative competitive advantages of each participating
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community. The compilation and presentation of this information to the satisfaction of
the parties is a transaction cost in both resources and time.
The cost of negotiation of a regional economic development agreement relates to
the capacity of the designated representatives to speak on behalf of the respective
stakeholders, constituents and voters. To the extent that the representatives are authorized
to make obligations, to offer concessions, to accept revisions, and to advance an
agreement expeditiously, the transaction costs of negotiations are minimalized. If the
representatives require approval from superiors for each step of the negotiations the cost
of negotiations escalate. The parties at the table responsible for crafting an agreement
must be capable of assessing that the stated goals and objectives of the regional
agreement comport with the long-term interests of the entities they represent, and be
prepared to make compelling arguments to win approval.
The cost of concluding a regional economic development agreement relates to the
transaction costs associated with winning the approval of the various governing boards of
the entities involved. There may be adjustments necessary to the proposed division of
resources and benefits, internal political concessions, additional cooperative provisions,
modifications to the term of the agreement, and other externalities that have to be
addressed. Creating an environment for a cooperative decision to occur may involve
ancillary public relations costs to secure approval.
Institutions that voluntarily forge collective actions agreements do so in order to
improve the conditions for all parties. The voluntary nature of the negotiations
underscores the need to discover a Pareto-optimal conclusion. The inherent challenges of
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attaining such a conclusion are starkly revealed with viewed through the lens of the
Coasian model of transactions costs.
In the intergovernmental arena, the determination of transaction costs often
includes estimated costs associated with the monitoring and enforcement of an
agreement. Fox (2007) makes a cogent argument that these factors do not arise during the
negotiations of the transaction and should not be considered transaction costs. Monitoring
and enforcement are administrative issues relating to implementation. This research study
conforms to this view, and does not anticipate the incidental costs of maintenance and
compliance associated with the implementation of a successful agreement.

2.7 Factors that Influence Cooperative Economic Development Transactions
Feiock, Steinacker and Park (2009) note that even though the potential benefits
for all parties can be substantial, institutional collective action agreements are particularly
difficult in the field of economic development because the transaction costs tend to be
high. The historic competitive posture of the parties, information asymmetry across
localities, the challenge of ensuring a fair commitment of resources and reasonable
distribution of the gains, a lack of economic homogeneity within and among the
respective jurisdictions, and variations in the structures of government all present serious
challenges to achieving a collective economic development agreement.
Feiock, Steinacker and Park (2009) utilized data from a national mail-in survey to
the lead development officials in 522 cities with populations over 50,000 as per 1990
census. The researchers applied a transaction cost framework for intergovernmental
relations to evaluate the results of the survey. According to them, “By focusing attention
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on the transaction costs of inter-local cooperation, institutional collective action provides
a coherent explanatory model for cooperative behavior and identifies policy variables that
may increase the prospects for cooperation, specifically the development of informal
policy networks” (Feiock, Steinacker, & Park, 2009).
According to the study, the likelihood of successfully concluding a cooperative
economic development agreement is positively related to: the council-manager form of
government; the tenure in office of elected and appointed officials; initiatives that bridge
weak-tie network relations among local governments; tightly clustered strong-tie network
relations among local governments; and the history of reciprocal relations across time and
policy arenas.
The above study also noted that the likelihood of success is negatively related to:
demographic heterogeneity among the component jurisdictions; demographic
heterogeneity within the component jurisdictions; geographic distance between the
component jurisdictions; the restrictiveness of state laws authorizing inter-local
cooperation; district-based representative systems; and institutional heterogeneity in the
political structure of local governments.
The study concludes that the primary policy variables that increase the prospects
for cooperation are: 1) homogeneous economic demographics; 2) a council-manager
structure; 3) geographic proximity; and 4) social links, both formally structured (strongtie) interactions and informal (weak-tie) associations. Notably, the study suggests that
racial diversity and ethnic population variance among the jurisdictions do not appear to
be influential factors (Feiock, Steinacker, & Park, 2009).
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While these policy variables serve as general guideposts for estimating the
likelihood of institutional collective action, there are unanswered questions relating to
increasing regional endeavors. As Feiock (2009) notes:
These factors suggest where cooperative endeavors are
most likely to spring up, but they provide few levers to
increase the likelihood of those activities. Network activity
may offer the greatest opportunities for change. Both
strong-tie networks with frequent interaction among cities
and weak-tie associational networks that involve only
minimal participation are associated with greater use of
inter-local partnerships. One way that higher-level
governments can encourage collaboration is to structure
incentives for local governments and other organization
officials to interact in ways that can help build the networks
and related social capital that lead to cooperative solutions
to metropolitan problems. (Feiock, Steinacker, & Park,
2009, p. 267).

2.8 The Stakeholders of Regional Economic Development Cooperation
In the present research, the ‘other organization officials’ involved in the
collaborative process with local government officials are defined as the board members
and executives of local economic development organizations. The literature provides the
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rationale for selecting EDO officials rather than chamber of commerce leaders as regional
economic development stakeholders.
The board members and executives of EDOs are philosophically better suited than
their counterparts in chambers of commerce for the task of advancing regional economic
development initiatives (Hanson, 2009). In the United States, the chambers of commerce
are voluntary membership organizations formed to provide services to the members and
advance the general interests of businesses within a local jurisdiction. Chamber board
members and executives serve as advocates for their business membership and engage in
public policy matters on a more limited basis than EDOs. Chamber of commerce
engagement in public policy is generally reserved for issues and topics that impact the
general welfare of the membership.
Economic development organizations are formed to address broader civic issues
and are generally comprised of executives representing major employers, directors of
utilities, and leaders from the public sector, schools and universities. An EDO often
serves as an extension of local government, entrusted with the responsibility of qualifying
firms for the award of tax breaks, incentives and rebates. These organizations and their
leadership are oriented toward external developments on the economic horizon that
present opportunities to increase the prosperity of the community.
Hanson (2009) suggested that the leadership of EDOs have “different skills and
expertise, experience, mind-set and outlook” than their chamber of commerce
counterparts. The board members and executives of EDOs seemingly provide a natural
pool of leadership talent to further the concept of regional cooperation. My research will
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adhere to this perspective and categorizes the EDO leaders as primary stakeholders in the
process of regional cooperation for economic development.

2.9 Social Capital and the Transaction Costs Approach
The transaction costs approach provides a coherent explanatory construct for
cooperative behavior within the framework of a rational choice paradigm. During
negotiations for collective action, each party effectively maintains a ledger of costs and
benefits in order to make a rational decision about whether or not to enter into such an
agreement. The social dilemma arises when the local costs of participation are measured
against collective benefits, and the benefits do not directly accrue to the particular
locality.
Feiock, Steinacker, & Park (2009) utilize the transaction costs model to frame a
rational decision-making process regarding economic development. They identified a
series of community profile variables that increase the likelihood of cooperation. Many of
these variables arguably reduce the tension among the parties (e.g., factors such as having
a common demographic or economic community profile). Yet, the final impetus to
achieve regional cooperation requires the parties to draw upon the less tangible aspects of
social capital.
Social capital has become a familiar concept in the public policy arena in the
wake of the two popular publications, Trust: social virtues and the creation of prosperity
by Francis Fukuyama (1995) and Bowling Alone, The Collapse and Revival of American
Community by Robert Putnam (2001). Fukuyama argued that trust has socioeconomic
benefits. Trust is the essential ingredient that reduces friction and eases tension, allowing
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public affairs and commercial transactions to conclude efficiently. Fukuyama found that
as a cultural trait, trust varies from nation to nation. In his book, Putnam traced the
decline of American civic involvement and a correlating loss of social capital by
examining a range of activities like playing cards and going to church. Putnam calls for
the social milieu of past generations where informal interactions engendered social
capital and warns of the dire consequences if the erosion of social capital is not reversed.
Although the above authors need credit for their endeavor to bring social capital
into the political discourse in recent times, the concept of social capital is not entirely
new. Hanifan (1916) defined social capital as “the tangible substances that count for most
in the daily lives of people: namely good will, fellowship, sympathy, and social
intercourse among the individuals and families who make up a social unit” (quoted in
Putnam, 2000, p.19). Woolcock (2004) also recognized the contributions of Janae Jacobs
and Glen Loury to the concept of social capital. While the former highlighted the value of
informal interactions for urban vitality, the later argued for the uses of social capital in
overcoming blacks’ marginalization. However, it is only recently that the notion of social
capital has emerged as a possible mechanism to resolve regional economic development
cooperation.
Public officials and civic leaders involved in developing regional economic
development agreements must overcome significant hurdles to achieve success. Many
times the costs of cooperation can be precisely calculated, but the benefits are less
tangible. From a strictly rational economic perspective, it is a notable challenge to justify
regional cooperation. Yet, the number of regional organizations responsible for managing
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economic development programs across local and state boundaries has grown (Olberding,
2002a).
Regional partnerships increased five-fold (from three to 16) in the span of just one
decade during the 1990s (specifically, from 1987 to 1997). Since then, 191 regional
partnerships for economic development have been identified in 147 metropolitan areas
across the U.S. (Olberding, 2002b). The Olberding study examined whether or not
cooperative norms influence the formation of regional economic development
organizations. As per Olberding (2002, p. 487), seven of the eight variables measuring
cooperative norms support the hypothesis that “cooperative norms in government, in the
private sector, and in the citizenry are positively related to the formation of regional
partnerships for economic development.”
My dissertation is designed to further probe the influence of cooperative norms by
measuring the social capital among the stakeholders in three MSAs. Putnam (2005, p.
288) asserts that “social capital allows citizens to resolve collective problems more
easily” and that “social capital greases the wheels that allow communities to advance.”
My dissertation assesses the amount of social capital available to stakeholders to advance
regional economic development cooperation.
Ostrom (1998) suggested that “better than rational” results are possible when
reciprocity, trust and reputation allow participants to extend themselves beyond short-run
self-interest. According to her, the rational choice models routinely underestimate the
willingness of parties to cooperate in order to address social dilemmas. By introducing
the value of social capital in the rational choice equation, she encouraged the
development of second-generation theories of rational choice that account for these
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observed behavioral traits (Ostrom, 1998). She showed how the capacity of participants
to trust and rely on reputation for reciprocity could otherwise alter the expected results of
stalemate in cooperation. To measure social capital in my study, I use the three
dimensions of social capital identified by Ostrom: reciprocity, trust and reputation.

2.10 Summary
The extant literature reveals that there is a positive correlation between regional
cooperation and the cooperative norms that exist in government, the private sector, and
the citizenry (Olberding, 2002a). This positive correlation of cooperative norms could be
used as the leverage to propel negotiations for regional cooperation forward (Feiock,
2009). To determine the specific influence of cooperative norms on regional cooperation,
it is necessary to focus on the social capital among the stakeholders involved in a
cooperative transaction. Typically, the stakeholders involved in regional cooperation are
public officials and the civic leaders prominent within EDOs (Hanson, 2009).
Empirical research reveals that regional cooperation for economic prosperity is an
attainable aspiration. Federal officials may have reason for optimism that the message of
job creation through innovation and cooperation is producing results (Porter, 2001).
While inter-local competition grounded in historic smokestack chasing tactics persists,
the increase in the number of regional organizations dedicated to economic development
is notable (Olberding, 2002b). In light of this recorded surge in cooperative activity, it is
important to understand how regions have overcome the power of path dependency in
smokestack chasing (Mahoney, 2000).
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The large-scale quantitative research by Feiock, Steinacker, and Park (2009)
identified a range of measurable community profile characteristics that are known to
influence the probability of success once the pursuit of a regional cooperative effort is
initiated. The research challenge is to recognize and account for the influence of these
known variables (which are factors such as homogeneity of economic demographics,
government structure, and geographic proximity), while testing for the influence of social
capital among the stakeholders.
The literature provides support for the application of a transaction cost model to
evaluate regional cooperative initiatives. The transaction cost model consists of three
components, or phases: discovery, negotiation and conclusion (Coase, 1988). The
transaction cost model is grounded in the theory of rational economic choices.
The results of negotiations often exceed the expectations of rational decisionmaking, in part, due to the influence of social capital. According to Ostrom (1998), the
elements of social capital that provide for such better than rational results are: trust,
reciprocity and reputation. The present comparative case study tests the influence of trust,
reciprocity and reputation on the decision to cooperate for regional prosperity within the
transaction model framework. The mechanics of the research design to test the influence
of social capital among the stakeholders of regional cooperation are described in the
following chapter.
My research effort sought to advance an understanding of the critical importance
of social capital in the formation of cooperative regional economic development
initiatives. While the findings of this particular research effort are unable to affirm the
critical role of social capital as an essential factor for cooperation, the research suggests
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greater attention be focused on the impact of policies adopted by the superior state
governments relative to regional economic development pursuits. State policies play a
prominent role in the regional economic development arena, at times enhancing the
prospects for cooperation, and at other times dimming the likelihood of cooperation.
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CHAPTER 3.
RESEARCH METHODS AND PROCEDURES
3.1 Introduction
The aim of this dissertation is to illuminate the factors that influence cooperative
regional economic development. Towards this end, I examine the social capital factors
that are of great importance to regional cooperation. The examination includes the wide
range of related explanatory factors, including demographic and economic homogeneity,
political fragmentation, cluster industry concentration, and the statutory environment
governing economic development activity.
My primary data sources include the survey responses and follow-up interviews
with regional stakeholders in the selected metropolitan areas. The secondary data sources
include the legal documents covering multiple-jurisdictional cooperation, census data on
demographics, and published reports on industries and regional cooperation in the
selected metropolitan areas. During the research process, I took careful steps to avoid the
circular tautological argument about the influence of social capital: the reason people in
the region are cooperative is because the people in the region are cooperative. This
dissertation identifies the most significant factors that influence and activate regional
economic development cooperative initiatives in the study area.
Chapter three outlines the research methods used in the dissertation. Following a
discussion of the research questions and the criteria for selecting the subject regions of
this study, the ranking of the regions in order of progress in effectuating regional
economic development cooperation is provided. The observations utilized to determine
the ordered rankings, and the dependent variables affecting the status of cooperation is
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then presented. An explanation of the social capital matrix and related survey questions
then follows. This chapter concludes with a brief review of the site visits and interviews.

3.2 The Research Questions
Drawing from the literature review in the previous chapter, there are two main
research questions and related hypotheses in this study. As explained in the last chapter,
these questions have not yet been dealt with in the existing literature. The first question of
the study is: Is accumulated social capital essential for regional economic development
cooperation to occur? This question is important to ask since the specifics of how social
capital is important for regional cooperation is not yet understood. The hypothesis to be
tested for this question is: For regional economic development cooperation to occur, a
reserve of social capital among the stakeholders is essential. If social capital matters for
regional economic development, the specifics of how social capital enabled or hindered
the regional cooperation need to be identified.
The second question in the study is: Is regional economic development
cooperation an endeavor that requires the consent and approval of local public officials
and civic leaders? This question deals with the role of local officials in establishing
regional agreements. The hypothesis is that regional economic development
programming is only possible if the local public officials and civic leaders reach an
agreement to cooperate.
I examine the two questions in the context of three metropolitan areas that are
similar in terms of population size and other economic characteristics, but are different in
terms of achieving regional cooperation for economic development. The selected
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Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs) are: Houston-Sugar Land-Baytown, Texas;
Atlanta-Sandy Springs-Marietta, Georgia; and Miami-Fort Lauderdale-Pompano Beach,
Florida. These MSAs are similar in their population sizes and their economic
characteristics. However, the extent of regional cooperation in economic development
varies among the metropolitan areas. Whereas Houston has achieved a great degree of
regional cooperation, Miami has not; Atlanta is in the mid-range, having some aspects of
regional cooperation. My dissertation uses the lens of social capital to examine why these
differences emerged over time.

3.3 The Empirical Case Study Regions
This section explains the dissertation’s empirical focus on the three MSAs of
Houston, Atlanta, and Miami. In light of the view that the competitive advantages of a
region are maximized through cooperative efforts, and that the prevailing federal
economic development policy encourages cooperation to increase the productivity of the
regional economies, this dissertation examines regional cooperation from a national
perspective. Towards this end, I first considered all of the most populated MSAs in the
United States. There are sixteen large MSAs in the country with a population of over 3
million. I chose three regions from these MSAs that are similar in population size and
other economic characteristics (i.e., similar in independent variables), but are remarkably
different in terms of their achievement of regional cooperation (i.e., dissimilar dependent
variables). Two other criteria for selecting the MSAs were that they should not straddle
state boundaries, and should not be located in the same state.
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I decided to eliminate those MSAs that straddle state boundaries from
consideration in order to maintain the same broader economic policy context within each
region. Variations in economic development policies set by different state legislatures
present a formidable challenge to regional cooperation efforts in metropolitan areas that
straddle state boundaries. The reconciliation of differing state economic development
policies across an MSA is an added impediment to cooperation that would strain direct
comparisons to other MSAs that are wholly contained within the boundaries of a single
state.
It was important for this study to select MSAs from different states in order to
avoid compounding the effects of a particular state’s economic development policies. If
two of the three MSAs were in the same state, and both were beneficiaries of state
policies that improved the likelihood of regional cooperation, the findings would be
skewed. If a particular state chose to offer inducements or incentives for its regions to
cooperate, they may distort the study results. For this reason, only MSAs from different
states were selected for this comparative study.
Following the procedures outlined in Chapter 1 (Section 2), I chose three
metropolitan areas of Atlanta, Houston, and Miami. The population sizes of the MSAs
are comparable, each MSA is wholly within the boundaries of a single state, and they are
each located in different states (Georgia, Texas, and Florida respectively).
MSA
Houston-Sugarland-Baytown, TX
Miami-Fort Lauderdale-Pompano Beach, FL
Atlanta-Sandy Springs-Marietta, GA
Table 2. The Selected MSAs
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Population
5,867,489
5,547,051
5,475,213

3.4 The Dependent Variable
Among the three MSA regions, Houston has clearly attained the greatest level of
regional economic development cooperation. Atlanta has regional entities and resources
that show evidence of regional economic development cooperation. In Miami, regional
economic development cooperation remains an elusive prospect. In the Miami MSA there
are some instances of regional economic development cooperation that occurred several
years ago, and there is occasionally an industry specific pronouncement, but there is no
sustained effort to note.
The ranking the degree of regional cooperation for economic development
purposes within the three MSAs is based upon the observations noted during site visits to
each of the jurisdictions, published materials from each jurisdiction, and historical data
from the three areas. The nature of cooperation among officials from counties and their
respective economic development organizations (EDOs) in each MSA could take many
forms. Multiple counties within an MSA often engage in collective action to satisfy
federal eligibility requirements for economic development grants. In certain instances,
two or more counties establish an organizational entity to coordinate economic
development activities. In some instances, the entire MSA could be served by public,
private, or hybrid partnerships engaged in economic development planning and
coordination. An inventory of the EDOs in each MSA was developed and categorically
defined.
To establish the inventory, I conducted county-by-county searches for countyaffiliated EDOs. I did searches through internet search engines, which were then
supplemented with phone calls to county offices asking for referrals to EDOs serving
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their area. Once the EDOs were identified, I determined their official affiliation with the
county for regional cooperation purposes through telephone inquiries or a search of
public records. If the EDO for the county participated in regional efforts, I noted the
associated multi-county organization. I spoke with representatives of the regional EDOs
within each MSA to determine the source of support for the organizations (e.g. public,
private, or both resources). For each MSA, I noted the top five industrial employers with
the highest location quotients. I used this information to examine the private industries’
influence on regional economic development planning and policies.
I did not simply rank the three regions based on the existence of a regional
organizational structure for cooperation. A regional entity might exist for the sole
purpose of complying with federal or state grant eligibility requirements. Site visits and
interviews provided the necessary insight to assess the nature of engagement in regional
cooperation by these entities. I arrived at the ranking of the degree of regional economic
development cooperation for each MSA based on the cataloging of the full range of
efforts of regional cooperation by all the stakeholder organizations in the MSAs.

3.5 Demographic Context
It is important to take into account the demographic context of the regions to
examine the emergence of regional cooperation in economic development. As already
mentioned, the overall population sizes of the three selected regions are comparable.
However, the population distribution among the county jurisdictions could differ,
affecting the dynamics of how the jurisdictions position themselves for cooperating with
others. Hence, I took into account the jurisdictions within each MSA that had larger
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population concentrations than other jurisdictions. Similarly, I took into account the
disparities in median household income among the jurisdictions, since this could affect
the power dynamics between them for cooperation purposes.
I paid special attention to ethnic diversity within each region, since this is likely to
influence the regional cooperation efforts. Feiock, Steinacker, and Park (2009) did not
take into account the significance of ethnic diversity in their study of regional
cooperation. However, diversity cannot be downplayed for establishing social networks
and relationships. I used the Herfindahl Index to measure racial and ethnic diversity
(Rhoades, 1993). The Herfindahl Index (HI) is given by the sum of the squares of the
racial/ ethnic percentages (EP) in the region:
n

HI =  ( EPi )

2

i=1

Low HI values (below 0.50) indicate diverse population and high HI values (0.50 or
above) indicate homogenous communities. There are four primary categories of ethnicity
reported in the census: White (Non-Hispanic), Black (Non-Hispanic), Asian and
Hispanic.

3.6 Political and Legal Contexts
The political and legal contexts of the MSAs are important considerations for
attaining regional cooperation. With respect to the political contexts, the number of
municipalities within each county of a MSA is important for regional cooperation since
the tangible or intangible costs of such cooperation could rise with larger number of
jurisdictions. Olberding (2002 a) noted that the political fragmentation because of a larger
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number of municipalities is a counter-productive factor in attaining regional cooperation.
To arrive at the measure of political fragmentation, I used a two-tiered approach. The first
tier comprised of calculating the per capita political fragmentation, determined by
dividing the MSA population by the number of counties. The second tier of per capita
fragmentation is comprised of the tier 1 result divided by the total number of
municipalities incorporated within the MSA. Though there are more complex methods of
computing political fragmentation, I selected these simple measures since they suffice the
dissertation’s purposes of measuring political fragmentation for comparative ranking
purposes (Morgan, 1999). Lower calculated values reflect greater fragmentation.

MSA( population)

#(counties)
#(cities)

Political _ Fragmentation =

With respect to the legal context, the importance of the statutory incentives and
limitations relative to regional economic development initiatives were recurring themes
during the site visits and stakeholder interviews. In order to develop legitimate
comparisons of regional cooperation in the three selected MSAs, it is imperative to
understand the statutory environment that governs economic development activity within
each MSA. State constitutional provisions and statutes not only define the parameters of
cooperation, they may also induce or inhibit regional economic development cooperation.
I documented the state tax incentives and economic inducements, if they were different
from the federal ones. I paid attention to state mandates pertaining to the authority of
local governments or EDOs to engage cooperatively, or any incentives to encourage
cooperation between municipalities.

45

At the federal government level, the Economic Development Administration
(EDA), an agency under the Department of Commerce, has repeatedly emphasized the
importance of regional councils established by states for the purposes of planning and
coordination. The EDA has subsequently designated economic development districts,
through which federal funds are allocated. The composition and physical alignment of
these federally recognized economic development districts are important since they also
encourage regional thinking. Hence, I took into account any overlaps of geographic
boundaries between the multi-county economic development organizations and the
federal economic development districts in influencing regional cooperation for economic
development.

3.7 The Survey Instrument
I designed a survey instrument to compare the level of social capital among the
regional stakeholders in the three MSAs. The survey was administered online using
Survey Monkey. The survey was short, consisting of nine questions, which could have
been completed in approximately three minutes. The survey instrument was short in
recognition of the time constraints of the officials and civic leaders who were to take the
survey.
The survey was designed to measure social capital variables at each of the
different stages of transaction model presented by Coase (1988). The survey questions
were based on the 3 x 3 matrix, reflecting the three phases of a transaction and three
elements of social capital. Responses for each question were thus tabulated for the three
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social capital elements (reciprocity, trust, and reputation) at each stage of a collective
action transaction (discovery, negotiation and conclusion) (Table 3).
The Social Capital Transaction Matrix

Discovery

Negotiation

Conclusion

Reciprocity
The expectations
associated with the
exchange of
information
The expectation that
the terms of an
agreement will be
reasonable and fair
The expectation that
all parties will ratify
an agreement

Reputation
The perceptions of
the process involved
in the exchange of
information
The perceptions of
the negotiating
process and
procedures
The perceptions of
the process for
approving
cooperative
agreements

Trust
The validity of the
information
exchanged
The integrity of the
negotiators
The confidence that
all parties will
adhere to the terms
of an agreement

Table 3. Social Capital Matrix

The survey questions were on a five-point Likert scale, where stakeholders were
asked to indicate whether they strongly disagree, disagree, have no opinion, agree, or
strongly agree with a series of statements. The statements were specifically designed to
gauge the levels of reciprocity, the strength of reputation, and the degree of trust
associated at each stage of a cooperative transaction. My research design allowed for the
collection of metrics for the three components of social capital as they are manifested at
the discovery, negotiation and conclusion stages of cooperative transaction.
The survey questions were designed such that the responses would provide
valuable insights into testing the research hypotheses that social capital is indeed the key
ingredient that makes possible regional economic development cooperation. The nine
statements for the five-point Likert scale responses correlate to the intersecting boxes
found in Table 3 above. Questions 1-3 relate to the Discovery stage; questions 4-6 relate

47

to the Negotiation stage; and questions 7-9 relate to the Conclusions stage. The questions
are presented below:
1. I have regular communications with my colleagues from other jurisdictions in
the region (Discovery, Reciprocity)
2. When it comes to sharing information, my colleagues in the region have been
very cooperative to (Discovery, Reputation)
3. Information I receive from my colleagues in the region is reliable and
dependable (Discovery, Trust)
4. Working across jurisdictional boundaries, regional problems get resolved in a
fair and reasonable way (Negotiation, Reciprocity)
5. I am confident in the way our local jurisdictions come together to handle
regional issues (Negotiation, Reputation)
6. In discussions about regional issues, my colleagues from other jurisdictions do
their best to truly represent the views of their communities (Negotiation,
Trust)
7. If a regional approach is necessary to address a particular situation, our local
jurisdictions will participate (Conclusion, Reciprocity)
8. Once a regional plan of action is negotiated, getting the local jurisdictions to
ratify a plan is relatively easy (Conclusion, Reputation)
9. The local jurisdictions of our region can be trusted to honor any commitments
they make (Conclusion, Trust)
I distributed the surveys to stakeholders in each MSA region. I sent the survey
directly to the elected officials through their offices of published email accounts, and to
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the professionals and board members of the EDOs of each county, either directly or
through the primary contacts of each organization. The response levels varied among the
three regions. Although the differences in response levels limited the use of the data, it
was still useful in giving comparative data and in providing a focus for subsequent
stakeholder interviews.

3.8 Site Visits, Interviews and Personal Conversations
The other components of this research project involved site visits, interviews and
personal conversations with the executives, elected leaders, and professional staff directly
engaged in the economic development activity of each region. Site visits involved several
days of interviews, meetings, and related events in each of the MSAs. The direct contact
with influential leaders within each MSA afforded a depth of understanding of the
regional aspirations and challenges of the region.
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CHAPTER 4.
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION IN THE ATLANTA REGION
4.1 Overview of the Atlanta MSA
The Atlanta MSA has achieved moderate success in regional economic
development cooperation, despite being a complex mosaic of regional, county and
municipal jurisdictions served by numerous municipal, county and multi-county
economic development organizations. Regional cooperation is not an aspirational goal in
the Atlanta MSA. There is substantial evidence of collaborative, organized efforts to
advance and coordinate economic development initiatives throughout the region.
There are 28 counties that comprise the Atlanta MSA, covering an area of 8,393.7
square miles (American fact finder, 2010). The Atlanta MSA is the ninth largest
population center in the nation with an estimated annual Gross Domestic Product of $270
billion (Metro Atlanta chamber of commerce, 2012). The Atlanta MSA is a major
logistics hub served by three interstate highways, the primary rail hub of the American
South, the world’s busiest passenger airport, and is only 250 miles away from a critical
eastern seaboard, the Port of Savannah. The Atlanta region is also a preferred location for
corporate headquarters, ranking third in the nation for hosting Fortune 500 and Global
500 companies, including Coca-Cola, Delta Airlines, Home Depot and UPS (Metro
Atlanta chamber of commerce, 2012).
Industry clusters for the Atlanta MSA showing positive location quotient
indicators for the number of establishments, employment opportunity and wages span a
variety of sectors. Based on the relative economic performance of these sectors, as
depicted in the Table 4, the Metro Atlanta Chamber of Commerce (MACOC) chose to
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concentrate its targeted efforts on developing the following sectors: Supply Chain &
Advanced Manufacturing (transportation & logistics); Technology (information
technology); Bioscience & Health IT (biomedical / biotechnical); and Corporate
Operations and Business Services (business services) (Metro Atlanta chamber of
commerce.2012).
Description

Employment LQ

Information Technology & Telecommunications

1.27

Business & Financial Services

1.23

Transportation & Logistics

1.22

Biomedical/Biotechnical (Life Sciences)

1.17

Chemicals & Chemical Based Products
Table 4. The Industry Clusters of the Atlanta MSA
Source: StatsAmerica, 2012

0.89

A number of organizations facilitate economic development cooperation in the
Atlanta MSA. There are five Regional Commissions and fourteen Joint Development
Authorities that strive to coordinate community and economic development programming
within the Atlanta MSA (Georgia department of community affairs, 2012a). The Georgia
Resource Center, a collaboration of utilities and the Georgia Department of Economic
Development, coordinates economic development site selection services throughout the
MSA and the State of Georgia (Staples, 2012). The economic development professionals
of the region collaborate through their participation in the Georgia Economic
Development Association. There is even one entity that expressly defines its coverage
area for economic development initiatives as the 28-county Atlanta MSA: the Metro
Atlanta Chamber of Commerce (Metro Atlanta chamber of commerce.2012; Sydney,
2012).
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Though the parameters of this research initially excluded chambers of commerce
as subject entities in the investigation of regional economic development cooperation, an
exception has been made for the MACOC. More than one official acknowledged the role
of the MACOC as a major contributor to regional economic development initiatives
(Kendrick, 2012; Martin, 2012; Staples, 2012). A subsequent interview with one of the
principles of the MACOC confirmed a robust regional engagement in economic
development activity in the Atlanta MSA (Sydney, 2012).
The U.S. Census Bureau includes 28 Georgia counties within the Atlanta region,
pursuant to MSA criteria developed by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB).
The OMB defines an MSA as an area that contains an urban core of 50,000 or more
population, plus “any adjacent counties that have a high degree of social and economic
integration with the central county or counties as measured through commuting” (United
States Census Bureau, 2012). Even though an MSA designation delineates a region with
a high degree of economic integration, it does not necessarily translate into collaborative
economic development programming for the public officials and EDO leaders of the
counties within the region.
In fact, the OMB cautions that MSAs “are not designed to serve as a generalpurpose geographic framework applicable for non-statistical activities or for use in
program funding formulas.” The purpose for the MSA designation is “to provide
nationally consistent delineations for collecting, tabulating and publishing Federal
statistics for a set of geographic areas” (Federal register, vol. 752010).
Though the MSA designation is not derived from operational collaboration among
the subject counties, there are organizations that define their operational jurisdiction
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according to the MSA boundaries. As noted earlier, in the Atlanta MSA, the MACOC
defines its jurisdiction according to the MSA designation. In order to facilitate the
research and programmatic mission of the MACOC, the boundaries are adjusted
decennially according to the census MSA designation (Sydney, 2012).

4.2 Demographics of the Atlanta MSA
The Atlanta MSA includes 28 counties with a combined population of 5,238,964
residents covering an area of 8,394 square miles resulting in a regional density of 624
residents per square mile. The City of Atlanta, the State Capitol of Georgia, lies mostly in
Fulton County, with a portion of the Atlanta municipal boundaries extending into DeKalb
County. Fulton County is the most heavily populated county in the MSA with a
population of 987,148 (American fact finder.2010).
In the Atlanta MSA, four (4) counties have populations greater than 500,000
(Cobb, DeKalb, Fulton and Gwinnett). At the other extreme, there are seven counties
with less than 25,000 residents (Butts, Dawson, Heard, Jasper, Lamar, Meriwether, and
Pike). The population densities across the MSA range from only 37 residents per square
mile in Jasper County to a density of 2733 residents per square mile in DeKalb County.
Though this mix of sparsely and densely populated counties may seem incongruous with
the metropolitan designation, the OMB makes no distinction between urban and rural
counties when delineating the boundaries for an MSA (American fact finder.2010) .
The Atlanta MSA, though comparable in population to the Houston MSA and
Miami MSA, has the greatest number of member counties. The table below provides an
overview of the counties within the Atlanta MSA, in rank order by population (American

53

fact finder.2010). Though there are many counties in this MSA, it is clear that there is a
population concentration within the core urban counties of the MSA. The table also
provides the square-mile coverage area and population densities; a sense of the political
fragmentation within the MSA relative to municipal incorporations; a diversity index to
depict ethnic concentrations in each county; and the different forms of government:
Council-Manager [CM]; County Executive [CE]; or Commission [C].
Recall that Feiock (2009) found that the likelihood of cooperation is enhanced
when the government structure among the jurisdictions takes the Council-Manager form.
In the Atlanta MSA, only 16 of the 28 counties (57%) are structured as Council-Manager
governments, with the remaining 12 counties evenly split as either County Executive or
Commission forms of government (Georgia department of community affairs.2012a).
The political fragmentation of the Atlanta MSA presents another serious
challenge to the likelihood of regional cooperation. The most obvious distinction of the
Atlanta MSA relative to the MSAs of Houston and Miami is the higher number of county
governments. The relative compactness of the Georgia counties, compared to the physical
dimensions of the typical counties in Texas and Florida, is the attribute that explains the
high number of counties in the Atlanta MSA. “According to anecdotal history, Georgia
established enough counties so that a farmer traveling by mule-drawn buggy could go to
the county seat, take care of business, and return to his farm in the same day” (Georgia
Humanities Council, 2012) . Extending this same logic forward to the modern day, the
Census Bureau has utilized daily commuting patterns in the metropolitan Atlanta region
to designate the Metropolitan Statistical Area.
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Atlanta MSA Summary Table
County

Pop.

Sq. Miles

Density

Cities

Diversity

Gov.

Fulton

987,148

528.7

1867

14

0.38

CM

Gwinnett

766,912

437.0

1755

15

0.35

CM

DeKalb

733,060

268.2

2733

8

0.39

CE

Cobb

690,430

340.2

2029

6

0.42

CM

Clayton

271,652

142.6

1905

6

0.42

CE

Cherokee

201,233

423.7

475

7

0.69

CM

Henry

182,952

322.7

567

4

0.49

CM

Forsyth

157,514

225.8

698

1

0.70

CE

Paulding

125,780

313.6

401

3

0.69

CE

Douglas

122,657

199.3

615

1

0.44

CM

Coweta

118,531

443.1

268

7

0.59

CM

Carroll

110,641

498.93

222

7

0.61

CE

Fayette

105,303

197.4

533

5

0.55

CM

Newton

94,076

276.4

340

5

0.49

CM

Bartow

92,490

470.1

197

8

0.69

C

Walton

82,243

329.3

250

7

0.68

C

Rockdale

81,444

130.7

623

1

0.44

CE

Barrow

66,458

162.8

408

6

0.62

CM

Spalding

63,073

198.0

318

3

0.52

CM

Pickens

30,021

232.1

129

3

0.90

C

Haralson

28,559

282.2

101

4

0.83

C

Butts

23,596

186.6

126

3

0.56

CM

Meriwether

22,858

503.4

45

7

0.50

CM

Dawson

21,300

211.0

101

1

0.88

CM

Pike

17,012

218.4

78

5

0.73

CM

Lamar

17,010

184.8

92

3

0.56

CM

Jasper

13,588

370.5

37

2

0.61

C

Heard

11,423

296.1

39

3

0.76

C

TOTAL
5,238,964
8393.7
Table 5. Atlanta MSA Profile Summary

624

145

0.40

Further devolving the political unity of the MSA, there are 145 incorporated
municipalities within the 28-county MSA. The trend to create additional, smaller
governments has not subsided. In the northern reaches of Fulton County, there has been a
burst of incorporation activity in recent years. “Balkanization” is the descriptive term
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used by an Emory University law professor in reference to the creation of the new cities
of Sandy Springs, Johns Creek, Milton, Dunwoody, Brook Haven, and Chattahoochee
Hills (Ross, 2012).
According to Ross (2012), politics, race and issues of local control have
motivated the current incorporation movement in northern Fulton County. Ross also
expects the new city leaders from this area, predominantly white and Republican, will be
successful in lobbying the Georgia Legislature for authorization to separate from Fulton
County and become their own county. By all measures, it would appear that political
fragmentation is a growing challenge in the Atlanta MSA that dims the prospects for
achieving regional economic development cooperation. For MSA comparisons in this
case study, the fragmentation value for the MSA is derived by dividing the population by
the number of counties and the number of cities. The resulting ratio of residents / local
government entities for the Atlanta MSA is:

5, 238, 964( population)
145(cities)

28(counties)
= 1,290

Though Feiock (2009) did not find ethnic heterogeneity to be a factor influencing
the likelihood of regional cooperation in the large-N study he conducted, the racial and
ethnic composition of the 28 counties of Atlanta certainly must be noted. The “marketshare” dominance by a particular ethnic group in all but three (3) counties exceeds,
greatly in some cases, the Herfindahl Index (HI) findings of .40 for the aggregate MSA.
As race is noted to be a factor that energizes the civic pursuit of creating new cities
(Ross, 2012) , in the course of my research the topic was not avoided.
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The state of race relations in the Atlanta MSA has always been a factor
influencing economic development. Race relations energize a social current that can
influence regional economic development initiatives both positively and negatively.
According to one prominent local legal scholar (Ross, 2012), the relative tranquility of
Atlanta during the Civil Rights Movement of the 1950s and 1960s may have contributed
to the rise of Metro Atlanta as the business capital of the South. Ross further noted that
the lack of sensational civil rights confrontations in Atlanta might have been by design of
the movement leaders, who were concerned for the safety and welfare of their families.
As evidence of the positive impact of the relatively peaceful race relations in
Atlanta during the Civil Rights Movement, Ross compares the growth and development
of Birmingham, Alabama. He contends that the two cities emerged from this period on
different economic trajectories because Atlanta was largely spared the racial strife and
conflict that became synonymous with places like Birmingham (Ross, 2012).
Ross points out that Birmingham, AL and Atlanta, GA were cities of nearly equal
population before the Civil Rights Movement. Indeed, the U.S. Census data for 1950
indicates Atlanta had a population of 331,314 and Birmingham had a population of
326,057 (1960 census.1960). At the time, the two cities were ranked 33rd and 34th in the
nation, respectively. Today, Birmingham has only 211,458 residents and the City of
Atlanta has 432,425 residents (American community survey 2009.).
The counterfactual of this theory cannot be known, but the stories of the freedom
riders being severely beaten at the bus station in Birmingham are ingrained in the
American psyche (J. O. Horton & Horton, 2001). It is entirely plausible that those
incidents in Birmingham chilled the interests of site selection consultants during the
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ensuing decades of smokestack chasing, when so many northern firms moved south. In a
similar vein, it is reasonable to speculate that had the freedom riders been severely beaten
in Atlanta, the street address and zip code for a host of Fortune 500 company
headquarters might be different today.
In deference to the complexity, subtleness and persistence of the issue of race
relations, this case study explores the diversity scores of the subject jurisdictions and
searches for patterns of cooperation. To illustrate the diversity, and lack of diversity, for
the member counties of the Atlanta MSA, the counties are grouped by increments of 10point ranges in the reported HI scores.
As the series of tables below depict, the HI diversity score groupings for the
member counties illustrate, in some cases, nearly monolithic, homogenous White
counties within the Atlanta MSA. Haralson, Dawson and Pickens Counties are at the
outer edges of the MSA and have populations that are over 90% White. At the other end
of the spectrum, Gwinnett, Fulton and DeKalb Counties, the core urban counties of the
MSA, report the lowest HI scores and reflect the greatest diversity. Reference to these
diversity groupings will facilitate the discussion about the composition of the Regional
Commissions established by the State of Georgia Department of Community Affairs and
the composition of the Joint Development Authorities that are voluntarily established by
county EDOs.

County

HI
Score

Diverse Communities
%
%
Black
Population White

Gwinnett

0.35

766,912

51.9

19.8

Fulton

0.38

987,148

43.7

DeKalb
0.39
733,060
30.7
Table 6. Atlanta MSA Diverse Communities
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%
Hispanic

%
Asian

16.8

9.4

42.5

8.1

4.1

53.6

10.1

4.1

County

HI
Score

Somewhat Diverse Communities
%
%
%
Population White
Black
Hispanic

%
Asian

Clayton

0.42

271,652

21.6

59.8

11.4

5.1

Cobb

0.42

690,430

60.0

22.3

11.3

4.1

Douglas

0.44

122,657

57.6

33.1

5.8

1.6

Rockdale

0.44

81,444

54.6

37.0

9.4

2.8

Henry

0.49

182,952

62.7

30.5

4.7

2.7

33.9

3.6

1.1

Newton
0.49
94,076
61.5
Table 7. Atlanta MSA Somewhat Diverse Counties

County

HI
Score

Somewhat Homogenous Communities
%
%
%
Population White
Black
Hispanic

%
Asian

Meriwether

0.50

22,858

58.3

40.5

1.3

0.0

Spalding

0.52

63,073

64.3

32.0

2.6

0.8

Fayette

0.55

105,303

71.9

18.3

4.2

3.8

Butts

0.56

23,596

69.7

27.1

2.2

0.4

Lamar

0.56

17,010

69.0

29.4

1.6

0.0

Coweta
0.59
118,531
74.7
17.2
Table 8. Atlanta MSA Somewhat Homogenous Counties

5.6

1.0

County

HI
Score

Homogenous Communities
%
%
Population White
Black

%
Hispanic

%
Asian

Carroll

0.61

110,641

75.8

17.1

4.8

0.8

Jasper

0.61

13,588

74.6

22.6

3.4

0.0

Barrow

0.62

66,458

77.3

11.2

7.2

3.1

Walton

0.68

82,243

81.0

15.5

3.0

0.1

Bartow

0.69

92,490

82.1

9.6

5.9

0.8

Cherokee

0.69

201,233

82.3

5.4

8.8

1.7

Paulding
0.69
125,780
81.5
Table 9. Atlanta MSA Homogenous Counties

14.4

4.3

1.0
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Very Homogenous Communities
%
%
%
Population White
Black
Hispanic

County

HI
Score

Forsyth

0.70

157,514

83.3

2.9

8.2

4.1

Pike

0.73

17,012

84.8

12.5

1.6

0.2

Heard
0.76
11,423
86.6
10.1
Table 10. Atlanta MSA Very Homogenous Counties

1.0

0.8

County

HI
Score

Extremely Homogenous Communities
%
%
%
Population White
Black
Hispanic
1.2

%
Asian

%
Asian

Haralson

0.83

28,559

90.9

5.2

0.2

Dawson

0.88

21,300

93.6

0.5

2.9

0.4

Pickens
0.90
30,021
94.8
2.3
Table 11. Atlanta MSA Extremely Homogenous Counties

2.5

0.3

Another demographic factor that Feiock (2009) found to be detrimental to
collective action agreements across jurisdictions is the issue of economic heterogeneity.
A broad disparity of median household incomes among the counties of the MSA might
suggest a greater degree of difficulty in achieving a cooperative agreement for the
purposes of economic development. In the Atlanta MSA, the average median household
income is $53,997 (American community survey 2009.2009) . The lack of homogeneity
in median household incomes is reflected in the findings for Forsyth County ($88,040)
and Lamar County ($35,835). This is a percentage differential of 153% in median
household incomes among the jurisdictions.

4.3 Economic Development Authorities
Every county in the Atlanta MSA has an Economic Development Organization
(EDO) established to facilitate growth within their jurisdiction. The EDO is known
invariably as the (Name of County) Development Authority, the (Name of County)
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Industrial Development Authority, or the Development Authority of (Name of County). As
a general rule, if the name of the county appears first, the authority is derived directly
from the Georgia Constitution as a local constitutional amendment; if the name of the
county appears in a following clause, the authority is derived from a General Statute.
Ten (10) of the counties in the Atlanta MSA have Development Authorities
established through the local Constitutional Amendment process: Barrow, Butts,
Cherokee, Coweta, Heard, Henry, Meriwether, Newton, Paulding, and Spalding Counties
(Georgia department of community affairs.2012b). Of these ten (10) counties, five (5)
also have Development Authorities that derive their authority from the General Statutes
of the Georgia Code. All of the remaining 18 counties have a statutorily authorized
Development Authority (Georgia department of community affairs.2012b).
The operational distinction between a Constitutional and Statutory Development
Authority is limited in most instances. Both forms of Development Authority have the
ability to exercise broad corporate powers to accomplish the economic development
purposes of a development authority (Official code of georgia.2012). The significant
difference between the two types of entities lies in the ability to update, revise and amend
the board composition and purpose. The provisional language of a local Constitutional
Development Authority is fixed, and not subject to any future referendum amendments short of full repeal. A Statutory Development Authority may amend its board
composition or reconstitute itself with relative ease, without any need of a referendum
(Official code of georgia.2012). This greater flexibility for the Statutory Development
Authority allows for adaptation when new municipal corporations or chambers of
commerce are formed.
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The justification for retaining a local Constitutional Development Authority lies
in special provisions adopted at the time of inception. Some Constitutional Development
Authorities include language authorizing the levy of additional property taxes. For
development authorities created pursuant to the Georgia Code, there is no such express
provision for levying additional millage (Official code of georgia.2012) .
A quick look at the governing language for the Heard County Development
Authority confirms one such exceptional taxing power: “Heard County is authorized to
levy an annual tax as may be determined by the governing authority, but not to exceed
two mills, on all taxable property within the County for the support of the Authority and
for its use and purposes… ” (Municode, 2012) . This taxing power is vested in Heard
County, whether it chooses to exercise it or not. In fact, the most recent audit of the
finances for Heard County reveals there is no special millage levied for the Heard County
Development Authority (Kimmel, 2012). But the possibility of imposing the tax remains.
Without exception, every county in the Atlanta MSA has formed a development
authority that is organized according to the Georgia Code or the Constitution of the State
of Georgia. Many counties have established both forms of development authority. The
county governments are directly involved in the formation, operation and support of these
entities. The development authorities act on behalf of the county governing bodies they
represent. For the purpose of attracting, recruiting and retaining employers, every county
of the Atlanta MSA has organized a development authority to solidly engage in economic
development competition. As the next section illustrates, the development authorities also
serve as building blocks for regional economic development cooperation.
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4.4 Joint Development Authorities
The Georgia Business Expansion and Support Act grants county officials the
authority to offer job tax credits to enterprises creating new jobs. Each jurisdiction is
designated as a Tier 1, 2, 3, or 4 county based upon a formula of equally weighted
factors: “(A) highest unemployment rate for the most recent 36 month period; (B) lowest
per capita income for the most recent 36 moth period; and (C) highest percentage of
residents whose incomes are below the poverty level according to the most recent data
available” (Revenue and Taxation, 2012).
Tier 1 counties are authorized to grant job tax credits “equal to $3,500.00
annually per eligible new full-time employee job for five years beginning with the first
taxable year in which the new full-time employee job is created and for the four
immediately succeeding taxable years” (Revenue and Taxation, 2012). In descending
order, the Georgia Code grants Tier 2 counties a $2,500.00 job tax credit; Tier 3 counties
a $1,250.00 job tax credit; and the Tier 4 counties a $750.00 job tax credit. For every
county, regardless of the particular job tax credit tier assigned, the Georgia Legislature
allows another mechanism to increase the job tax credit amount offered by an additional
$500.
The Georgia Code provides that an enterprise “located within the jurisdiction of a
joint authority established by two or more contiguous counties shall qualify for an
additional $500.00 tax credit for each new full-time employee position created” (Joint
Development Authorities, 2012). For those counties that wish to offer this additional job
tax credit, they must enter into a Joint Development Agreement with contiguous counties.
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There are specific provisions that must be met in order to become a Joint
Development Authority: “A joint authority created by two or more contiguous counties
pursuant to this Code section must be an active, bona fide joint authority; must have a
board of directors; must meet at least quarterly; and must develop an operational business
plan. A county may belong to more than one such joint authority” (Joint Development
Authorities, 2012).
The requirements that the authority must have an operational business plan, and
the board must meet at least quarterly, are conditions that must be met in order to qualify
for the additional $500.00 job tax credit. As the list below reveals, every county within
the Atlanta MSA belongs to at least one joint development authority, and several belong
to more than one. There are ten (14) multi-county joint development authorities active in
the Atlanta MSA (Georgia department of community affairs.2012b) . Included in the list
are the diversity ratings for individual counties (HI Score) and the range of scores
reported across each JDA.

1. Butts (.56), Henry (.49), Lamar (.56) and Spalding County (.52) Joint
Development Authority (JDA). [.7 HI Score Range]
2. Coweta (.59), Fayette (.55), and Meriwether (.50) JDA. [.9 HI Score Range]
3. Georgia Bioscience JDA – Gwinnett (.35), Barrow (.62), Clarke (.41) and
Oconee (.74) Counties. [.39 HI Score Range]
4. JDA of Bartow County (.69) and Pickens County (.90). [.21 HI Score Range]
5. JDA of Carroll (.61), Douglas, Paulding, Haralson (.83), Polk (.56), Heard
(.76) and Troup (.36) Counties. [.47 HI Score Range]
6. JDA of Metropolitan Atlanta – Clayton (.42), DeKalb (.39), Fulton (.38),
Henry (.49) and Rockdale (.44) Counties. [.11 HI Score Range]
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7. Lanier JDA – Cherokee (.69), Forsyth (.70) and Hall (.47) Counties. [.22 HI
Score Range]
8. The JDA of Cherokee County (.69) and Cobb (.42) County. [.27 HI Score
Range]
9. West Central Georgia JDA – Lamar (.56), Pike (.73) and Upson (.54)
Counties. [.19 HI Score Range]
10. West Point Lake Development Authority–Heard (.76) and Troup (.36)
Counties [.40 HI Score Range]
11. JDA of Dawson (.88), Lumpkin and White Counties. [NA]
12. JDA of DeKalb (.39), Newton (.49) and Gwinnett (.35) Counties. [.14 HI
Score Range]
13. West Georgia JDA of Douglas (.44) and Paulding (.69) Counties. [.25 HI
Score Range]
14. JDA of Jasper (.61), Morgan, Newton (.49), and Walton (.68) Counties. [.19
HI Score Range]

Each JDA listed above is an example of a public multi-county EDO. It is
important to note that these are ‘voluntary’ associations. There is no mandate to
participate in a Joint Development Authority. There is an incentive to participate, but it is
a free association to be entered into with any contiguous county. While contiguous
counties are likely to share rural or urban characteristics, and population attributes in
some instances, the HI Scores of the JDA member counties within the Atlanta MSA
reveal a mixed composition of diversity scores.
Only six (6) of the 14 JDAs show a pattern of proximate, compact (separation <
.20) HI Scores: the JDA of Butts, Henry, Lamar and Spalding; the JDA of Coweta,
Fayette and Meriwether; the JDA of Metropolitan Atlanta; the JDA of West Central
Georgia; the JDA of DeKalb, Newton and Gwinnett; and the JDA of Jasper, Morgan,
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Newton and Walton. The majority of the JDAs are composed of counties that reflect a
wider range of HI Scores. The majority of JDAs in the Atlanta MSA do not appear to be
organized according to shared diversity values.

4.5 Job Tax Credits and the Tier Rating System
For JDA member counties, the baseline job tax credits within each county is
adjusted by $500 above the amounts set according to the Tier Rating System in Georgia.
The Tier Rating System determines the baseline amount of job tax credits a county may
offer to enterprises based upon unemployment, per capita income, and poverty rate data
in each county (Georgia department of community affairs.2012b). This baseline job tax
credit amount is then supplemented with the additional $500 if the county belongs to a
multi-county JDA. Every county in the Atlanta MSA is a member of a multi-county JDA.
The state incentive for the counties to join a JDA, the additional $500 of job tax
credit, has been a very effective tool for encouraging cooperation. In the Atlanta MSA,
100% of the counties have entered into JDA agreements. There are only three (3)
counties out of the 159 counties in the State of Georgia that have not chosen to participate
in a JDA (Georgia department of community affairs.2012b) . Table 12 below illustrates
the net effect of this JDA incentive adjustment (Georgia USA, 2012).
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Atlanta MSA
County
DeKalb

Tier
3

Tier Rating Job
Tax Credit

JDA Adjusted
Job Tax Credit

$1,250

$1,750

Cobb

4

$750

$1,250

Clayton

1

$3,500

$4,000

Fulton

3

$1,250

$1,750

Gwinnett

4

$750

$1,250

Forsyth

4

$750

$1,250

Rockdale

3

$1,250

$1,750

Douglas

3

$1,250

$1,750

Henry

3

$1,250

$1,750

Fayette

4

$750

$1,250

Cherokee

4

$750

$1,250

Barrow

3

$1,250

$1,750

Paulding

3

$1,250

$1,750

Newton

2

$2,500

$3,000

Spalding

1

$3,500

$4,000

Coweta

4

$750

$1,250

Walton

3

$1,250

$1,750

Carroll

2

$2,500

$3,000

Bartow

2

$2,500

$3,000

Pickens

3

$1,250

$1,750

Butts

2

$2,500

$3,000

Dawson

3

$1,250

$1,750

Haralson

2

$2,500

$3,000

Lamar

1

$3,500

$4,000

Pike

3

$1,250

$1,750

Meriwether

1

$3,500

$4,000

Heard

1

$3,500

$4,000

Jasper

2

$2,500

$3,000

Table 12. Tax Credit Enhancement for JDA Participation

In order to qualify for the additional Job Tax Credit, one of the state requirements
is that the JDA must adopt a business plan for the organization. The additional
requirement of a business plan ensures that the principles are not simply forming the
organization to qualify for the additional economic incentives, but are thoughtfully
engaged in a collaborative effort to engage in economic development cooperation. In a
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similar vein, the federal government requires the Regional Commissions, the state
jurisdictions that are recognized by the federal government as Economic Development
District, to formulate a Comprehensive Economic Development Strategy (CEDS).

4.6 Comprehensive Economic Development Strategies (CEDS)
The number one priority of the EDA is Collaborative Regional Innovation
(Economic development administration.2012) . In the process of awarding grants, the
EDA first evaluates whether a grant proposal supports “the development and growth of
innovation clusters based on existing regional competitive strengths.” It is further
clarified that “initiatives must engage stakeholders; facilitate collaboration among urban,
suburban, and rural (including tribal) areas; provide stability for economic development
through long-term intergovernmental and public/private collaboration; and support he
growth of existing and emerging industries” (Economic development
administration.2012).
In order for the political subdivisions of a state government to qualify for federal
grants administered by the EDA, multiple jurisdictions must collaborate to produce a
report outlining the regional Comprehensive Economic Development Strategy (CEDS).
The federal code is very specific that any “Planning Investments” administered by the
EDA may only be offered to a State or its political subdivisions if a CEDS has been
prepared for the Economic Development District (Planning Investments and CEDS,
2012) .
In the most recent announcement of available planning grants, applicants were
clearly advised that the EDA provides grants “to the designated Economic Development
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Districts throughout the Nation.” Further, it is explained that these “planning
organizations are typically recognized by the State in which they reside as multijurisdictional councils of governments, regional commissions, or planning and
development centers.” In the State of Georgia, the regional commissions carry out this
responsibility.

4.7 Regional Commissions
The State of Georgia has been subdivided into twelve (12) distinct regions; each
numerically designated and nominally identified (Georgia association of regional
commissions.2012) . The 28 counties of the Atlanta MSA have been sorted and assigned
to five (5) different Regional Commissions: the Atlanta Regional Commission; the Three
Rivers Regional Commission; the Northwest Georgia Regional Commission; the Georgia
Mountains Regional Commission; and the Northeast Georgia Regional Commission.
Pursuant to Georgia law, the definition of a region “means the territorial area
within the boundaries of operation for any regional development center, as such
boundaries shall be established from time to time by the board of the department” of
community affairs (Georgia Planning Act, 1981). The law grants broad discretion to the
department to set the boundaries of a region, ostensibly to ensure the efficient
administration of programs through its offices. “The number of regional development
centers and the region within which each regional development center shall operate and
shall be established from time to time by the board of community affairs” (Georgia
Planning Act, 1981). The current maps for the regional commissions reflect changes that
were put into effect on July 1, 2009 (Georgia Department of Community Affairs, 2010).
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While the Atlanta Regional Commission appears to have counties with positive diversity
scores, the other regions do not fare as well in terms of diversity.
The Regional Commissions of Georgia are each managed by an appointed board
of directors. “Amended by HB 1216, each Council is now comprised of the chairman of
each county commission (or his/her designee), a municipal representative from each
county, three appointees named by the governor, and one each by the lt. governor and
speaker of the House of Representatives” (Willis, 2009). As Willis points out, the
membership may be expanded if necessary to comply with the specific regional
membership requirements of the U.S. Economic Development Administration (EDA), the
federal agency that provides grant funding for local government public works projects
and economic development planning. The Regional Commissions conduct a broad scope
of duties to facilitate effective and efficient local government services. According to
Section 50-8-30 of the Official Code of Georgia:
The purpose of this article is to provide for regional commissions to develop,
promote, and assist in establishing coordinated and comprehensive land use,
environmental, transportation, and historic preservation planning in the state, to assist
local governments to participate in an orderly process for coordinated and
comprehensive planning, to assist local governments to prepare and implement
comprehensive plans which will develop and promote the essential public interests of the
state and its citizens and advance positive governmental relations among the state,
regional, and local levels, and to prepare and implement comprehensive regional plans
which will develop and promote the essential public interests of the state and its citizens.
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This article shall be construed liberally to achieve its purpose (Regional Commissions,
2011).
As noted above, one of the duties is to prepare and implement comprehensive
regional plans. To assist local governments, and to qualify the member jurisdictions for
federal grant opportunities, each Regional Commission accepts the responsibility to
produce a Comprehensive Economic Development Strategy (CEDS). The economic
development activities and the status of the CEDS process for each of the five (5)
regional commissions operational within the Atlanta MSA are presented in the following
sections.

4.7.1 The Atlanta Regional Commission
The Atlanta Regional Commission (ARC) is also known as Region 3. The ARC
includes ten (10) of the 28 counties that constitute the Atlanta MSA. The board of the
ARC has a total of 41 members: 23 of the members are elected officials from the counties
and cities of the region, 17 are appointed citizens, and there is one (1) representative from
the Georgia Department of Community Affairs. An appointed citizen currently chairs the
ARC (Atlanta regional commission.2012).
Table 14 below illustrates the HI scores, population and ethnic characteristics for
the ARC member counties. The diversity score range for the regional commission is
relatively compact with a differential of only 20%. As will be noted later, this relatively
compact range in the diversity score for the regional commission does not reflect any bias
on the part of the member counties. The grouping of counties within regional
commissions is a matter determined by the Georgia Department of Community Affairs.
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County

HI
Score

Atlanta Regional Commission
%
%
%
Population White
Black
Hispanic

%
Asian

Gwinnett

0.35

766,912

51.9

19.8

16.8

9.4

Fulton

0.38

987,148

43.7

42.5

8.1

4.1

DeKalb

0.39

733,060

30.7

53.6

10.1

4.1

Clayton

0.42

271,652

21.6

59.8

11.4

5.1

Cobb

0.42

690,430

60.0

22.3

11.3

4.1

Douglas

0.44

122,657

57.6

33.1

5.8

1.6

Rockdale

0.44

81,444

54.6

37.0

9.4

2.8

Henry

0.49

182,952

62.7

30.5

4.7

2.7

4.2

3.8

Fayette
0.55
105,303
71.9
18.3
Table 13. County Profiles in the Atlanta Regional Commission

The National Association of Regional Councils has recognized the leadership of
the ARC for its efforts to encourage regional cooperation. Its past chairman,
Commissioner Sam Olens, received a 2008 national leadership award for being a
consensus builder in metro Atlanta, working for the adoption of a $51 billion
transportation plan and creating a Transit Planning Board (Miles, 2009) .
The ARC is the core of the Atlanta MSA, consisting entirely of counties from
within the MSA. As already mentioned, the counties of the ARC are the most highly
populated and diverse counties of the MSA. More than one thousand business and
community leaders attended the “2012 State of the Region” breakfast, held at the Georgia
World Congress Center.
Tad Leithead, the Chairman of the Atlanta Regional Commission, lamented the
failure of the July, 2012 sales tax referendum for regional transportation and
infrastructure, but encouraged everyone to “disenthrall from parochial thinking”
(Leithead, 2012) . Leithead’s message was clear: “It’s mandatory that we cooperate as a
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region. We cannot address our problems or implement a vision individually as a county
or a city. We need to agree on a regional vision” (Leithead, 2012).
Letihead was referring to the failed $7.2 billion transportation plan that the voters
of Metro Atlanta rejected on July 31, 2012 (Hart, 2012) . The Special Local Option Sales
Tax, a percent sales tax to support capital infrastructure needs of the region, failed to win
approval in every regional commission of the Atlanta MSA (Hart, 2012) . Leithead, in
the State of the Region address, remained optimistic about the future of regional
cooperation, noting that 22 elected officials had unanimously concurred with a project list
for the Atlanta Regional Commission (Leithead, 2012) .
The ARC is currently engaged in a nine-month process to create the Metro
Atlanta Regional Economic Development Strategy. Expressly stated in the publication
announcing this initiative is the statement that the roadmap will “meet the Economic
Development Administration’s requirements for a Comprehensive Economic
Development Strategy (CEDS)” (Metro Atlanta chamber of commerce.2012) . To ensure
compliance with the federal requirements, a Steering Committee of leaders from the
private, public and non-profit sectors was appointed, and a working group of economic
development officials from organizations throughout the 10-county Metro Atlanta region
are participating in the process (Metro Atlanta chamber of commerce.2012) .
Though the ARC is the organizing entity responsible for the production of a
CEDS, there is no evidence that the ARC is posturing to assume a greater role as a
regional entity to coordinate economic development activity. As the ARC is currently
organized, it does not serve such a purpose. The committee structure of the ARC does not
expressly include economic development as a function of the organization. The existing

73

committees include: Executive, Aging Advisory, Aging Services, Budget Audit Review,
Communications / Public Involvement, Environment and Land Use, Transportation and
Air Quality, Transportation Coordinating, and Regional Transit Committee (Atlanta
regional commission.2012) . Though the ARC is actively working on the publication of a
CEDS, which will qualify the member counties for EDA grant funding, the ARC will
likely remain as a resource and facilitator for EDOs within the region, and will not
become an active agent for the implementation of economic development programming.

4.7.2 Three Rivers Regional Commission
The Three Rivers Regional Commission (TRRC), which is on the southern border
of the ARC. There are eight (8) Atlanta MSA counties in the Three Rivers Region, and
two (2) counties from outside the Atlanta MSA, Upton (population 27,153) and Troup
(population 67, 044) (American community survey 2009.2009) . As illustrated in the
table below, all of the counties in the Three Rivers Regional Commission have a HI
Score of .50 or greater. The diversity range score is .26, largely due to the outlier score
attributed to Heard County (.76 HI Score).

County

HI
Score

Three Rivers Regional Commission
%
%
%
Black
Hispanic
Population White

%
Asian

Meriwether

0.50

22,858

58.3

40.5

1.3

0.0

Spalding

0.52

63,073

64.3

32.0

2.6

0.8

Fayette

0.55

105,303

71.9

18.3

4.2

3.8

Butts

0.56

23,596

69.7

27.1

2.2

0.4

Lamar

0.56

17,010

69.0

29.4

1.6

0.0

Coweta

0.59

118,531

74.7

17.2

5.6

1.0

Carroll

0.61

110,641

75.8

17.1

4.8

0.8

Heard
0.76
11,423
86.6
10.1
1.0
Table 14. County Profiles of the Three Rivers Regional Commission

0.8
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When the Georgia DCA modified the regional commission boundaries in 2009,
the federally designated Economic Development Districts (EDD’s) were also impacted
(Three rivers regional economic development district annual progress report.2010) . The
McIntosh Trail Regional Development Center (MTRDC) was merged with the
Chattahoochee-Flint Regional Development Center (CFRDC) to form the TRRC. “Both
the MTRDC and CFRDC are grant recipients of 301.b Planning Investments from the
Economic Development Administration (EDA), under the U.S. Department of
Commerce” (Three rivers regional economic development district annual progress
report.2010). The significance of this statement is clarified further in the executive
summary of the 2010 annual update of the CEDS prepared by the TRRC:
“In order to be eligible for grant funding by EDA, a Comprehensive Economic
Development Strategy must be established as a regional economic tool which focuses on
job creation, economic initiatives and incentives to assist business and industry, and
workforce training and education as priorities in the region. The Comprehensive
Economic Development Strategy (CEDS) is a five-year plan, which serves as a guide for
those efforts. This plan is based upon a specific set of goals and objectives designed to
address the various economic challenges of the District. The CEDS provides a foundation
that helps create additional jobs, attract public and private investment, foster a more
stable and diversified economy and improves living conditions. Having this plan allows
for better coordination among individuals, organizations, local governments and private
industry concerned with economic development (Three rivers regional economic
development district annual progress report.2010).
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The TRRC recognizes that the importance of the CEDS is to provide a foundation
for coordination among the counties and EDOs within the region. The TRRC is
representative of the region, with 20 public officials, 10 private officials, and five at-large
officials. The TRRC does comply with the EDA and State of Georgia membership
requirements (Three rivers regional economic development district annual progress
report.2010) . However, the TRRC does not serve as an official entity with the
responsibility of implementing economic development policy.

4.7.3 Northwest Georgia Regional Commission
The Northwest Georgia Regional Commission (NWGRC) occupies the northwest
corner of the State of Georgia. A majority of the counties within the NWGRC are not
included in the Atlanta MSA. The eleven (11) non-Atlanta MSA counties within the
Northwest Georgia region are: Dade, Caloosa, Fannin, Walker, Whitfield, Murray,
Gilmer, Chattooga, Gordon, Floyd and Polk. As the table below indicates, the Atlanta
MSA counties within the NWGRC (Bartow, Haralson, Paulding and Pickens Counties)
all have White populations above 80% and very high HI Scores that indicate a lack of
diversity. The HI Score range across these Atlanta MSA counties is .21.
Northwest Georgia Regional Commission
%
%
%
Black
Hispanic
Population White

County

HI
Score

Bartow

0.69

92,490

82.1

9.6

5.9

0.8

Paulding

0.69

125,780

81.5

14.4

4.3

1.0

Haralson

0.83

28,559

90.9

5.2

1.2

0.2

Pickens
0.90
30,021
94.8
2.3
2.5
Table 15. County Profiles of the Northwest Georgia Regional Commission
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%
Asian

0.3

As designated counties within the NWGRC, the Atlanta MSA counties do stand
to benefit by being included in the federally recognized Economic Development District.
According to the NWGRC, “ The Economic Development Administration (EDA) funds
public works and planning projects for local governments to support creating and/or
retaining private sector jobs. Since 1976, EDA has invested approximately $17 million in
the Coosa Valley region” (Northwest Georgia regional commission.2012).
The NWGRC, as designated by the Georgia DCA in 2009, has been in continuous
existence as a regional cooperation entity for over 50 years. In 1960, it was known as the
Coosa Valley Planning and Development Association. What was once a local initiative
for multi-county cooperation has become the model for multi-county coordination
throughout the state.

4.7.4 Georgia Mountains Regional Commission
The Georgia Mountains Regional Commission (GMRC), which lies northeast of
the ARC, is comprised of 13 counties, but only two (2) counties are listed as part of the
Atlanta MSA, Dawson County and Forsyth County. As listed in the table below, Dawson
and Forsyth Counties have a notable lack of diversity in the composition of the
populations. The HI Score range of .18 is noted for these two (2) Atlanta MSA member
counties.

County

HI
Score

Forsyth

0.70

Georgia Mountains Regional Commission
%
%
%
Black
Hispanic
Population White
157,514

83.3

2.9

8.2

Dawson
0.88
21,300
93.6
0.5
2.9
Table 16. County Profiles of the Georgia Mountains Regional Commission

77

%
Asian
4.1
0.4

As member counties of the GMRC, Dawson County and Forsyth County stand to
benefit from the services provided by this regional organization. The GMRC is
recognized as an Economic Development District by the federal agencies, and a
Comprehensive Economic Development Strategy (CEDS) report has been properly filed
with the EDA. The GMRC economic development department “assists local governments
and development authorities in pursuing sound economic development through a variety
of technical assistance, including: preparation of federal and state grant and loan
applications, preparation of redevelopment plans, and grant administration” (Georgia
mountains regional commission.2012).
The GMRC has clarified its role is to assist the EDOs of the region, and is not an
entity responsible for implementing economic development policy. “The Department
meets with the 13-county Economic Development Directors as needed to discuss
economic development issues, project sharing, and best management practices” (Georgia
mountains regional commission.2012). Again, this distinction regarding the role of the
GMRC is important for the purpose of assessing economic development cooperation
within the Atlanta MSA.

4.7.5 Northeast Georgia Regional Commission
Northeast Georgia Regional Commission
%
%
%
Black
Hispanic
Population White

County

HI
Score

Newton

0.49

94,076

61.5

33.9

3.6

1.1

Jasper

0.61

13,588

74.6

22.6

3.4

0.0

Barrow

0.62

66,458

77.3

11.2

7.2

3.1

Walton
0.68
82,243
81.0
15.5
3.0
Table 17. County Profiles of the Northeast Georgia Regional Commission

78

%
Asian

0.1

The Northeast Georgia Regional Commission (NEGRC) lies due east of the ARC
and is composed of 12 counties. There are eight (8) counties in the NEGRC that lie
outside the Atlanta MSA: Jackson, Madison, Elbert, Oconee, Clark, Oglethorpe, Morgan,
and Greene Counties. As identified in table 19 above, three (3) of the four (4) counties
that fall within the Atlanta MSA (Barrow, Walton, and Jasper) recorded HI Scores above
.60; Newton County was the exception, reporting a .49 HI Score. An HI Score range of
only .19 is recorded for these four (4) Atlanta MSA member counties.
As member counties of the NEGRC, the local governments and EDO officials
benefit from the services provided by the economic development professionals. The
Economic Development division notes that the “NEGRC serves as the Local Economic
Development District (EDD) in coordination with the Economic Development
Administration (EDA), and encourages cooperation between local government officials,
community-based organizations, and the private sector” (Northeast Georgia regional
commission.2012) . The role of the NEGRC is to encourage cooperation; it is not vested
with any authority to manage economic development cooperation among the counties.

4.8 One Georgia
In conversations with economic development professionals in the Atlanta region
there are occasional references to the concept of two Georgias – one Georgia is Metro
Atlanta, and the other Georgia is the rest of the state. The concept is attributed to the late
Jimmy Gray, who was once editor of the Albany Herald. In a speech two decades ago,
Gray spoke of one Georgia, Atlanta, as “prosperous, with high incomes, good schools
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and educational opportunities, good healthcare, plentiful job opportunities and a high
quality of life” (Young, 2010). “The other Georgia, Gray said, was mired in poverty,
with poor schools, inadequate healthcare, high unemployment, high crime rates and a
poor quality of life” (Young, 2010).
While the particular economic conditions that prompted Gray to make those
remarks back in the 1990s have been modified with the passage of time, the power of his
commentary has not necessarily waned. There remains a pervasive sentiment that Metro
Atlanta is capable of providing for itself. According to a senior economic development
official with DeKalb County, the State of Georgia is more than keen to allow the local
officials of the Metro Atlanta region opportunities to demonstrate their prowess in
solving problems without state intervention or assistance (Whatley, 2012).
Examples of officials from the Metro Atlanta area engineering solutions to major
problems, without any notable assistance from the state government, include the
construction of the commuter rail and the stabilization of Grady Hospital. Both the transit
system and the public safety-net hospital are supported primarily from local taxes and
dedicated revenues from the City of Atlanta and Fulton and DeKalb Counties (Grady
hospital.2012).
On the other hand, the other Georgia, outside Metro Atlanta, is often the
beneficiary of legislation intended to address the perceived disparity between the
successful urban State Capitol and the struggling rural regions of the state. Even within
the Atlanta MSA, it is possible to see how the results of the Tier system for awarding Job
Tax Credits puts the urban core counties at a disadvantage. The most populated urban
counties (Fulton, Gwinnett and DeKalb) are authorized to offer Job Tax Credits of $1,250
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and $1,750; while the least populated rural counties (Lamar, Jasper and Heard) may offer
Job Tax Credits of $3,000 and $4,000. The structural inequity of this particular program
likely traces its genesis to Gray’s observations two decades ago, and it remains is an issue
that concerns economic development professionals today (Martin, 2012).
Perhaps the strongest evidence of the lasting impact of Gray’s commentary about
“Two Georgias” is a program adopted by the Legislature to allocate settlement proceeds
of a tobacco lawsuit that is entitled “One Georgia.” As one economic development
professional lamented, the One Georgia program seems to reinforce the division and
expressly excludes the Metro Atlanta region from accessing any of the proceeds of the
settlement (Whatley, 2012). The summary of the grants and loan programs found on the
website for The One Georgia Authority confirms the assertion:
Utilizing one-third of Georgia’s share of the Tobacco Master Settlement
Agreement to assist the State’s most economically challenged areas, the One Georgia
Authority anticipates spending $1.6 billion on investments in Georgia’s rural counties
over the 25-year term of the settlement. The goal of the One Georgia Authority is to offer
financial partnerships with rural communities to create strong economies in all business
sectors, allowing new and existing industries, both large and small, to flourish. One
Georgia is bridging Georgia’s economic divide by ensuring balanced growth across the
state helping to guarantee that all Georgians have access to economic opportunities in
their own communities (One Georgia authority.2012).
This section is included to provide context to the challenges that confront the
economic development professionals working to facilitate cooperation in the Atlanta
MSA. This pervasive sense that the Metro Atlanta area is capable of promoting economic
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growth and development, despite disadvantages incorporated into the economic
development programs of the State of Georgia, does not enhance opportunities for
regional economic cooperation across urban and rural counties of the MSA.
There is also the confounding problem of defining the “Metro Atlanta”
boundaries. One senior economic development official from DeKalb County noted that
the definition of Metro Atlanta changes depending on the topic (Whatley, 2012). The
boundaries of the Metro Atlanta Rapid Transit Authority include DeKalb and Fulton
Counties (Metropolitan Atlanta regional transit authority.2012). The Metro Atlanta JDA
consists of Clayton, DeKalb, Fulton, Henry and Rockdale Counties (Georgia Department
of Community Affairs, 2010). Clayton, Cobb, DeKalb, Fulton, Gwinnett and Henry
Counties support the Metro Atlanta Arts & Culture Coalition (Metro Atlanta arts.2012).
The Metro Atlanta Chamber of Commerce includes all 28 counties of the MSA (Metro
Atlanta chamber of commerce.2012).

4.9 Cooperative Organizations of the Atlanta MSA
As a counterbalance to the numerous entities that subdivide the region, and the
many governmental jurisdictions that fragment the political leadership of the MSA, there
are several entities that do endeavor to provide cohesive support for economic
development in the Atlanta MSA. The MACOC provides “one-stop-site selection
assistance for the 28-county metro Atlanta area” (Metro Atlanta chamber of
commerce.2012). The Georgia Economic Development Association (GEDA),
headquartered in Midtown Atlanta, is an association that strives to improve the
relationships among the economic development professionals who are active on behalf of
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the cities and counties of the Atlanta MSA and the State of Georgia (Georgia economic
development association.2012). The Georgia State Economic Development Office
(GSEDO) is another critical institution that provides support to regional collaborations.
The GSEDO is co-located in Midtown Atlanta with the Georgia Resource Center, which
is owned and operated by Georgia Power. The Resource Center dedicates its services to
business attraction and expansion throughout the Atlanta MSA and the entire State of
Georgia (Georgia resource center.2012).
The Metro Atlanta Chamber has over 4,000 members representing firms from
throughout the 28-county MSA. The board of advisors for the Chamber is composed of
the 400-500 members who contribute a premium. These individuals qualify for the
Leadership Councils that have been created to provide support for the targeted industry
clusters (Sydney, 2012). With assistance from Bain Consulting, the Metro Atlanta
Chamber has selected four (4) clusters of economic activity to develop: Bioscience,
Technology, Supply Chain and Clean Tech (Metro Atlanta chamber of commerce.2012).
The Leadership Councils for each of these targeted clusters each have between
50-80 board members of the Chamber participating (Sydney, 2012). Board members are
assigned to Leadership Councils according to their professional affiliation and cluster
interests (Sydney, 2012). The Leadership Councils enhance communications and linkage
among the industry representatives of the Atlanta Region in order to strengthen capacity
and foster innovation and growth. The Chamber also works with the Atlanta Convention
& Visitors Bureau to host receptions by the Leadership Councils when related
international trade shows are held in Atlanta (Sydney, 2012). The Chamber initiatives to
encourage industry specific networking across the MSA region are very much in accord
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with the concepts advanced by Michael Porter and endorsed by the U.S. Department of
Commerce.
The Georgia Economic Developers Association (GEDA) was established “to
provide and promote networking and professional development opportunities and to
shape economic development public policy” (Georgia economic development
association.2012). GEDA is a statewide organization headquartered in Atlanta that is
currently led by Misti Martin of the Cherokee Office of Economic Development
(Georgia economic development association.2012). For fifty years, GEDA has been
instrumental in shaping the economic development policies of Georgia by encouraging its
members to provide input to their legislators (Martin, 2012). GEDA is not a lobbying
organization, but the members are educated, informed and engaged in matters important
to their profession (Martin, 2012). It is an important network for economic development
professionals in the Atlanta MSA and the State of Georgia (Kendrick, 2012).
According to the Chair of the GEDA, the County Development Authorities and
Joint Development Authorities all report their available sites and facilities to the Georgia
State Economic Development Office (Martin, 2012). The inventory of available sites and
facilities is utilized to match the preferences of site selection consultants and corporate
relocation professionals interested in expanding operations in the State of Georgia. The
State Economic Development Office plays an important role in centralizing the data and
supporting the efforts of economic development professionals across the MSA (Martin,
2012).
The GEDA, the GSEDO, the Georgia Power economic development team and a
business incubator center are all co-located in the Georgia Resource Center in Midtown
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Atlanta, near the Georgia Tech campus. The ground floor of the building is a suite of
conference rooms with theatre-style meeting space to provide tailored presentations to
prospective employers. Depending on the site specifications being sought, every location
in Georgia that meets the client’s criterion can be presented on the big screen. Once the
satellite search zooms in, software applications are utilized to visually transform the
landscape of the site to buildable surfaces, with parking and traffic circulation modeling
instantly incorporated. The Resource Center staff then uses advanced ‘augmented reality’
programming to allow patrons to ‘see’ their facilities on the selected location (Staples,
2012).
While every EDO in Georgia has access to the Georgia Resource Center facilities,
the central location within the Atlanta MSA gives every county development official in
the region easy access to this incredible asset. The topographical modeling software
allows the board members of any Development Authority or JDA the ability to evaluate
the site preparation expenses instantaneously. Before acquiring a property for an
industrial development park, the software provides development officials with an
informed estimate of the volume of earthmoving required to transform hilly countryside
properties into flat buildable surfaces (Staples, 2012). Whether it is a site for potential
employer, or an investment site to lure future employers, the Resource Center provides
decision makers with critical development information in a timely fashion – instantly.
The multiple cohesive organizational assets mentioned above are all indicators of
a region that is capable of collective action for economic development purposes. The
tools for cooperation are in place, and the Metro Chamber is organized structurally to
respond to the regional interests. Though a formal economic development agreement
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across the entire Atlanta MSA has not emerged, the willing participation of every county
in at least one JDA reveals a willingness to engage in collective action. To measure the
strength of the social capital available to support a region-wide economic development
endeavor, a survey process was utilized.

4.10 Social Capital Survey
The preliminary results of the survey suggest the key stakeholders of the Atlanta
MSA possess reasonable reserves of social capital to facilitate collective action for
regional economic development. However, it must be noted, the response rates do not
afford adequate data to draw conclusions relative to the other MSAs of this study.
Only 28 of the 117 elected officials contacted eventually submitted responses.
There were 48 direct contacts with the executives of the EDOs in the Atlanta MSA, many
of whom offered to distribute the survey to board members, but would not provide email
contact information. A total of 26 responses were received from EDO officials. The
combined response rate was at best 33%, discounting the offer to further distribute the
survey material, based upon 54 respondents /165 direct survey recipients.

4.10.1 The Discovery Phase
In the Atlanta MSA, there are very positive responses to statements designed to
measure the various elements of social capital within the discovery phase of a collective
action transaction. The tables below report the metrics of reciprocity, reputation and trust
within the discovery phase.
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The vast majority of respondents reported engaging in regular communications
with their colleagues from other counties in the region. Only 13.1% indicated that they do
not engage in regular information exchanges with individuals from outside their county.
Statement #1: I have regular communications with my colleagues
from other counties in the region.
Answer Options
strongly disagree
disagree
somewhat disagree
somewhat agree
agree
strongly agree

Response
Percent

Response
Count

1.9%
5.6%
5.6%
29.6%
37.0%
20.4%

1
3
3
16
20
11

answered question
skipped question

54
0

Table 18. Response #1, Atlanta MSA

The reputation for cooperation in sharing information is rated highly by most of
the respondents. Even though 7.5% of the respondents in the prior question indicated they
do not have regular communications with their colleagues from outside the county, only
5.6% had no opinion on the quality of those communications. As the table below
indicates, the vast majority of respondents (89%) believe their colleagues have been very
cooperative in providing information.
Statement #2: When it comes to sharing information, my colleagues
from other counties in the region have been very cooperative.
Response
Percent

Answer Options

0.0%
1.9%
3.7%
5.6%
16.7%
59.3%
13.0%
answered question
skipped question

strongly disagree
disagree
somewhat disagree
no opinion / non-applicable
somewhat agree
agree
strongly agree

Table 19. Response #2, Atlanta MSA

87

Response
Count
0
1
2
3
9
32
7
54
0

There is a high level of trust among the respondents that their colleagues from
other counties in the region provide reliable and dependable information. In fact, there
was not even one respondent who was inclined to express doubts about the veracity of
their colleagues from other counties. Among those who expressed an opinion, 100%
somewhat agreed, agreed or strongly agreed their colleagues were to be trusted to provide
reliable information. Table 22 below illustrates these survey results.
Statement #3: Information I receive from my colleagues in other
counties of our region is reliable and dependable.
Response
Percent

Answer Options

0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
9.3%
24.1%
61.1%
5.6%
answered question
skipped question

strongly disagree
disagree
somewhat disagree
no opinion / non-applicable
somewhat agree
agree
strongly agree

Response
Count
0
0
0
5
13
33
3
54
0

Table 20. Response #3, Atlanta MS

4.10.2 The Negotiation Phase
Among the survey respondents in the Atlanta MSA, the metrics for reciprocity in
the negotiation phase of a transaction reveal 84.7% maintain a positive view of equitable
give and take among the regional jurisdictions. As the Table 23 below reveals, among the
52 leaders who responded, only 15.3% expressed reservations about equitable reciprocity
between and among the county jurisdictions.
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Statement #4: Working across county boundaries, regional problems
get resolved in a fair and reasonable way.
Answer Options
strongly disagree
Disagree
somewhat disagree
somewhat agree
Agree
strongly agree
Other (please specify)

Response
Percent

Response
Count

0.0%
1.9%
13.5%
48.1%
30.8%
5.8%

0
1
7
25
16
3
3

answered question
skipped question

52
2

Table 21. Response #4, Atlanta MSA

The respondents indicated community leaders had a generally favorable
reputation for cooperative action in solving problems of the region. By slightly more than
a 3:1 margin, respondents noted a favorable response regarding the capacity for leaders to
negotiate effectively to resolve regional issues. The fact that several respondents
‘strongly disagreed’ (5.7%) does suggest some leaders have experienced unsuccessful
cooperative outcomes and are less than confident in the ability of their counterparts to
successfully negotiate solutions to regional issues. Notably, 24.5% of respondents
registered unfavorable responses.
Statement #5: Working across county boundaries, regional problems
get resolved in a fair and reasonable way.
Answer Options
strongly disagree
disagree
somewhat disagree
somewhat agree
agree
strongly agree
Other (please specify)

Response
Percent

Response
Count

0.0%
1.9%
13.5%
48.1%
30.8%
5.8%

0
1
7
25
16
3
3

answered question
skipped question
Table 22. Response #5, Atlanta MSA
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52
2

Though the table above suggests that the regional leaders may have not always
succeeded in negotiating favorable outcomes, there is no sentiment that the leaders do not
trust their colleagues to advocate in an honest and forthright manner. In response to the
query designed to elicit opinion regarding the level of trust during the negotiating
process, the respondents were overwhelmingly positive. As the Table 25 below reveals,
only two (2) respondents indicated some degree of doubt about the trustworthiness of
their colleagues from other counties.
Statement #6: In discussions about regional issues, my colleagues
from other counties do their best to accurately represent the views of
their community.
Response
Percent

Answer Options

1.9%
0.0%
1.9%
5.6%
14.8%
64.8%
11.1%
answered question
skipped question

strongly disagree
disagree
somewhat disagree
no opinion / non-applicable
somewhat agree
agree
strongly agree

Response
Count
1
0
1
3
8
35
6
54
0

Table 23. Response #6, Atlanta MSA

4.10.3 The Conclusion Phase
Opinion regarding the likelihood of leaders to conclude cooperative agreements to
resolve regional problems is very positive (85.2%). As the table below indicates, <10%
somewhat disagree or disagree with the notion that counties will cooperate to effectively
respond to regional challenges. These high metrics for reciprocity in the conclusion phase
of a collective transaction are noteworthy for the Atlanta MSA.
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Statement #7: If a regional approach is the best way to address a
particular situation, our counties will cooperate to get the job done.
Response
Percent

Answer Options

0.0%
5.6%
3.7%
5.6%
35.2%
27.8%
22.2%
answered question
skipped question

strongly disagree
disagree
somewhat disagree
no opinion / non-applicable
somewhat agree
agree
strongly agree

Response
Count
0
3
2
3
19
15
12
54
0

Table 24. Response #7, Atlanta MSA

The negative metrics for the reputation of officials successfully, formally
concluding agreements in the Atlanta MSA presents cause for concern. The survey
results reveal considerable doubts (40.8%) about the reputation of officials’ ability to
readily conclude collective action agreements. On the other hand, as the table below
suggests, a clear majority of respondents (59.2%) believe it is relatively easy to get the
officials to bless a fair solution to a regional problem.
Statement #8: Once a fair solution to a regional problem has been
found, getting all the officials from the different local jurisdictions to
bless it is relatively easy
Answer Options
strongly disagree
disagree
somewhat disagree
somewhat agree
agree
strongly agree
Other (please specify)

Response
Percent

Response
Count

9.3%
9.3%
22.2%
40.7%
18.5%
0.0%

5
5
12
22
10
0
3

answered question
skipped question
Table 25. Response #8, Atlanta MSA
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54
0

Within the conclusion phase of a collection action agreement, the overwhelming
favorable response to this survey question (88.7%) reveals a depth of trust among the
leaders of the Atlanta MSA that should serve the region well. This level of confidence in
the ability to conclude agreements that will be respected and honored by all parties is
perhaps the most critical element of social capital within this survey. The table below
reveals a strong reservoir of social capital within the Atlanta MSA.
Statement #9: The local jurisdictions of our region can be trusted to
honor any commitments they make
Answer Options
strongly disagree
disagree
somewhat disagree
somewhat agree
agree
strongly agree
Other (please specify)

Response
Percent

Response
Count

0.0%
1.9%
9.4%
39.6%
45.3%
3.8%

0
1
5
21
24
2
3

answered question
skipped question

53
1

Table 26. Response #9, Atlanta MSA

4.11 The Dependent Variable: Regional Economic Development Cooperation
Regional cooperation for economic development purposes is not an elusive
concept, nor simply an aspirational goal in the Atlanta MSA. There is ample evidence of
regional cooperation in the Atlanta MSA among the economic development
professionals, and there are institutional manifestations of cooperation as well. While it is
relatively easy to identify impediments and obstacles to cooperation, the weight of the
evidence gathered in this study reveals the Atlanta MSA to be a region with cooperative
attributes that are very much aligned with the national policies for strengthening the
performance of the regional economies. Most importantly, there is evidence of a regional
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database of economic development information that is being used to promote the region.
By the definition utilized in this study, regional economic development cooperation is
occurring in the Atlanta MSA.
In the Atlanta MSA, the Metro Chamber serves as the primary organizing entity
that provides economic development services throughout the 28-counties of the region.
The boundaries of the MSA are the boundaries of the Metro Chamber. It is the policy of
the Metro Chamber to adjust their boundaries every ten (10) years to align with the MSA
designation determined by the U.S. Census Bureau (Sydney, 2012).
The Metro Chamber not only publishes a strategic plan every five years for the
Atlanta MSA, the organization serves as a coordinating entity to strengthen the ties
among business leaders in the targeted industry clusters of the region (Sydney, 2012).
And while many economic development professionals note that the Metro Chamber is
unable to close on a deal with prospective employers, the Metro Chamber is recognized
for its role in disseminating regional promotional material and for distributing
information to local EDOs about prospects, trends and opportunities (Kendrick, 2012;
Martin, 2012).
There are two (2) other organizations that are major contributors to enabling
cohesive economic development action in the Atlanta MSA. Even though the Georgia
Economic Development Association and the Georgia Resource Center are constituted to
serve statewide interests, both are physically located in Atlanta and both organizations
provide critical services that enhance opportunities for collaboration among their
stakeholders throughout the Atlanta MSA. The fact that both entities are co-located in the
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same building is further evidence of the collaboration between them (Georgia resource
center.2012) .
Not to be overlooked, the five (5) Regional Commissions in the Atlanta MSA
have engaged in developing planning documents for economic development
coordination. Though the Regional Commissions do not serve as EDOs for the purpose of
implementing the Comprehensive Economic Development Strategy reports, the
preparation of the CEDS reports is an important step in advancing cooperation among the
member counties of the Atlanta MSA.
The Atlanta MSA does have numerous multi-county EDOs that serve a portion of
the MSA. The formation of the 14 Joint Development Authorities involving multiple
counties within the MSA is a clear indication of cooperative economic development
activity within the Atlanta MSA. The fact that 100% of the counties in the Atlanta MSA
have entered into cooperative agreements with adjoining counties is a strong indicator of
a willingness to cooperate for the purpose of advancing economic development
opportunities beyond the county jurisdictional boundaries. The incentives offered by the
State of Georgia can be credited for much of this collaboration.

4.12 Conclusion
The 28 counties of the Atlanta MSA have not formally adopted a collective action
agreement to advance economic development programming for the entire region, but the
economic development professionals of the Atlanta MSA have access to a robust
database of regional information managed by the Georgia Resource Center, and the MSA
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is effectively promoted by the Metro Atlanta Chamber of Commerce. Regional economic
development cooperation does occur in the Atlanta MSA.
From the interviews and office visits during this research, it is clear that the local
jurisdictions are entirely capable of simultaneously seeking opportunities for their
respective communities while advancing the interests of the region. Actively engaging
with peers and colleagues throughout the region to share and assimilate information,
while working very closely with neighboring counties, seems to be the norm among the
Atlanta MSA economic development professionals. It is fair to label economic
development cooperation in the Atlanta MSA as decentralized cooperation. There is
deference to the urban core when association is advantageous, while every local EDO and
JDA pursues their own interests.
The results of the survey suggest there is a reservoir of social capital that could be
expended to successfully conclude a cooperative transaction, if one were necessary. The
need for a formal agreement among the key stakeholders may be eclipsed by the regional
mechanisms that have emerged to facilitate economic development cooperation. The
contributions from the Georgia Resource Center in Atlanta, the Metropolitan Atlanta
Chamber of Commerce, the association for economic development professionals, and the
extensive network of Joint Development Authorities may render the need for a more
formal governance structure moot.
An initiative to advance a more formal governance structure might not be able to
overcome the obstacles outlined in the inventory of community profile characteristics.
The governments of the counties in the region are a mixed bag of structures, with only
57% percent being council-manager governments. The economic disparity among the
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counties of the region is indeed wide, with the median household income in Lamar
County at only $33,835 and Forsyth County with median household income of $88,040.
The political fragmentation in the Atlanta region, with 28 counties and 145 cities, is not
conducive to effectuating a formal cooperative agreement.
Rather than challenge the body politic to suppress the preference for autonomy
and local control in a quest for a formal regional cooperative agreement for economic
development, the business community and economic development professionals in the
Atlanta MSA engage in informal regional collaboration. The common database support
of the Georgia Resource Center, the industry cluster programming focus and the regional
promotional efforts of the Metro Atlanta Chamber of Commerce obviates the need for a
formal cooperation agreement.
There are possible actions that might benefit the regional economic development
efforts of the Atlanta MSA. Legislators could enhance the incentives for cooperation
among county economic development organizations to encourage even greater expansion
of the Joint Development Authorities. The incremental $500 incentive associated with the
formation of a JDA has been very effective in facilitating cross-county economic
development cooperation. Perhaps JDAs with ten counties or more could become eligible
for even greater Job Tax Incentives.
The other matter that deserves attention is the number of regional commissions
that intersect and divide the Atlanta MSA. It might benefit the economic development
planning n the Atlanta MSA if the Department of Community Affairs realigned the
regional commission boundaries to minimize the divisions of the MSA. This might allow

96

the Comprehensive Economic Development Strategy documents to have greater
applicability to the actual economic development policies and programs of the MSA.
A review of the diversity of the member counties within each regional
commission reveals groupings within a relatively tight range of .18 to .26 Herfindahl
Index scores. These groupings are not decided locally. The Georgia Department of
Community Affairs organizes the regional commissions. Unlike the locally initiated JDA
formations that do not demonstrate a pattern of similar diversity scores, the regional
commissions reflect the possibility of grouping by common diversity factors. These
patterns are worth noting and should be considered by the DCA when shaping the
boundaries in the future.
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CHAPTER 5
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION IN THE HOUSTON REGION
5.1 An Overview of the Houston MSA
The Houston MSA has achieved a level of regional economic development
cooperation that is notably superior to the other two (2) regions of this study. A single
organizational entity has emerged to conduct economic development activities on behalf
of the entire MSA. The Greater Houston Partnership (GHP) is a private organization with
an 85-member professional staff dedicated to conducting regional economic research and
ensuring the Houston region is recognized globally as a destination for international
business and commerce (Greater Houston partnership.2012). As one county economic
development official aptly stated, “The Greater Houston Partnership is the mother ship”
(Texas conversations2012).
The GHP was formed in the 1980s by a merger of the World Trade Organization
of Houston, the Economic Development Council of Houston and the Houston Chamber
of Commerce (Richard, 2012). The impetus to combine the efforts of the various
economic development institutions was economic recession. In 1982-1983, the national
unemployment rate hit double-digits for ten (10) months in a row (Texas
conversations2012). In Houston, the impact of the recession seemed deeper and wider
due to the downturn in the energy sector (Wilkins, 2012). Though the energy sector
remains a dominant economic force in the Houston economy, great strides have been
made to balance the economic activity with growth in other sectors (Richard, 2012).
The energy sector is the major industry cluster in the Houston MSA economy.
“More than 3,000 energy-related establishments are located within the Houston MSA,
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including more than 500 exploration and production firms, more than 150 pipeline
transportation establishments and hundreds of manufacturers and wholesalers of energy
sector products” (FY 2012 budget houston.2011). While Houston prides itself on being
the “US energy headquarters and a world center for virtually every segment of the
petroleum industry,” economic development professionals emphasize the continuing
efforts to diversify the Houston MSA economy, which began in earnest following the
atypical decline of the energy sector in the late 1980s (FY 2012 budget
houston.2011)(Rendeiro, 2012).
Using 2009 employment location quotient data to compare the Houston MSA to
the national economy, the dominance of the energy sector is evident, complemented by
growth across a number of related sectors. Within several sectors of the economy, the
Houston MSA has outperformed the national average, reflected as a Location Quotient
greater than 1.0, in terms of employment (StatsAmerica.2012) :
Houston MSA Industry Clusters

Energy (Fossil & Renewable)

Employment
LQ
2.74

Machinery Manufacturing

2.11

Fabricated Metal Products

1.96

Chemicals & Chemical Based Products

1.62

Transportation & Logistics

1.42

Manufacturing Super cluster

1.17

Description

Table 27. Industry Clusters of the Houston MSA

The intense concentration of energy related business in the Houston MSA is
certainly a defining characteristic of the local economy, and may account for the relative
strength in employment data when comparing unemployment rates among the three (3)
metropolitan areas of this study. The Houston MSA generally posts the lowest
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unemployment numbers among the three regions in recent years. To suggest the more
favorable unemployment numbers are directly related to the issue of regional economic
development cooperation is not supported by the mixed unemployment results in Atlanta
and Miami. The seasonally adjusted unemployment rates reported by the U.S. Bureau of
Labor Statistics for the month of August from 2007 to 2012 are listed in the table below.
Seasonally Adjusted Unemployment Rates
Houston

Atlanta

Miami

Aug-07

4.2

4.6

4.0

Aug-08

4.9

6.4

6.4

Aug-09

8.0

10.3

10.9

Aug-10

8.3

10.0

11.3

Aug-11

8.2

9.7

10.4

Aug-12
7.0
8.8
Table 28. Unemployment History for all three (3) MSAs

8.7

The Port of Houston and the Houston Airport System are major economic drivers
for the Transportation & Logistics sector. The Port of Houston Authority and more than
150 private industrial companies operate along 25 miles of shipping channel with direct
access to the Gulf of Mexico. The Port of Houston has been ranked number one for U.S.
imports for the past 19 years and is second for U.S. export tonnage (FY 2012 budget
houston.2011). The George Bush Intercontinental Airport and two other aviation
facilities “position Houston as the international and cargo gateway to the south central
Unites States and a primary gateway to Latin America” (FY 2012 budget houston.2011).
In the 2005-2015 strategic plan adopted by the GHP, industries are targeted that
demonstrate a capacity to grow and prosper in the region. The ten (10) industries
identified in strategic plan include: Aerospace, Alternative Energy, Biotechnology,
Education, Energy, Entrepreneurial Enterprises, Health Care, Information Technology,
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Nanotechnology, and Petrochemical (Greater Houston partnership 2005-2012 strategic
plan.2005). The decision of the GHP to nurture the competitive advantages of particular
industries in the region comports with the federal economic development policies
outlined in the literature review (Porter, 2001).
The GHP functions as a resource and coordinating entity for the sub-regional and
county EDOs of the Houston MSA. Organizations constituted to serve the economic
interests of more than one county include The Economic Alliance – Port Region and the
Bay Area Houston Economic Partnership (Gulf Coast Economic Development District,
2009) . The active county-level EDOs in the Houston MSA include: Sealy EDC (Austin
County), ED Alliance for Brazoria County, Baytown West Chambers County ED
Foundation, Chambers County EDD, Chambers-Liberty Counties Navigation District
EDC, Greater Fort Bend EDC, Galveston County Economic Alliance, Galveston ED
Partnership, University of Houston SBD Centers (Harris County), Liberty County ED
Alliance, South Montgomery County ED Partnership, Greater Conroe EDC
(Montgomery County) and Waller county EDP (Gulf Coast Economic Development
District, 2009).
Though there are a number of active sub-regional and county level EDOs in the
Houston MSA, it is not necessarily a detriment to economic development cooperation.
Many of these organizations gained their footings as active and robust agencies working
alongside the GHP. The functional relationship between the GHP and these organizations
will be described later in this chapter.
Cooperation among the local officials in the Houston region is advanced through
a public sector organization. The State Legislature in Texas has long held the view that
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cooperation is vital among the local governments of a region. For many decades, the
State has supported regional councils dedicated to developing and maintaining
transportation infrastructure, transit services, water supply, public safety and emergency
response networks (TSHA, 2012) .
The Houston Galveston Area Council (H-GAC) was formed in 1966. Its
boundaries span 13 counties, including all of the Houston MSA counties with the
exception of San Jacinto County. The H-GAC reaches beyond the perimeter of the
Houston MSA to include the sparsely populated counties of Matagorda (36,717),
Wharton (41,225), Colorado (20,831) and Walker (67,641) (American community
survey, 2009) . The H-GAC “mission is to serve as the instrument of local government
cooperation, promoting the region’s orderly development and the safety and welfare of its
citizens” (Houston-Galveston Area Council, 2008) .
The H-GAC is also the entity responsible for producing the Gulf Coast Economic
Development District Comprehensive Economic Development Strategy (CEDS) report
for the federal government. Publication of the CEDS is a qualifying event for the member
counties of the H-GAC to be eligible for federal economic development grants. The
CEDS is informative and reflective of the regional economic development strategy, but
does not necessarily serve as an instrument of policy to be enacted for the purpose of
economic development in the region (Gulf Coast Economic Development District,
2009).
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5.2 Demographics and Characteristics of the Houston MSA
The Houston MSA includes ten counties, 144 municipalities, and a combined
population of 5.86 million people (United states census bureau, 2012). There are 66
independent school districts serving the Houston MSA (FY 2012 budget houston, 2011).
The City of Houston has over 2 million residents and is the county seat of Harris County.
Harris County is the largest and most densely populated county in the Houston MSA,
home to more than 70% of residents in the Houston MSA (American community survey,
2009) . The table below provides an overview of the counties within the Houston MSA,
in rank order by population (American community survey, 2009).
A Commission form of government is uniformly found in the counties of the
Houston MSA as prescribed in the Texas Constitution. Each County elects a presiding
Judge and a Court of Commissioners to “exercise such powers and jurisdiction over all
county business, as is conferred by this Constitution and the laws of the State, or as may
be hereafter prescribed” (Texas Constitution, 2012) . Pursuant to the findings of Feiock
(2009), this consistency in the form of county government, though not the more preferred
Council-Manager form, could favorably influence the likelihood of economic
development cooperation among county officials. For reasons that will be explained in
the section devoted to the legal history of economic development policy in Texas, county
officials do not have an entrenched, historical familiarity with the intricacies of local
economic development practices.
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County
Harris

Houston MSA Summary Data
Sq.
Pop.
Miles
Density Cities

Diversity

Gov.

4,070,989

1703.5

2390

34

0.32

C

Fort Bend

556,870

861.5

646

20

0.27

C

Montgomery

447,718

1041.7

430

17

0.57

C

Brazoria

309,208

1357.7

228

23

0.40

C

Galveston

286,814

378.4

758

14

0.42

C

Liberty

74,941

1158.4

65

13

0.54

C

Waller

35,552

513.4

69

7

0.36

C

Chambers

29,198

597.1

49

9

0.54

C

Austin

26,567

646.5

40

4

0.52

C

San Jacinto

24,645

569.2

43

3

0.64

C

Total
5,862,502
8827.4
664
144
Table 29. County Profile Summary in the Houston MSA

0.33

Historically, the commissioners’ court in most counties has deferred to the private
EDOs and municipal leaders to shape the economic development agenda of the county
(Tollett, 2012). This lack of direct involvement by county officials somewhat diminishes
the importance of political fragmentation at the county level as a factor influencing
economic development cooperation in the region. Valid arguments could arise that the
formula should be weighted to reflect this functional difference. For the integrity of this
comparative case study, the method for calculating the value for political fragmentation
will not be modified.
The chosen method for calculating the value for political fragmentation in this
study is to divide the population of the region by the number of counties, then divide the
results by the number of cities. A lower score indicates a relatively higher degree of
political fragmentation. The value for political fragmentation in the Houston MSA is a
score of 4,071. By comparison, the Houston MSA is less politically fragmented than the
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Atlanta MSA, which reported a score of 1,290. The calculation for the Houston MSA is
presented below:

5,862, 502( pop.)

10(counties) =4,071
144(cities)

The ethnic diversity of the population in the Houston MSA was evaluated
utilizing the Herfindahl Index, which produces a percentage scale to measure the extent
any particular ethnic demographic (Non-Hispanic White, Hispanic, Black or Asian)
enjoys a relative advantage. The index is stated in percentages, with a lower percentage
indicating greater diversity. A higher percentage suggests one particular ethnic group has
a more dominant representation in the jurisdiction.
The Herfindahl Index rating overall for the Houston MSA is 33%. This rating
suggests the population is diverse, and no particular demographic is disproportionately
represented at the level of the MSA. Harris County, the most populous county in the
region, has a slightly lower diversity index of 32%. Harris County is also the only county
in the MSA with a Hispanic population (1,620,254) greater than the number of White
non-Hispanic residents (1,428,917).
However, the diversity ratings among several counties in the MSA reveal that
certain jurisdictions do exceed a 50% rating. A rating of >50% indicates one ethnic
demographic has disproportionate representation, or greater market share of influence, in
a county. Five (5) of the ten counties in the Houston MSA fall into the category of having
a diversity score above 50% due to the dominance of the Non-Hispanic White
population: Austin (52%), Chambers (54%), Liberty (54%), Montgomery (57%) and San
Jacinto (64%). It should be noted however that, with the exception of Montgomery
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County, these counties are the least populated counties in the MSA. Montgomery County,
with a population of 447,718, is further distinguished as an affluent metropolitan
suburban community with a mean family income of $100,457 (American fact
finder.2010).
As the findings above suggests, the lower (<50%) diversity rating for the Houston
MSA can be traced to the more densely populated urban counties: Harris (32%),
Galveston (42%), Fort Bend (27%), and Brazoria (40%). Waller County (36%) is an
exception with a population of only 35,552. Waller County is also the only county in the
Houston MSA with a population of Black, non-Hispanic residents (9,101) greater than
the number of Hispanic residents (8,532). Fort Bend County has the lowest Herfindahl
Index score in the Houston MSA, reflecting the highest diversity rating. This result can
be attributed to the fact that Fort Bend County has the highest percentage of Asian
residents (15.5%) of any county in the MSA. The spike in percentage of Asian residents
in Fort Bend County serves to balance the ‘market share’ of White, non-Hispanics
(38.7%), Black, non-Hispanics (20.8%) and Hispanics (23.8%) (American community
survey. 2009).
The overall median household income for the Houston MSA is $55,532 a year
(American fact finder.2010) . Among the three (3) MSAs of this comparative case study,
the Houston MSA has the highest median household income. As expected, some counties
within the Houston MSA are more prosperous than others.
The degree of differential in the household incomes is notable. The median
household ranges from a low of $42,043 in San Jacinto County to a high of $80,638 a
year in Fort Bend County (American community survey 2009.2009) . This is a 91.8%
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differential in median household incomes across these counties of the MSA. Recall,
Feiock (2009) found that economic disparity among the member jurisdictions is a factor
that decreases the likelihood of cooperation.

5.3 The Constitutional and Statutory History
The history of economic development policy in Texas is strikingly different than
the historic pattern of ‘smokestack chasing’ that was found in Georgia and Florida. The
state and the local governments of Texas were effectively prohibited from participating in
the ‘smokestack chasing’ practices. The Constitution of Texas did not allow the state or
local governments to expend any public funds to promote private business activity. Until
1987, it was essentially illegal for any governmental body in Texas to offer incentives,
rebates, or tax breaks to attract or retain firms considering relocation (Abbot, 2008) .
In the wake of the 1982 national recession, Texas experienced prolonged high
unemployment rates due to the deep and lingering impacts on the energy sector. To
recover fully, consensus emerged in the business community that the economic
development laws needed to be changed in order to attract and expand business in Texas.
By and large, it was private business interests that pushed for the change. The GHP
considered this change crucial to ensuring Texas could compete in the global marketplace
and was instrumental in getting a referendum question to amend the Constitution
approved (Houston interviews, 2012) .
“In November 1987, the voters of Texas approved an amendment to the Texas
Constitution providing that expenditures for economic development serve a public
purpose and were therefore permitted under Texas law” (Abbot, 2008). This
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Constitutional amendment finally opened the door for legislation that would authorize
local officials to expend public resources on economic development initiatives.
According to a recent New York Times series, the public officials in Texas have entered
into the ‘smokestack chasing’ fray with complete abandonment and are now provide
more public assistance to private firms on an annual basis than any other state in the
nation (Story, 2012).
This relatively recent change in economic development policy in Texas helps to
explain why public officials at the county level have not historically been involved in
economic development affairs. Other than cheering from the sidelines, they could not
expend one dollar of public funds to impact private business decisions. Even with the
Constitutional change that made it possible for local governments to expend public
monies for economic development purposes, the county officials of Texas were not the
primary actors on the local level. The State Legislature of Texas has delegated to cities
the leading role in the local economic development arena.
Prior to the passage of the 1987 Constitutional amendment, the Texas Legislature
adopted the Development Corporation Act of 1979 (the ACT). Development corporations
could be established by cities and were authorized to promote local business
development. Until the Constitution was amended in 1987, these development
corporations were entirely dependent upon private contributions (Abbot, 2008). In the
1989 Legislative Session, following the passage of the Constitutional amendment, the
Act was amended to allow for cities to ask voters to approve a sales tax to fund the
initiatives of the development corporations (Abbot, 2008).
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Municipal Incentive Programs in Houston MSA
County

4A/4B

Angleton

City

Brazoria

County

4A/4B
4B

Montgomery

Montgomery

4B

Arcola

Fort Bend

4B

Nassau Bay

Harris

4B

Baytown

Harris

4A/4B

Fort Bend

4B

Beasley

Fort Bend

4A/4B

Needville
Oak Ridge
North

Montgomery

4B

Bellville

Austin

4B

Orchard

Fort Bend

4A/4B

Brookshire
Clear Lake
Shores

Waller

4B

Oyster Creek

Brazoria

4B

Galveston

4B

Pasadena

Harris

4B

Cleveland

Liberty

4B

Pearland

Brazoria

4B

Clute

Brazoria

4B

Prairie View

Waller

4B

Conroe

Montgomery

4B

Richmond

Fort Bend

4B

Dayton

Liberty

4B

Rosenberg

Fort Bend

4B

Dickinson

Galveston

4B

Santa Fe

Galveston

4B

Freeport

Brazoria

4B

Seabrook

Harris

4B

Galveston

Galveston

4B

Sealy

Austin

4B

Hempstead

Waller

4A

Shenandoah

Montgomery

4B

Hitchcock

Galveston

4A

Stafford

Fort Bend

4B

Kemah

Galveston

4B

Sugar Land

Fort Bend

4A/4B

La Marque

Galveston

4A

Sweeny

Brazoria

4B

La Porte

Harris

4B

Texas City

Galveston

4A

Lake Jackson

Brazoria

4B

Tomball

Harris

4B

League City

Galveston

4B

Waller

Waller

4A

Liberty

Liberty

4B

Wallis

Austin

4B

Manvel

Brazoria

4B

Webster

Harris

4B

Magnolia

Montgomery

West Columbia

Brazoria

4A/4B

City

Meadows
Fort Bend
4A
Willis
Table 30. Municipal Incentive Programs in the Houston MSA

Montgomery

4B
4A/4B

Cities across Texas took advantage of this sales tax program to fund the initiatives
of their development corporations. The legislation amending the Development
Corporation Act of 1979 included two sections outlining the eligibility criteria and
purposes of the sales tax, sections 4A and 4B. Generally, the 4A sales tax could be up to
a ½ cent and be used for new and expanded industrial and manufacturing activities; the
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4B ½ cent sales tax is less restrictive and can be used for a wide range of civic and
commercial projects (Abbot, 2008).
According to the Texas Attorney General, 558 cities in Texas have levied an
economic development sales tax: “Of these cities, 115 have adopted a Section 4A
economic development sales tax, 339 cities have adopted a Section 4B economic
development sales tax, and 104 cities have adopted both a Section 4A and a Section 4B
sales tax” (Abbot, 2008) . The 50 cities within the Houston MSA that have levied an
economic development sales tax are listed in Table 31 above (Gulf Coast Economic
Development District, 2009).
The Texas Legislature has been clear in its intent to empower cities, and not
counties, to levy the sales tax and control the local economic development agenda. This
deference to cities, rather than counties, may have naturally flowed from the Legislature’s
familiarity with city-centric EDOs. Regardless of the origins of the State’s predisposition
to empower cities with the authority to levy the economic development sales tax, the
secondary role of counties seems to persist in the economic development arena. In the
opinion of the Texas Attorney General, cities are even authorized to engage in projects
beyond their municipal boundaries:
Section 23(a)(1) of the Development Corporation Act provides that an economic
development corporation may undertake projects outside of the city limits with
permission of the governing body that has jurisdiction over the property. In other words,
if the corporation wants to undertake a project that is located completely in the city’s
extraterritorial jurisdiction or beyond, it should get approval from the governing body of
the county, the county commissioners court. The language of the Act, however, does not
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seem to require this approval if the project is located at least partially within the
boundaries of the city (Abbot, 2008).
The Texas Legislature has provided opportunities for county officials to take the
lead in certain economic development programs. Chapter 312 of the Texas Code
authorizes counties the ability to grant tax abatements to attract new business to Tax
Reinvestment Zones (TRZs). To grant the tax abatements, unless a county enacts more
liberal policies, the business must be located in a TRZ designated by the county (Texas
Statute 312, 2012).
According to the most recent report from the Texas Comptroller, between 2006
and 2009, the cities of Texas have taken the lead in establishing 567 TRZs (Combs,
2010) . By comparison, during the same period of time, the counties of Texas acted as the
lead in establishing 132 TRZs. Half of the counties in the Houston MSA have not
designated their own TRZs (Combs, 2010) . The table below reflects the findings of the
Texas Comptroller:
Houston MSA County TRZs
County

Tax Reinvestment Zones

Harris

10

Fort Bend

3

Montgomery

0

Brazoria

1

Galveston

6

Liberty

0

Waller

0

Chambers

0

Austin

1

San Jacinto

0

Table 31. County Tax Reinvestment Zones in the Houston MSA
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Given the history of the legal constraints on expending public resources to
advance economic development interests in Texas, and the Legislature’s predilection to
empower city officials with tax revenues for economic development matters, it is not
entirely unexpected that county officials might be remiss in availing themselves of every
possible economic development program that is authorized. This is not to suggest that
county officials have not been generous in providing tax abatements and other state
incentives when called upon.
As reported in a recent New York Times series, the state, county and city
governments of Texas have raised the bar for incentive competition. The people of Texas
spend more money per capita on economic development incentives than any other state.
It is estimated that the annual expenditures on economic development incentive programs
amount to $759 per capita, costing Texans more than $19 billion a year (Story, 2012).
For comparison purposes to the other states in this report, the expenditures in Georgia
amount to $144 per capita, costing Georgians at least $1.4 billion a year; the expenditures
in Florida amount to $212 per capita, costing Floridians at least $3.98 billion per year
(Story, 2012).
In the short span of 25 years, the governments of Texas have traveled at lightning
speed from a position of not offering economic development incentives to being the most
generous state in the nation for incentives (Story, 2012). Prior to the 1987 Constitutional
amendment that allowed for the expenditure of public funds, the economic development
arena was a function of the creativity and resources found in the private sector. With the
subsequent introduction of a host of public incentive programs, the private sector
continues to lead the economic development process today in an aggressive fashion. The
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EDOs of Texas have been demonstrably successful in persuading public officials to
loosen the purse strings. As one former Houston official sized up the situation,
“Everything is led by the private sector. They are the brains behind the projects”
(Houston interviews, 2012) .

5.4 Greater Houston Partnership
The GHP emerged as the regional EDO for the Houston MSA at a time of
financial crisis. In the 1980s, billboards in downtown Houston were promoting the
advantages of locating in other regions (Richard, 2012) . The lingering effects of the
1982 national recession were more acute in the Houston MSA than other regions of the
country due to the inordinate economic influence of the energy sector. Following the
recession, the energy sector of the Houston region continued to struggle due to the
reduced demand for fuel, and a contemporary increase in oil and gas production capacity
overseas (Houston ED official2012) . The business leaders of Houston became alarmed
and recognized the need for an institutional response.
Due to the Constitutional constraints on local government, it became imperative
that all of the non-governmental economic development resources of the community be
unified to address the financial crisis. Before the end of the 1980s, the Houston Chamber
of Commerce, the Houston Economic Development Council and the Houston World
Trade Association merged to form the GHP. This powerful, centralized agency, housed
on several floors in a Houston skyscraper, has worked to de-emphasize its orientation as a
tool of downtown business interests. From the outset, the GHP struck a regional posture
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and committed to serving all counties of the Houston MSA (Greater Houston
partnership.2012).
The evolution of the GHP transpired during the same period of time that the
Legislature was taking steps to secure funding for municipal development corporations.
Many of the same individuals responsible for the formation of the GHP were actively
working to change the Constitutional restrictions on public economic development
expenditures (Houston ED official, 2012) . Since its inception, the GHP has maintained
an active and influential government advocacy program. The GHP dedicates almost 20%
of their operating budget to government relations (Houston ED official, 2012) .
Though the GHP is a robust agency with a regional agenda, it is committed to
ensuring the local EDOs throughout the region are stable partners. Early on, the
leadership of the GHP recognized the importance of developing the capacity of the local
EDOs throughout the Houston MSA. The GHP has earned lasting goodwill by facilitating
opportunities to develop the skill sets and capabilities of the local EDO professionals
throughout the region.
The GHP partnered with CenterPoint Energy, the electric company that serves the
Houston metropolitan region, to provide economic development training programs for the
staff of the local EDOs. The partnership with CenterPoint was a natural fit, as the utility
is an accredited economic development organization with a notable history of community
involvement in the Houston MSA (CenterPoint energy, 2012). The GHP-sponsored
training programs effectively assuaged concerns of the local EDOs that the GHP would
usurp their functions and dominate the economic development realm throughout the
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Houston MSA. The educational outreach program was very effective in demonstrating to
the local EDO professionals that the GHP was intent on cooperation (Richard, 2012).
The partnership with CenterPoint has been lasting and beneficial to the GHP.
CenterPoint Energy is one of the nine (9) Executive Partners contributing at the highest
levels ($100,000 and above) to sustain the GHP. The other Executive Partners include BP
America, Inc.; Chevron; Conoco Phillips; Exxon Mobil; Shell Oil Company; Reliant, an
NRG Company; AT&T; and JPMorgan Chase (GHP partners list, 2012). As the
Executive Partners list reveals, energy sector corporations remain at the top of the GHP
hierarchy. The table below depicts the constitution of the membership roster for the GHP.
GHP Membership Levels
Membership Level

Dollar Range

Number of Firms

Executive Partner

$100,000 and above

9

Managing Partner

$50,000-$99,999

21

General Partner

$25,000-$49,999

44

Partner

$10,000-$24,999

98

Limited Partner

$3,000-$9,999

248

Investor

$550-$29,999

1,000

Table 32. Private Sector Contributors to GHP

In the detailed reports of the GHP membership, the absence of cities and county
governments is notable. The GHP is truly a private membership operation. The ability of
the GHP to operate an EDO with a staff of 85 personnel is the result of its broad and
generous membership base. From membership dues alone, assuming the low end of the
possible contributions from the table above, the GHP generates at least $4,450,000
annually. The GHP also has an endowment fund known as Opportunity Houston.
According to a January 14, 2008 press release, during Phase 1 of the campaign, the GHP
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raised “the largest total raised by any such organization in the U.S.,” a record $30 million
(Greater Houston partnership.2012).
According to a senior economic development official, the GHP has a very
positive relationship with the Texas Governor’s office. If a prospect has an interest in the
Houston region, the Governor’s staff will hand off the lead to the GHP, and the GHP will
work with the local EDOs to find a good fit for the firm (Richard, 2012) . In turn, the
GHP often supports foreign missions led by the Governor, and hosts an annual regional
luncheon featuring the Governor of Texas.
The GHP has a special program dedicated to promoting events that allow its
members to network with business colleagues and prominent officials. The “Signature
Events” of the GHP include the following: Regional Delegation Dinner; State of
METRO; State of the Airports; State of the City; State of the County; State of the Port;
State of the Senate; State of the State; and the World Trade Soirée. All of these events are
designed to afford members access to the major public figures of the region (Greater
Houston partnership.2012).
The “Signature Events” also provide a forum for the GHP leadership to remind
the public officials of the importance of maintaining and improving the infrastructure of
the region to ensure Houston remains globally competitive. The purpose and intent of the
GHP is always focused on ensuring and increasing the prosperity of the Houston region.
According to the strategic plan of the organization, the primary purpose of the GHP is to
brand Houston as a Business Magnet. To accomplish this feat, the GHP promotes
“specific initiatives by highlighting opportunities and advancements within each industry
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segment to companies and organizations, nationally and globally” (Greater Houston
partnership 2005-2012 strategic plan, 2005) .
As evidence of the international cachet of the Houston region, a senior economic
development official pointed to the generous gift of $150 million to the MD Anderson
Cancer Center from the United Arab Emirates (Moukheiber, 2011); the May 30, 2012
decision by the City Council to add international flights at Hobby Airport (Moran, 2012);
and the fact that Houston has nearly as many foreign consulates as Los Angeles and
Chicago (Foreign consular offices in the united states, 2012)(Richard, 2012). The global
economic development prowess of the GHP is certainly enhanced by the ability to
leverage the working investment fund that exceeds $30 million (Greater Houston
partnership, 2012).

5.5 Sub-regional Economic Development Organizations
There are two (2) multi-county EDOs and ten (10) local EDOs active in the
Houston MSA (Gulf Coast Economic Development District, 2009) . The Economic
Alliance – Port Region and the Bay Area Houston Partnership serve multi-county
jurisdictions.
The Economic Alliance – Port Region is a professional EDO that serves sixteen
communities adjacent to the 25-mile long Houston shipping channel. The economic
clusters that define the port region effectively bond the 16 communities in the coverage
area. The EDO concentrates on two (2) dominant economic clusters: 1) Refining and
Petrochemical Manufacturing; and 2) Maritime-International Trade (The economic
alliance.2012).
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More than 125 energy companies operate in this industrial region. The EDO
reports that Port Region hosts the largest complex of petrochemical-manufacturing
facilities in the nation (The economic alliance.2012). The growth of the energy sector in
the Houston MSA has not been impeded by environmental protectionist policies. There is
a prevailing view among the EDO officials that the environmental risks associated with
petrochemical manufacturing are acceptable in light of the extraordinary economic
benefits for the region (Wilkins, 2012). The civic motto of one Harris County waterfront
community aptly summarizes this sentiment: “The City of Baytown: Where Oil and
Water Really Do Mix” (Baytown, texas.2012).
The majority of the municipalities that participate in The Economic Alliance –
Port Region EDO are located in Harris County. The EDO is supported by the member
cities and Harris County to help prospects “navigate through incentive process such as
tax abatements and more” (The economic alliance.2012). Indeed, the website for the
EDO prominently lists the Harris County tax abatement incentives. In addition to a
number of major petrochemical companies, such as Chevron Phillips, Dow Chemical
Company, DuPont, Exxon Mobil, and Shell Chemical Company, the membership of the
EDO includes CenterPoint Energy, the GHP, and the Bay Area Houston Economic
Partnership (The economic alliance.2012).
The Bay Area Houston Economic Partnership is the other multi-county subregional EDO in the Houston MSA. The geographic area for the Bay Area Houston
Economic Partnership overlaps much of the coverage area of The Economic Alliance –
Port Region. The regional focus is on Galveston and Harris counties and the Port of
Houston. Several cities within this sub-region are active in both organizations (Pasadena,
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Houston, La Porte, and Seabrook). The primary distinction between these two (2) subregional EDOs is the cluster industry targeting. The target industries for The Bay Area
Houston Economic Partnership include: Aerospace Engineering; Bioscience /
Biotechnical Research and Development; Chemicals and Plastics; and Health Care (Bay
area Houston economic partnership.2012).
The other major difference in the two sub-regional organizations is the industry
membership. In the 2009 Membership Report from The Bay Area Houston Economic
Partnership, the petrochemical industries are not dominant. Municipalities provided 45%
of revenues, and Aerospace industries contributed 15% of revenues. The remaining
categories of contributors include: Consumer Products (8%), Construction (1%),
Education (3%), Finance (6%), Healthcare (3%), Hospitality (3%), Manufacturing (2%),
Professional (7%), Real Estate (5%), and Utilities (1%) (Bay area Houston economic
partnership.2012).
The collaboration among the sub-regional EDOs in the region is evident in
examining the membership rosters. Just as the GHP and the Bay Area Houston Economic
Partnership are members of The Economic Alliance - Port Region, both the GHP and The
Economic Alliance - Port Region are listed as members of the Bay Area Houston
Economic Partnership (Bay area Houston economic partnership.2012). And, the local
EDOs of the Houston MSA are all identified as Allies of the GHP. The table below lists
the local EDOs active in the Houston MSA. The GHP identifies all of these organizations
as Economic Development Allies (Greater Houston partnership.2012).
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GHP Economic Development Allies
County

Economic Development Organization

GHP
Allied
Yes

Multiple

The Economic Alliance - Port Region

Multiple

Bay Area Houston Economic Partnership

Yes

Austin

Yes

Chambers

Sealy Economic Development Corporation
The Economic Development Alliance for Brazoria
County
Baytown-West Chambers County E.D. Foundation

Fort Bend

Greater Fort Bend Economic Development Council

Yes

Galveston

Galveston County Economic Alliance

Yes

Galveston

Galveston Economic Development Partnership

Yes

Harris

Katy Area Economic Development Council

Yes

Montgomery

Economic Development Partnership

Yes

Montgomery

Greater Conroe Economic Development Council

Yes

Waller

Waller County Economic Development Partnership

Yes

Brazoria

Yes
Yes

Table 33. Allies of the Greater Houston Partnership

The EDOs of the Houston region appear to be truly collaborating with each other.
As one member of the Bay Area Houston Economic Partnership put it: “Every
community in the region is focused on trying to develop economic activity for their
particular jurisdiction, but most folks know it is counterproductive to be territorial. You
have to cooperate. If a prospect doesn’t work out for your community, you have to try to
get them to locate in the region. And if it doesn’t work out for the region, you have to try
to get them to locate in the state” (Tollett, 2012) .

5.6 Houston-Galveston Area Council
Regional cooperation in the public sector has been institutionalized for more than
45 years. In 1966, the local government officials of the 13-county Upper Gulf Coast
Region of Texas formed the Houston-Galveston Area Council (H-GAC) (Gulf Coast
Economic Development District, 2009). With the exception of San Jacinto County, the
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other nine (9) counties of the Houston MSA are represented on the H-GAC. The nonHouston MSA jurisdictions that are included on the H-GAC are Colorado, Matagorda,
Walker and Wharton counties.
The H-GAC counties coordinate local government activities across a full
spectrum of service lines: transportation and air quality; community and environmental;
public safety and security; human services; cooperative purchasing; and regional data and
GIS (Houston-Galveston area council.2012). To meet federal transportation
requirements, the H-GAC is designated as the Metropolitan Planning Organization for
Brazoria, Chambers, Fort Bend, Galveston, Harris, Liberty, Montgomery and Waller
counties. In a similar vein, the H-GAC is co-designated to address federal economic
development requirements.
The 13-counties of the H-GAC are co-designated as a federal region known as the
Gulf Coast Economic Development District (GCEDD). The GCEDD was officially
incorporated in the State of Texas in 1988 to formulate the federal Comprehensive
Economic Development Strategy (CEDS) (Gulf Coast Economic Development District,
2009) . This function is consistent with the purposes of the regional councils, which is to
“make studies and plans to guide the unified, far-reaching development of a region,
eliminate duplication, and promote economy and efficiency in the coordinated
development of a region” (Texas Code Chapter 391, 2012).
The cluster analysis for the 13-county region reported in the CEDS identified
several clusters that overlap with the findings of earlier Texas studies and the industry
clusters that have been targeted by the Governor’s office: business and financial;
distribution, transportation and logistics; biotechnology and medical; energy, petroleum
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refining and chemical; information technology and communications; and manufacturing
(Gulf Coast Economic Development District, 2009). As noted earlier, these sectors are
also covered by the strategic plans of the GHP, the Bay Area Houston Economic
Partnership, and the Economic Council- Port Region.
The regional vision and goals of the GCEDD are in keeping with the entity’s
primary functions to: 1) coordinate the economic development activities of the planning
region, 2) provide technical assistance to economic development organizations of the
region, and 3) maintain the region’s eligibility to apply for economic development grants
and assistance from the Economic Development Administration (EDA) The regional
vision of the GCEDD is succinctly stated: The Board envisions a healthy regional
economy, diversified among a variety of sectors, poised to accommodate economic
development of the future, with unprecedented opportunities to the citizens of the Gulf
Coast (Gulf Coast Economic Development District, 2009).
The four (4) goals adopted by the GCEDD to achieve the vision are: 1) Promote
coordination among local economic development efforts; 2) Advocate economic
development projects and programs of benefit to the Gulf Coast region; 3) Facilitate
access to relevant economic and business data to support economic development
activities; and 4) Work to raise awareness of issues affecting quality growth and
development across the region (Gulf Coast Economic Development District, 2009) . As
the goals suggest, the GCEDD is dedicated to serving as a collaborative resource to
ensure public officials are properly informed of the economic development opportunities
and initiatives across the entire region. According to a senior staff member of the H-
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GAC, “Our organization works to enhance cooperation throughout the region. It is the
primary purpose of the Council” (Wemple, 2012).
It is important to note that the H-GAC, though it fulfills critical duties as a
regional board, is a voluntary association of local governments. The Texas Code
authorizes the association, but does not mandate participation. Funding for the H-GAC is
derived from a population formula that is used to assess fees from the participating
governments. There are currently 36 local elected officials who serve as the Board of
Directors for the H-GAC (Houston-Galveston area council.2012). By virtue of the
decision by so many local governments to fund the H-GAC, it is reasonable to infer that
the local public officials of the Houston MSA value collaboration.

5.7 Social Capital Survey Results
In the Houston MSA, 21 recipients of the two-minute, nine-question electronic
survey responded. The survey was sent to 45 elected officials and 58 economic
development professionals in the region. Many of the economic development officials
had offered to circulate the survey among their peers. Discounting this possible wider
audience that may have received the survey, a total of 21 responses for 103 direct
recipients is a response rate of 20%. This low response rate is a very generous
calculation. The results of this survey are being reported, though the response rate was
below expectations.
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5.7.1 The Discovery Phase
The respondents in the Houston MSA gave very positive responses to the
statements designed to gauge the degree of reciprocity, reputation and trust within the
discovery phase of a transaction. This high degree of comfort relative to the free
exchange of quality information between and among the respondents suggests a
storehouse of social capital available in the Houston MSA.
Statement #1: I have regular communications with my colleagues
from other counties in the region.
Response
Percent

Answer Options

9.5%
0.0%
4.8%
19.0%
47.6%
19.0%
answered question
skipped question

strongly disagree
disagree
somewhat disagree
somewhat agree
agree
strongly agree

Response
Count
2
0
1
4
10
4
21
0

Table 34. Response #1, Houston MSA

An overwhelming majority (85.6%) responded positively to the query about
reciprocal information exchange. Less than 10% of the respondents indicated they
strongly disagree with the statement about regular communication with their colleagues
from other counties in the region. The results for statement #1 are listed in table 35.
Those surveyed were very favorable when expressing views regarding the
reputation of their colleagues for being responsive to requests for information. As the
table below reveals, over 90% gave positive responses to statement #2. In the Houston
MSA, the results suggest there is every expectation that one’s colleagues will be
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cooperative in providing information. Given this wealth of social capital in the reputation
category, the discovery phase of a transaction should proceed easily.

Statement #2: When it comes to sharing information, my colleagues
from other counties in the region have been very cooperative.
Response
Percent

Answer Options

Response
Count

4.8%
0.0%
0.0%
4.8%
14.3%
47.6%
28.6%
answered question
skipped question

strongly disagree
disagree
somewhat disagree
no opinion / non-applicable
somewhat agree
agree
strongly agree

1
0
0
1
3
10
6
21
0

Table 35. Response #2, Houston MSA

Statement #3: Information I receive from my colleagues in other
counties of our region is reliable and dependable.
Response
Percent

Answer Options

4.8%
0.0%
0.0%
4.8%
4.8%
52.4%
33.3%
answered question
skipped question

strongly disagree
disagree
somewhat disagree
no opinion / non-applicable
somewhat agree
agree
strongly agree

Response
Count
1
0
0
1
1
11
7
21
0

Table 36. Response #3, Houston MSA

Table 36 above confirms a high level of trust regarding the exchange of
information In the discovery phase, the respondents in the Houston MSA report a regular,
reciprocal exchange of information, acknowledge their colleagues have a good reputation
for responding to requests for information, and they trust the accuracy of the information
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that is provided. More than 90% responded favorably to statement #3 of the survey. This
very high rating of trust bodes well for any collective action transactions in the Houston
MSA.

5.7.2 The Negotiation Phase
The responses to questions 4, 5, and 6 of the survey suggests the Houston MSA
leaders hold a favorable amount of social capital (reciprocity, reputation and trust) that
would be useful in negotiation phase of a transaction. Question 4 seeks to measure the
reciprocity in solving problems that has occurred in the region. While the responses are
90% favorable, it is worth noting that 35% only somewhat agree with the statement.
Statement #4: Working across county boundaries, regional problems
get resolved in a fair and reasonable way.
Answer Options
strongly disagree
disagree
somewhat disagree
somewhat agree
agree
strongly agree
Other (please specify)

Response
Percent

Response
Count

0.0%
0.0%
10.0%
35.0%
40.0%
15.0%

0
0
2
7
8
3
2

answered question
skipped question

20
1

Table 37. Response #4, Houston MSA

The reputation for negotiating solutions to regional problems also scores very
high in the survey. As the results in Table 38 show, 90% of the respondents expressed
favorable views regarding the capacity of the region to effectively address problems. This
degree of confidence in the ability to work across county lines to address regional issues
suggests the Houston MSA has a strong reservoir of social capital to draw upon during
the negotiation phase to resolve any possible social dilemma.
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There is also a very high regard for the reputation of community leaders to
collaborate to solve regional problems. Statement #5 [see table 39] reveals more than
90% of respondents have a favorable opinion of their colleagues’ ability to come together
and address regional issues.
Statement #5: I am confident in the way our communities come
together to handle regional issues.
Response
Percent

Answer Options

0.0%
4.8%
4.8%
23.8%
47.6%
19.0%
answered question
skipped question

strongly disagree
disagree
somewhat disagree
somewhat agree
agree
strongly agree

Response
Count
0
1
1
5
10
4
21
0

Table 38. Response #5, Houston MSA

Perhaps of more importance during the negotiation phase of a transaction is the
element of trust. Not one of the survey respondents expressed negative views of the
sincerity or trustworthiness of their colleagues. Though 4.8% registered no opinion on the
‘trust’ statement, the finding that more than 95% of the respondents trust their
counterparts to negotiate in good faith is a very positive result.
Statement #6: In discussions about regional issues, my colleagues from
other counties do their best to accurately represent the views of their
community.
Response
Response
Answer Options
Percent
Count
0.0%
0
strongly disagree
0.0%
0
disagree
0.0%
0
somewhat disagree
4.8%
1
no opinion / non-applicable
14.3%
3
somewhat agree
52.4%
11
agree
28.6%
6
strongly agree
answered question
21
skipped question
0
Table 39. Response #6, Houston MSA
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5.7.3 The Conclusion Phase
In the conclusion phase of the survey, the Houston MSA respondents expressed a
very positive view of the accrued social capital elements of reciprocity, reputation and
trust. The recorded scores for the series of statements (#7, #8 and #9) relative to the
conclusion phase were beyond 80% favorable across the series. The conclusion phase of
a transaction is inherently the most critical, and positive findings in this phase of the
survey are of particular interest.
The respondents expressed very favorable views of the ability of the counties in
the region to interact to address regional concerns. The degree of confidence in the ability
of jurisdictions to engage in reciprocal exchanges for the greater good of the region is
certainly high. Over 90% of those surveyed noted favorable responses to the statement
(#7) about reciprocity in the conclusion phase of a transaction.
Statement #7: If a regional approach is the best way to address a
particular situation, our counties will cooperate to get the job done.
Response
Percent

Answer Options

0.0%
0.0%
4.8%
4.8%
23.8%
47.6%
19.0%
answered question
skipped question

strongly disagree
disagree
somewhat disagree
no opinion / non-applicable
somewhat agree
agree
strongly agree

Response
Count
0
0
1
1
5
10
4
21
0

Table 40. Response #7, Houston MSA

The officials in the Houston MSA have a very favorable reputation for concluding
transactions to benefit the region. While over 81% expressed a favorable opinion on this
‘reputation’ statement, it was the lowest scoring response in the entire survey. To the
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extent that almost 20% of the respondents do not have confidence in the ability of
officials to conclude an agreement, there is some minor pause for concern.
Statement #8: Once a fair solution to a regional problem has been
found, getting all the officials from the different local jurisdictions to
bless it is relatively easy
Answer Options
strongly disagree
disagree
somewhat disagree
somewhat agree
agree
strongly agree
Other (please specify)

Response
Percent

Response
Count

4.8%
4.8%
9.5%
42.9%
33.3%
4.8%

1
1
2
9
7
1
1

answered question
skipped question

21
0

Table 41. Response #8, Houston MSA

Statement#9: The local jurisdictions of our region can be trusted to
honor any commitments they make
Answer Options
strongly disagree
disagree
somewhat disagree
somewhat agree
agree
strongly agree
Other (please specify)

Response
Percent

Response
Count

0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
28.6%
42.9%
28.6%

0
0
0
6
9
6
0

answered question
skipped question

21
0

Table 42. Response #9, Houston MSA

While there is not a unanimous positive opinion regarding the ability of officials
to conclude an agreement, 100% of the respondents trust the counties to honor the terms
of any agreement that reaches a favorable conclusion. The final statement of the survey
(#9) did not record anyone registering disagreement.
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To the extent that it can be inferred from these survey respondents that their views
reflect the opinion of the key community leaders engaged in economic development
cooperation in the Houston MSA, it is reasonable to conclude that there is an abundance
of social capital at their disposal. In this survey, at every stage of a transaction (discovery,
negotiation, and conclusion) the elements of social capital (reciprocity, reputation, and
trust) were recorded to be very high.
5.8 The Dependent Variable: Regional Economic Development Cooperation
The Houston MSA is an economic region of the United States that is fueled by
cooperation in the economic development arena. The GHP is a private regional EDO with
tremendous resources that defines its service area as the 10-counties of the Houston MSA
(Greater Houston partnership.2012) . The GHP belongs to, and supports, the two (2)
sub-regional multi-county EDOs that are active within its service area (Bay area
Houston economic partnership.2012; the economic alliance.2012) . The GHP has
partnered with CenterPoint Energy to provide training to build professional capacity
among the economic development professionals of the region. The GHP refers to the
local EDOs of the Houston MSA as Allies (GHP partners list2012) .
Public officials of the region voluntarily participate in the regional commission
known as the Houston-Galveston Area Council (H-GAC). There are 36 local officials
from a 13-county region that overlaps 90% of the counties in the Houston MSA actively
engaged in cooperative efforts to improve the quality of life throughout the region
(Houston-Galveston area council.2012) . The H-GAC is the umbrella organization for
the Gulf Coast Economic Development District (GCEDD).
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The GCEDD is the entity responsible for production of the Comprehensive
Economic Development Strategy (CEDS) for the region. The CEDS is a compilation of
the demographics, economic assets, industry cluster data and economic activities
occurring in the region. The CEDS is an excellent resource for local officials in the
region, and is also a document required by the federal government in order for the
member counties to be eligible recipients of federal economic development assistance
(Gulf Coast Economic Development District, 2009) .
At the conclusion of the review of all relevant material, a visit to the region,
conversations and interviews with a wide range of economic development professionals,
and the opportunity to weigh the results of the other two cases, it is clear that the Houston
MSA has achieved greater degree of regional economic development cooperation than
the MSAs of Atlanta and Miami. This comparative case research study finds the Houston
MSA to be a region that has clearly embraced the concept of regional economic
development cooperation.

5.9 Conclusion
The fundamentals of regional economic development cooperation, the utilization
of region-wide economic data in support of a unified marketing strategy, are
institutionalized in the operations of the Greater Houston Partnership (GHP). Regional
economic development cooperation is definitely occurring in the Houston MSA. A long
history of collaboration among the public officials of the region, dating back to the
formation of the Houston-Galveston Area Council in 1966, may have provided a template
for the private sector to take a regional approach to economic development.
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In the same way that the Texas Legislature ordained the establishment of the Area
Council and provided for voluntary membership of local governments, the GHP declared
its purview to be the ten counties of the MSA and then sought to ally its operations with
the local EDOs in the counties. As a largely private sector initiative, the factors that
typically impede such regional cooperation and give rise to social dilemmas had little
impact on the formation of the Greater Houston Partnership.
The community profile characteristics revealed various challenges that would be
expected to inhibit regional cooperation. Economic heterogeneity throughout the region
is one such challenge. There is a 91.8% median income differential between the low of
$42,043 in San Jacinto County and the high of $80,638 in Fort Bend County. There are
no council-manager forms of government among the counties of the region, the form of
government that increases the likelihood of cooperation (Feiock, Steinacker, & Park,
2009). The MSA is also somewhat politically fragmented, first by the ten county
governments that constitute the MSA, and again by the 144 cities of the region.
The challenges listed above might have impeded a formal agreement among the
public entities, but these factors did not limit the ability of the private sector to move
forward with a regional plan. In this particular case, due to the Constitutional prohibition
on public subsidies to the private sector development interest that existed at the time,
there was no need to engage local governments in the initiative to develop a regional
economic strategy. The provisions of the Constitution effectively sidelined local
governments from the economic development process. The downtown business
community of Houston was largely able to develop a plan and implement it without
addressing local political considerations.
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The decision to merge three (3) different economic development organizations
that were active in downtown Houston into one entity, and then declare the service area
to be the entire 10-county MSA was a bold move by the private sector. The subsequent
decision to partner with the regional electric utility to offer services and training to the
local economic development organizations of the ten (10) counties in the MSA was a
strategy that worked. The GHP, though emanating from the City of Houston in Harris
County, where 70% of the population in the Houston MSA resides, has become an ally of
every economic development organization in the region.
The GHP conducts research and distributes information regarding the industry
clusters of the region to its allies, uses its corporate endowment to promote the region
globally to prospective employers, and acts as a powerful lobby in the State Capitol. In
the early years of its operation, the GHP lobbied to have the voters of Texas amend the
Constitution and make possible economic development incentives. Local governments,
particularly cities and school districts, have since become very cooperative in assembling
incentive packages for prospect employers. Now, Texas leads the nation as the most
generous source of economic incentives to business (Story, 2012).
According to the survey responses received, social capital among the Houston
MSA stakeholders identified in this study is bountiful. The positive responses suggest
there are sufficient reserves to overcome difficulties at every stage of a possible
collective action transaction. However, given the primacy of the business community in
the economic development arena, the need to expend this social capital to overcome the
politics of local government jurisdictions may never arise. The foundations for regional
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economic development cooperation were set by the private sector and seem fixed in the
Houston MSA.
The interviews and site visits confirmed there is widespread commitment to
regional economic prosperity, and a willingness to work together to advance the interests
of the local community, the Houston region and the State of Texas (Tollett, 2012). From
the interviews that were conducted for this study, there is also a continuing deference to
the business community on matters relating to economic development policy.
As of this writing, a formal collective action agreement for the purposes of
advancing economic development policies involving public and private sectors does not
seem necessary in the Houston MSA. The centralized function of the GHP, in harmony
with its allied local and sub-regional EDOs, is a model that has worked well to advance
economic development programming for the entire region.
This research is not designed to evaluate the economic outcomes of regional
cooperation, but it is worth noting that unemployment is relatively lower in the Houston
MSA and the regional approach to economic development is institutionalized. However,
it would be a reach to conclude that regionalism is the vehicle that has brought greater
prosperity to Houston, relative to the MSAs of Atlanta and Miami.
Recall, the Houston MSA economy is buoyed by the very profitable energy sector
and its related industries. And, the efforts to diversity the Houston economy since the
recession of the 1980s has been greatly assisted by the advent of generous economic
incentives bestowed on the private sector. As mentioned earlier in this chapter, the annual
per capita expenditure on private sector incentives is Texas is roughly four (4) times the
amount awarded to firms in Georgia or Florida. Excessive generosity that directly
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reduces the cost of operating a business has certainly created a favorable business climate
in the Houston MSA. An argument could be made that the combination of regional
economic development cooperation and the most generous incentive packages in the
nation is a formula for economic prosperity.
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CHAPTER 6
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION IN THE MIAMI REGION
6.1 An Overview of the Miami MSA
Regional cooperation for the purposes of economic development remains an
elusive concept in the Miami MSA. Though the region has only three (3) counties, it is a
rare occasion for the EDOs of the Miami-Dade, Broward and Palm Beach counties to
collaborate for the economic benefit of the region. The three (3) counties of the Miami
MSA were once unified within the boundaries of a single political division of the State of
Florida known as Dade County. This much larger jurisdiction was subdivided by the
Legislature early in the 20th century (Annual report to bondholders.2010) .
In 1909, the Florida Legislature designated the northern portions of Dade County
as Palm Beach County. Then, in 1915, Palm Beach County and Dade County each
conceded equal sections between them to form Broward County (Annual report to
bondholders 20102010) . Since then, the name of Dade County has been changed to
Miami-Dade County (Finefrock, 1997), but the geographic boundaries have remained
firmly set. The current mayor of Miami-Dade County often quips, “The only man-made
features visible from space are the Great Wall of China and the border between MiamiDade and Broward counties” (Gimenez, 2011).
From an economic development perspective, the wall-like division between the
counties does seem firm and is rarely breached. In interviews with the senior staff of the
respective county EDOs, there is one memorable incident of formal collective action on
behalf of the region. A cooperative effort was underwritten with a grant from Enterprise
Florida, the state economic development agency. With the proceeds of the grant, a
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brochure was produced, South Florida: Your Global Business Connection, and one joint
promotion event to Canada was undertaken in 2009 (Broward EDO official.2012)(Miami
EDO official2012)(Palm beach EDO official.2012). This may be the one and only
qualifying event for regional economic development cooperation in the Miami MSA.
Despite the political and operational barriers, a relationship of sorts has evolved
among the three EDOs of the region - the Beacon Council in Miami-Dade County; the
Greater Fort Lauderdale Alliance in Broward County; and the Palm Beach Business
Development Board in Palm Beach County. For many years, these agencies were in a
very competitive posture, pilfering prospects across the county lines. In the late 1990s,
the three (3) EDOs finally agreed to cooperate and abide by a regional détente on the
practice of luring employers from within the region (Targeted Job Tax Incentives, 2012).
Building upon this thin foundation of minimal cooperation, the three (3) EDOs have
ventured forth to a state of constrained, limited collaboration.
The county EDOs of the Miami MSA have agreed to share information whenever
a firm from another county expresses a desire to relocate (Miami EDO official2012). In
essence, if one of the EDOs is approached to ‘bid’ for the relocation of a firm from within
the three-county region, the EDO is to refer the firm back to the home-county EDO for a
retention offer (Miami EDO official2012). This courtesy of notifying an EDO of the
potential loss of an employer is an informal type of collaboration.
A more formal collaboration along these lines is reflected in the adoption of
implementing Ordinances by the respective county governments for the Targeted Job Tax
Incentive Program. In each case, there is protective language to deter firms from seeking
incentives by merely changing their address within the Miami MSA. This formal

137

collaboration in restricting the eligibility of firms will be discussed further in the
following section of this Chapter (Targeted Job Tax Incentives, 2012).
The executives from the three (3) county EDOs do meet on a quarterly basis to
share information and discuss regional opportunities (Greater Fort Lauderdale
alliance.2012). In conversations with EDO officials, there is consistent reference to a
Life Sciences Corridor running from the Scripps complex in Palm Beach, through
Broward County and reaching the medical research facilities of the University of Miami
in Miami-Dade County (Palm beach EDO official2012). The Public and Private
Universities of the region, the Research Parks, and Research Institutes of the region are
the formal leaders of this collaborative effort (Life sciences corridor.2012).
The President of Florida International University and the CEO of the Beacon
Council of Miami-Dade County instigated the creation of Life Sciences South Florida, as
the Life Science Corridor project is now known (Life sciences corridor.2012) . It is
worth noting that this fledgling regional exercise in economic development cooperation
has no local politicians participating. The mission statement of Life Sciences South
Florida appears to be carefully crafted to shield the county EDOs from being criticized
for spending local resources on regional collaboration:
“Universities, state colleges, research institutes, and research parks will utilize
our collective assets and facilitate collaborations with economic development councils
and regional, state, national, and international industries, governments, and communities
to promote innovation investment, entrepreneurship and economic growth in the areas of
biotechnology, pharmaceuticals, diagnostics, and information technology to generate
high-technology and high-paying employment” (Life sciences corridor.2012).
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Miami MSA Industry Clusters
Description
Arts, Entertainment, Recreation & Visitor
Industries

Employment
LQ
1.33

Transportation & Logistics

1.23

Business & Financial Services

1.20

Biomedical/Biotechnical (Life Sciences)

1.02

Printing & Publishing

0.96

Apparel & Textiles
Table 43. Industry Clusters of the Miami MSA

0.87

The industry cluster assessment for the region does indicate there is a location
quotient advantage (1.02) for the Life Sciences sector in the Miami MSA
(StatsAmerica.2012) . The real strength in the Miami MSA lies in the trade and tourism
sectors. As the table above indicates, the location quotient advantage for the Visitor
Industries, Transportation & Logistics, and Business & Financial Services sectors are all
1.20 or better. However, by sheer volume of employment opportunities, the Life Sciences
sector plays a prominent role in the economy of the Miami MSA.
Coordinating economic development strategy among the three (3) counties is
complicated by the legacy Regional Planning Councils that bisect the MSA region. The
South Florida Regional Planning Council (SFRPC) and the Treasure Coast Regional
Planning Council (TCRPC) are the responsible Florida agencies that formulate the
Comprehensive Economic Development Strategy (CEDS) documents for U.S. Economic
Development Agency within the Miami MSA (Treasure coast CEDS 2007-2012.
2007)(South Florida CEDS 2012-2017.2012). Miami-Dade and Broward counties are
joined by Monroe County to form the SFRPC. Palm Beach County is within the
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jurisdiction of the TCRPC and is joined by Indian River, Martin and St. Lucie Counties
(Florida regional planning councils.2012).
As expected, the determination of cluster industry configurations for the different
groupings of counties yields divergent recommendations for economic development
strategy. A comparison of the CEDS documents guiding the Miami MSA counties will be
provided in a later section.
A recent initiative supported by both the SFRPC and the TCRPC to provide a
common regional strategic plan for the entire seven-county Southeast Coast of Florida
will also be discussed (Seven50: SE Florida prosperity.2012). The decision to merge the
geographic coverage areas of these two historic Economic Development Districts for the
purposes of the federally funded study is not an academic exercise only. Enterprise
Florida, the state economic development agency, has now identified the seven-county
Southeast Region as one of its eight (8) key regions (Enterprise florida.2012).

6.2 Demographics and Characteristics of the Miami MSA
The Miami MSA consists of three large counties stacked along the southeastern
coast of Florida covering a combined land area of 5,077 square miles. The MSA hosts a
population of 5,547,051 residents. At the bottom of the stack, Miami-Dade County is
home to 45% of the population of the MSA; going north, Broward has 32% of the MSA
population; and, at the northern end, the Palm Beach County, the largest county by square
miles, is home to 23% of the MSA population (American community survey.2009).
Table 45 below reflects the geographic top-to-bottom alignment of the counties within
the Miami MSA.
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County

Miami MSA Summary Table
Sq.
Pop.
Miles
Density Cities

Diversity

Gov.

Palm Beach

1,279,950

1969.8

650

37

0.44

CM

Broward

1,766,476

1209.7

1460

31

0.33

CM

Miami-Dade

2,500,625

1897.7

1318

34

0.45

CE

102

0.33

Totals
5,547,051
5077.2
1093
Table 44. County Summary Profiles of the Miami MSA

This stacked population distribution for the MSA is unlike the central urban core
configuration found in the Houston MSA, and to a lesser degree in the Atlanta MSA. The
urban centers of the Miami MSA appear as rungs in a stepladder. There are “downtown
business interests” found in multiple downtowns: Miami, Fort Lauderdale, and West
Palm Beach. Regional coordination on any issue is often hindered by an extensive
discussion about where to meet.
Until the voters of Miami-Dade County approved a change in the Home Rule
Charter in 1992, the Council-Manager form of government was common across the
region. Effective in 1996, Miami-Dade County shifted to an Executive Mayor, hybrid
form of government that continued to rely on the professional services of a County
Manager. Then, January 23, 2007, the voters approved a referendum in Miami-Dade
County conferring Strong Mayor authority on the elected mayor and eliminating the need
for a professional manager (Miami-Dade charter.2012).
It is considered a favorable condition for regional cooperation to have the
Council-Manager form of government across the jurisdictions, according to Feiock
(2009). With the advent of the change to a strong mayor form of government in MiamiDade County, there is no uniformity in government structure across the region. It is worth
noting that only evidence of collaboration among the three governments in the arena of
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economic development, the legislation adopted to prevent firms from qualifying for job
tax credits by changing locations within the region (Targeted Job Tax Incentives, 2012),
occurred before Miami-Dade County transitioned to a strong mayor form of government.
To the extent that common government structure may benefit collaborative efforts
to achieve regional economic development cooperation, there is a possibility that strong
mayors may govern all three (3) counties. Broward County has tried unsuccessfully to
shift to a strong mayor form of government in the past, and civic interest in making the
change has apparently not waned (Wallman, 2010). Even if future civic efforts result in
a common government form across the three (3) counties, there is no guarantee that
regional economic development cooperation would become a common governing priority
for three (3) strong mayors.
Political fragmentation is another factor that is taken into consideration when
evaluating the prospects for cooperation within a region. The findings of Feiock (2009)
indicated the likelihood of cooperation is inversely related to the degree of fragmentation.
The method for calculating the value is to divide the MSA population by the number of
counties, and then divide that result by the number of cities within the MSA.
For comparison purposes, the higher the value indicates the MSA is relatively less
fragmented. As noted earlier in the previous chapters, the Atlanta MSA reported a
Fragmentation Value of 1,290 (the most fragmented) and the Houston MSA had a
Fragmentation Value of 4,071 (less fragmented than the Atlanta MSA). The value
calculated for the Miami MSA (18,127) reveals the region is the least politically
fragmented of the three MSAs in this study. In ranking the political fragmentation across
the MSA regions using the formula for this research, Miami < Houston < Atlanta.
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5, 547, 051( pop.)

3(counties)
= 18,127FV
102(cities)

The ethnic diversity of the population in the entire Miami MSA and among the
member counties is another factor explored in this study. The Herfindahl Index, a
mathematical formula utilized to gauge market share dominance within jurisdictions, is
adapted for this study to assess the diversity of a region by ethnic demographic (NonHispanic White, Hispanic, Black or Asian). The index is stated in percentages, with a
lower percentage indicating greater diversity - or less dominance by any particular ethnic
class.
The Herfindahl Index rating overall for the Miami MSA is 33%. Similar to the
rating for the Houston MSA, this result suggest the population of the region is diverse,
with no particular demographic disproportionately represented at the MSA level.
Broward County has the exact same rating of 33% as the entire Miami MSA (see Table
45). Miami-Dade County has a rating of 45% and Palm Beach County has a score of
44%. Though the diversity scores for Miami-Dade County and Palm Beach County are
similar, the formula results are derived from a very different ethnic composition in each
county.
In many ways, the counties of Miami-Dade and Palm Beach are at opposite ends
of the spectrum in the composition of their diverse communities. Miami-Dade has a
62.5% Hispanic population. The Hispanic population of Palm Beach is only 18.5%. The
White, Non-Hispanic population constitutes 61.8% of Palm Beach. In Miami-Dade the
White, Non-Hispanics are only 17.4% of the population. In both counties, the Black,
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Non-Hispanic population is between 15% and 18% and the Asian population is single
digit percentages (American community survey.2009).
The middle county, Broward, has the most diverse population with a score of
33%. The White, Non-Hispanic population of Broward is 45.5%; Black, Non-Hispanics
constitute 24.4%; Hispanics make up 24.6% of the population; and Asians constitute the
remaining 3.1% of the population (American community survey.2009). As the
crossroads county within the MSA, Broward clearly has a population composition that
reflects the greatest diversity.
The overall median household income for the Miami MSA is $47,350 annually.
Miami-Dade reports the lowest median household income among the three (3) counties:
$42,969 annually. Broward is in the middle, with a median household income of $51,731
annually. Palm Beach is at the top for the region, reporting a median household income
of $53,538 (American community survey, 2009) . From the perspective of economic
heterogeneity, the differential in annual earnings for household across the three (3)
counties of the MSA is a matter of $10,569 annually, or a 19.7% difference. Feiock
(2009) found that economic heterogeneity is a factor that diminishes the likelihood of
cooperation. Relative to the findings of economic heterogeneity in the Houston MSA
(153%) and the Atlanta MSA (93%), this is not a factor that challenges cooperation in the
Miami MSA (19.7%).

6.3 Statutes, Regulations and Politics
The most significant legislative action that has impacted regional cooperation in
the Miami MSA can be traced to the funding mechanism for economic development

144

organizations (EDOs). In 1986, the State Legislature authorized an additional Local
Business Tax that could be collected in certain counties, with the proceeds dedicated to
an EDO serving the county (Local Business Taxes, 2012). Two county EDOs in the
Miami MSA benefit from this dedicated funding mechanism. One does not. The two
county EDOs that receive these dedicated funds, the Beacon Council of Miami-Dade
County and the Greater Fort Lauderdale Alliance (the Alliance) of Broward County, have
a direct and dependent affiliation with their respective county governments.
The Business Development Board (the BDB) of Palm Beach County does not
receive dedicated funding from the Palm Beach County government, but there is a publicprivate partnership involving the transfer of funds. This partnership did not emerge under
the auspices of the State Legislature. This economic development public-private
partnership is a voluntary association between the BDB and the Palm Beach County
government, negotiated as an arm’s length contract to further mutual interests (Miami
EDO official.2012).
The county-centric funding mechanisms, and the subordinate affiliation of the
EDOs with the governing bodies of the counties, is a possible factor that constrains the
opportunities for regional collaboration in the Miami MSA. Several senior EDO officials
expressed the importance of having the political leadership out front on the issues of
regional economic development cooperation (Miami EDO official, 2012)(Palm beach
EDO official, 2012)(Broward EDO official, 2012).
There was one period of time during the years 1999-2000 where the elected
officials of all three counties embraced a policy regarding economic cooperation and the
use of incentives. Miami-Dade County Commissioner Jimmy Morales spearheaded an
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initiative to get all three counties to “agree not to use county funds as incentives to cause
a business to relocate from one county to another county” (Morales, 1999). Working
with the leadership of the three (3) county EDOs, regional cooperation was embraced, for
a moment, by the elected leadership of the counties.
As a result of the Morales initiative, all three (3) counties inserted language into
the legislation implementing the Quality Targeted Industry (QTI) program that excludes
firms from qualifying for the incentives by simply changing their regional address
(Targeted Job Tax Incentives, 2012). Though the resolution sponsored by Morales and
adopted by the Miami-Dade County Commission contained aspirational language
suggesting the counties would “agree to encourage cooperative initiatives related to the
regional economy,” there has been no marked progress to note in the decade since
(Morales, 1999). Without the political leadership, the financially dependent county
EDOs of the region have been cautious in making regional overtures.
The Legislature had the best of intentions when it took action to authorize public
funding of for certain EDOs in Florida. The Miami MSA was in dire economic straits and
the civic leaders were clamoring for an institutional response during the critical juncture
of the early 1980s. In November of 1981, the cover of TIME magazine asked the
question that the civic leaders of the Miami MSA were struggling with: Paradise Lost?
(Kelly, 1981). A sampling of the excerpts from this 1981 TIME cover story reveals the
depth of the South Florida region’s troubles:
•

When the FBI issued its annual list of the ten most crime-ridden

cities in the nation last September, three of them were in South
Florida: Miami (pop. 347,000) was in first place, West Palm Beach
(pop. 63,000) was fifth and Fort Lauderdale (pop. 153,000) was
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eighth. Miami last year had the nation’s highest murder rate, 70 per
100,000 residents, and this year’s pace has been even higher.
•

An estimated 70% of all marijuana and cocaine imported into the

U.S. passes through South Florida. Drug smuggling could be the
region’s major industry, worth anywhere from $7 billion to $12
billion a year (vs. $12 billion for real estate and $9 billion for
tourism, the area’s two biggest legitimate businesses). Miami’s
Federal Reserve branch has a currency surplus of $5 billion, mostly
in drug-generated $50 and $100 bills, or more than the nation’s
twelve Federal Reserve banks combined. Drug money has corrupted
banking, real estate, law enforcement and even the fishing industry,
whose practitioners are abandoning the pursuit of snapper and
grouper for the transport of bales of marijuana (“square grouper, “
as fishermen call it) from freighters at sea to the mainland.
•

Since the spring of 1980, when Cuban President Fidel Castro

opened the port of Mariel to those who wanted to leave, about
125,000 “Marielitos” have landed in South Florida. In addition,
25,000 refugees have arrived from Haiti; boatloads of half-starved
Haitians are washing up on the area’s beaches every week. The wave
of illegal immigrants has pushed up unemployment, taxed social
services, irritated racial tensions and helped send the crime rate to
staggering heights. Marielitos are believed to be responsible for half
of all violent crime in Miami (Kelly, 1981).

Beginning on May 17th of 1980, race riots wracked the region. Following the
decision by an all white jury that City of Miami Police officers were not guilty in the
beating death of Arthur McDuffie, an African American former U.S. Marine and
successful salesman who had led the police on a high speed chase, the urban core went up
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in flames (Hampton, 1987). Businesses were burned to the ground. From an economic
development perspective, the situation was a nightmare.
While other regions of the nation were contending with an economic recession in
the earl 1980s, the Miami MSA was processing thousands of desperate refugees, tamping
down racial tensions, and working with law enforcement to wean the regional economy
off the profits of a lucrative illegal drug trade. It took civic leaders several years to
grapple with this situation. As with any disaster, there is a period of rescue and recovery
before the rebuilding begins. The request to the Florida Legislature for authorization to
secure a revenue stream for economic development activities was eventually presented,
and approved, during the 1986 Legislative Session (Feldstein Soto, 1986).
To aid the counties in the Miami MSA, the Florida Legislature adopted House
Bill 453 allowing Home Rule Counties recognized in Section 125.011 of Chapter 125 of
the Florida Statutes, “or any county adjacent thereto” to “levy and collect, by ordinance
enacted by the governing body of the county, an additional business tax up to 50 percent
of the appropriate business tax imposed under section (1)” (Local Business Taxes, 2012).
Within the Miami MSA, the eligible counties were the Home Rule County of MiamiDade and the adjacent county of Broward. Both counties imposed the additional tax
(Broward.org.2012).
The law further provided that: “Proceeds from the additional business tax must be
placed in a separate interest-earning account, and the governing body of the county shall
distribute this revenue, plus accrued interest, each fiscal year to an organization or agency
designated by the governing body of the county to oversee and implement a
comprehensive economic development strategy through advertising, promotional
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activities, and other sales and marketing techniques” (Local Business Taxes, 2012). In
Miami-Dade County, the governing body designated the Beacon Council as the recipient
of these funds; in Broward County, the Greater Fort Lauderdale Alliance (the Alliance) is
the recipient of the additional business tax proceeds (Broward.org.2012).
The additional Local Business Tax proceeds provide vital, sustaining
contributions to the Beacon Council and the Alliance. In 2011, the Broward County
Commission negotiated a new five-year public / private economic development
partnership agreement with the Alliance. Pursuant to the new agreement, Broward
County allocated a base annual budget amount of $874,650 to support the Alliance
(Broward Economic Development Partnership Agreement, 2011). According to an audit
published in 2011, 38% of the Alliance’s annual revenues ($2,048,500) are derived from
the additional Local Business Tax proceeds collected and distributed by Broward County
(Lukic, 2011).
Miami-Dade County has not updated the public / private partnership agreement
with the Beacon Council since it was executed back on July 19th of 1988. The agreement
remains in its original form pursuant to the terms of the ordinance enacting the additional
Local Business Tax (Additional Tax on Local Business Tax, 2012) . The agreement has
been automatically renewed every year since 1988. During each annual budget cycle, the
County Commission approves a single-line allocation of the proceeds from the additional
local business. In 2012, as a routine matter associated with adopting the annual county
budget, the Miami-Dade County Commission conveyed $3,375,000 of Local Business
Tax revenue to the Beacon Council (Gimenez, 2012).
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News reports about the Beacon Council have suggested that “more than half of
the agency’s annual budget” is derived from the additional local business tax (Mazzei,
2012). This is a very conservative representation of the amount of public funding that
props up the Beacon Council. The information about the private sector support for the
agency is very guarded and not normally published in the public domain. During the
course of this research, one exception was discovered.
According to a report by the Miami-Dade County Commission Auditor, public
funding constitutes between 78-80% of the Beacon Council’s annual budget. In FY 20072008, the additional Local Business Tax contribution was $3,940,000 and the overall
annual budget for the agency was $5,026,000. Public funds were 78.3% of the agency’s
annual budget. In the FY 2008-2009, the additional Local Business Tax contribution was
$3,893,000 and the agency’s overall budget was $4,862,000. That amounts to exactly
80% of the annual budget (Anderson, 2010).
The Business Development Board of Palm Beach County (the BDB) also receives
substantial public funding support. The BDB does not receive any funding from an
additional Local Business Tax. Palm Beach County, at the northern end of the stack, does
not qualify as an “adjacent county” under the Statute that authorized the collection of the
additional Local Business Tax (Local Business Taxes, 2012). Palm Beach County funds
the BDB with general funds of the county.
In 2011, the BDB entered into a five (5) year agreement to provide “business
recruitment, expansion and retention services and general marketing for Palm Beach
County” worth an aggregate amount of $4,657,350 (Agreement with BDB of Palm
Beach County, 2011). In 2010, Palm Beach County allocated $1,049,750 from the
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general funds of the county to support the programming of the BDB (Palm beach county
budget 2010.2012). In 2010, the Palm Beach Post reported the other half of the BDB’s
$2.2 million annual budget comes from the contributions of its 400 dues-paying corporate
members (Eyman, 2010).
The three (3) EDOs that serve the three (3) counties of the Miami MSA are all
dependent to varying degrees upon public funds for their operations. The Beacon Council
of Miami-Dade is most dependent on the public sector, leveraging only 20-25% of its
funds from the private sector. The Alliance of Broward County, with almost 40% of its
funds banked from the public sector, raises over 60% of its support from the private
sector. The BDB of Palm Beach has a balanced public-private partnership, operating with
roughly 50% of its funds coming from the public and private sectors.
As a result of the financial dependence on local government, regional economic
development cooperation among the counties of the Miami MSA is, for the most part, a
decision that rests with the governing bodies of the counties. Absent a regional economic
development cooperation accord entered into by the county commissions, it is
unreasonable to expect the professional EDOs to advance beyond the county boundaries
and expend resources to develop the regional industry clusters or promote the competitive
advantages of the entire region. After all, the elected leadership of the counties controls a
substantial portion of the resources that fund the operations of the county EDOs. Even
though many of the EDO professionals expressed support for regional economic
development cooperation, it is considered primarily a policy issue for the elected officials
(Miami EDO official2012). In a way, it seems public funding serves as a policy leash
restraining cooperation among the three (3) county economic development organizations.
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Evidence of this restraint in acting regionally is writ large by the recent One
Community, One Goal strategic planning initiative undertaken by the Beacon Council in
Miami-Dade County. The purpose of this project was to develop a targeted industries
strategy to more effectively compete in the global economy. The executive summary of
the report declares: Miami-Dade County is a truly international community with global
brand recognition as the “Gateway to the Americas.” Comparative communities and
competitors include the likes of Rio De Janeiro, Toronto, Singapore, Hong Kong,
Panama, Los Angeles, New York, Houston and Atlanta (One community, one goal.2012).
The global competitors identified in the project are all regional economies.
In the benchmarking section of the One Community, One Goal report, it is clearly
stated that “in most circumstances Miami-Dade County metrics were compared to US
Census defined Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs) or Metropolitan Divisions, which
include central cities and surrounding counties considered an integrated part of the
metro” (One community, one goal.2012). To the consultants responsible for preparing
the assessment, it made eminent sense to select the economies of regional MSAs for
benchmarking purposes. Yet there is no explanation offered for limiting the scope of this
effort to one county within the Miami MSA.
A guest editorial that ran in the Miami Herald following the announcement of this
one-county initiative urged the political leadership of Miami-Dade County to elevate the
initiative to a regional level: “A coordinated effort with Broward and Palm Beach
Counties to make this region more competitive in the global economy is urgently needed”
(Murphy, 2011). The current mayor of Miami-Dade County, who serves as a co-chair of
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the One Community, One Goal program, was not persuaded (One community, one
goal.2012).

6.4 Regional Public Organizations
There is not a single institution that has been identified by the local governments
to coordinate economic development programming across the three (3) counties of the
Miami MSA. In the absence of any such regional EDO, other regional public
organizations of the MSA were reviewed to provide context for the assessment of the
dependent variable in this case study region. The South Florida Regional Transportation
Authority (SFRTA) is the best example of regional cooperation in the Miami MSA. The
Comprehensive Economic Development Strategy (CEDS) developed by the regional
planning councils, the Seven50 project, and the Southeast Florida Climate Change
Compact will also be discussed.
The SFRTA provides a commuter rail service that connects the three (3) counties
of the MSA. The authority was created on July 1, 2003. The (9) nine-member governing
board includes one commissioner and one designee appointed from Miami-Dade,
Broward and Palm Beach counties; a district secretary appointed by the FDOT Secretary,
and two appointees by the Governor.
By law, each county is required to allocate several million dollars annually to
partially match the FDOT support for this commuter rail service (Regional
Transportation and Transit Authorities, 2012) . The county contributions have historically
accounted for about 20% of the SFRTA’s revenues. Due to the significant financial
support from the State of Florida (over 50% of revenues), the SFRTA is listed as an
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enterprise fund of the FDOT (SFRTA 2011 CAFR.2011). It is important to note that this
cooperative regional venture is embedded in Florida Law and is not voluntary in nature.
As a mandate that serves the public interests, the SFRTA does present a unique model for
regional cooperation.
The Miami MSA has two (2) regional planning councils that serve the southern
and northern ends of the region. The Treasure Coast Regional Planning Council
(TCRPC) serves Palm Beach County, along with the non-MSA northern coastal counties
of Martin, St. Lucie and Indian River. The South Florida Regional Planning Council
(SFRPC) serves the MSA counties of Broward and Miami-Dade, along with the nonMSA, southernmost county of Monroe.
Regional councils are established pursuant to Florida Law to, among other
purposes, “assist local governments with activities designed to promote and facilitate
economic development in the geographic area covered by the council” (Florida Regional
Planning Council Act, 2012). The geographic area covered by the council is a decision
that rests with the Executive Office of the Governor (Florida Regional Planning Council
Act, 2012) . The boundaries of the SFRPC have been set since the organization was
established in 1969 (Davis, 2009); the boundaries of the TCRPC have been in place
since 1976 (McAlpin, Cavalcanti, & and Lewis, 2009).
From time to time, the Executive Office of the Governor may exercise the
authority granted by the Legislature to modify the boundaries of the regional planning
councils. In doing so, the Governor is to take into consideration the preferences of local
general-purpose governments; the effects of population migration, transportation
networks, population increases and decreases, economic development centers, trade
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areas, natural resource systems, federal program requirements, designated air quality
nonattainment areas, economic relationships among cities and counties, and media
markets; and other data, projects, or studies that it determines to be of significance in
establishing district boundaries (Florida Regional Planning Council Act, 2012).
With so many variables in play, it is certainly plausible that a defense of the
existing boundaries could be mustered. With the passage of so many decades since the
boundaries of the SFRPC and the TCRPC were originally set, valid reasons for making
adjustments could also be advanced. The statute does not require a periodic evaluation of
the boundaries (Florida Regional Planning Council Act, 2012), and there is no record
found of any such exercise occurring.
In sync with the State of Florida designation of the regional planning council
boundaries, the federal government has designated each region as an Economic
Development District (EDD). With this designation comes the responsibility for
submitting and updating a Comprehensive Economic Development Strategy (CEDS).
Given the far-flung reaches of the TCRPC and the SFRPC, from the Florida Keys to the
grapefruit orchards of Indian River, the CEDS documents for each region present
divergent assessments of the industrial clusters.
The 2007-2012 CEDS of the TCRPC advises that the region should focus on the
“star” clusters identified in the table below. There is also a recommendation to dedicate
attention to certain sectors that are identified as “opportunity” clusters. The opportunity
clusters include Biopharmaceuticals, Education and Knowledge Creation, Publishing and
Printing, and Transportation and Logistics.
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Treasure Coast Region (2004 data)
Description

Employment LQ

Agricultural Products

4.82

Hospitality & Tourism

1.49

Power Generation & Transmission

1.46

Heavy Construction Services

1.42

Aerospace Vehicles & Defense
Table 45. Cluster Industries of the Treasure Coast Region

1.34

The 2007-2012 CEDS of the SFRPC identifies industry clusters that have
performed well in comparison to the national norms, and suggests an economic
development strategy grounded in the concept of nurturing and developing certain
clusters. The industries that registered LQ employment values above 1.0 are listed in the
Table 47 (South Florida regional planning council 2007-2012 CEDS.2007).
South Florida Region (2004 data)
Description

Employment LQ

Arts, Entertainment and Recreation

1.3

Hospitality & Tourism

1.2

Educational Services

1.2

Real Estate, Rental, Leasing

1.2

Retail Trade

1.2

Utilities
Table 46. Cluster Industries of the South Florida Region

1.2

In this CEDS report, the “traditional clusters” are identified as Professional and
Technical Services, Financial Services, Administrative and Support Services, Tourism
and Hospitality Industries, Aviation, Marine, Transportation Activities, Real Estate, and
Health Care. There is also reference to “cutting edge” clusters that includes the Life
Sciences / Biomedical Sector, a Creative Economy Cluster, and the Homeland Security
and Defense Cluster (South Florida regional planning council 2007-2012 CEDS.2007).
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Some of the findings of the cluster industry analysis from the two (2) regions do
overlap. There is common reference to sectors such as Hospitality & Tourism,
Transportation & Logistics, and Biomedical / Life Sciences. The overlap in cluster
industries is to be expected, as these sectors are prominent in the analysis of clusters for
the greater Miami MSA [See Table 44, page 145]. To bring some cohesion to this
divided planning process, a new initiative has been undertaken.
In 2010, the TCRPC and the SFRPC collaborated and won a federal HUD
Sustainable Communities Regional Planning Grant. Working in concert with partners
from government, education, and the private sector, the application was submitted and
the Southeast Florida Regional Partnership secured a $4.25 million regional planning
grant. The objective of this grant-funded exercise is to divine a broad plan for the entire
seven-county region served by the two (2) regional planning councils. If successful, “the
Plan will: 1) serve as the framework for future federal investment; 2) support the efforts
of individual counties, municipalities and their regional partners whose plans and
projects further the implementation of the regional Vision and Plan; and 3) put the
Southeast Florida Region in the best position possible to capture future federal funds for
critical infrastructure projects designed to improve the region’s’ sustainability
(Seven50: SE Florida prosperity.2012).
Part of the justification for the inclusion of seven (7) counties in this regional plan
is the fact that Enterprise Florida, the public / private partnership that provides economic
development services for the State of Florida, and the Florida Department of
Transportation (FDOT), in their Strategic Intermodal Plan, refer to the area as the
“Southeast Region” of Florida (Seven50: SE Florida prosperity.2012). It should be
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noted that FDOT continues to administer their transportation services through separate
districts in the “Southeast Region”: District 4 (Broward, Palm Beach, Martin, St. Lucie
and Indian River) and District 6 (Miami-Dade and Monroe)(Florida DOT.2012).
The Southeast Florida Regional Climate Change Compact (the Compact) is a
truly voluntary, multiple-county cooperative effort. The Compact idea was circulated to
county representatives of Palm Beach, Broward, Miami-Dade, and Monroe during the
Southeast Florida Regional Climate Leadership Summit on October 23, 2009 (Southeast
Florida climate change compact.2012) . The original summit was organized by Broward
County.
The county commissions from the four (4) member counties subsequently adopted
resolutions to support this collaborative initiative “to foster sustainability and climate
resilience at a regional scale (Southeast Florida compact website.2012) . The
professional staff from the four (4) member counties has since produced valuable subject
matter documents, and there have been annual summits hosted in each of the four
member counties. The level of engagement and commitment by the elected officials has
been less remarkable. At the most recent summit in Palm Beach, not one county elected
official from Miami-Dade attended.
The lack of sustained cooperation among the counties of southeast Florida is an
observation shared by the organizers of the Seven50 project. In their assessment, “The
absence of a regional, collaborative partnership and shared vision for Southeast Florida
has left our region at a competitive disadvantage when we seek to access needed state and
federal resources. Envision Utah, One Bay (Tampa), Portland Metro 2040, Denver Metro
Vision 2040, Sacramento Area Blueprint (2004) and Myregion.org (Orlando) are
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examples of regions that have well-established, multi-sector partnerships and regional
strategies for quality communities and growth. While Southeast Florida has made
progress in many issue areas, including transportation, water supply, and climate change
planning with the recent signing of the four-county Southeast Florida Regional Climate
Change Compact, these examples are the exception rather than the rule
(Seven50.org.2012).
The challenge of shifting the focus of local officials beyond the immediate needs
of a particular jurisdiction to the issues of regional concern is more than problematic in
South Florida. Even when all of the counties of the MSA are confronted with a similar
threat, such as climate change related sea level rise, it is a challenge to maintain a united
front. In the arena of economic development, where the threat of global competition
should spark a collaborative response across the region, there is no such public agenda.
The collaboration among the three (3) EDOs of the MSA that produced a regional
promotional brochure and one joint marketing mission to Canada ended when the
Enterprise Florida grant expired. The cooperation among the three (3) counties regarding
incentive programs was not the first step on the path towards greater cooperation. It
seems to have been another case of “the exception rather than the rule”. The results of the
social capital survey reflect the relatively weak cooperative state of affairs in the Miami
MSA.

6.5 Social Capital Survey Results
In the Miami MSA, 31 recipients responded to the two-minute, nine question
electronic survey. Due to the configuration of the survey data, it is known that the
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response rate among the elected officials was 19.2% (5 responses/26 recipients = 19.2).
The response rate among the potential pool of 322 executives and board members for the
three (3) EDOs of the Miami MSA is not known (Report to the community2009)(Greater
Fort Lauderdale alliance.2012)(Palm beach BDB.2012).
The three (3) EDOs in the Miami MSA each provided a single point of contact for
distribution of the survey to their respective board members. The receipt of 26 responses
from EDO board members does confirm the survey was circulated. However, it is not
known how widely the anonymous survey was circulated. Assuming the request for total
distribution was honored by each of the EDOs contact persons, and all 322 executives
and board members received the survey, the response rate would only be 8% (26
responses /322 recipients = .08). There is no evidence available to suggest all 322
candidates received the survey, making the 8% response rate an extremely conservative
estimate.
Though the unimpressive response rates for this particular survey limit the
conclusiveness of the results, it is still edifying to compare the relative scores of the three
(3) regions. The integrity of the survey, in its design and simplicity, remains valid. As an
academic survey depending upon voluntary participation, there was no authoritative
leverage or incentives utilized to compel or induce participation. A qualified correlation
of these social capital metrics and the relative rank ordering of the dependent variable in
the MSAs will be presented in the final chapter.
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6.5.1 The Discovery Phase
In the Miami MSA, 22.6% of the respondents initially indicated there was little or
no regular communications with colleagues in other counties. Even though more than
20% of the respondents had little or no regular communication with their colleagues from
other counties, in response to Statement #2, 86.7% expressed favorable views regarding
the reputation of their colleagues.
Statement #1: I have regular communications with my colleagues from
other counties in the region.
Response
Percent

Answer Options

3.2%
12.9%
6.5%
25.8%
35.5%
16.1%
answered question
skipped question

strongly disagree
disagree
somewhat disagree
somewhat agree
agree
strongly agree

Response
Count
1
4
2
8
11
5
31
0

Table 47. Response #1, Miami MSA

Statement #2: When it comes to sharing information, my colleagues
from other counties in the region have been very cooperative.
Response
Percent

Answer Options

0.0%
3.3%
0.0%
10.0%
16.7%
56.7%
13.3%
answered question
skipped question

strongly disagree
disagree
somewhat disagree
no opinion / non-applicable
somewhat agree
agree
strongly agree

Response
Count
0
1
0
3
5
17
4
30
1

Table 48. Response #2, Miami MSA

The third statement measures the level of trust that exists relevant to the quality of
the information exchanged. Though 12.9% of the respondents had no opinion on this
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statement, no negative views were expressed. The respondents provided an 87%
favorable opinion in response to the statement designed to measure the social capital
element of trust. The responses to Statement #3 are listed on table 48 below.
Statement #3: Information I receive from my colleagues in other
counties of our region is reliable and dependable.
Response
Percent

Answer Options

0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
12.9%
3.2%
67.7%
16.1%
answered question
skipped question

strongly disagree
disagree
somewhat disagree
no opinion / non-applicable
somewhat agree
agree
strongly agree

Response
Count
0
0
0
4
1
21
5
31
0

Table 49. Response #3, Miami MSA

6.5.2 The Negotiation Phase
In the Miami MSA, the responses to statements 4, 5, and 6 reveal a diminished
degree of social capital (reciprocity, reputation and trust) among the respondents for the
negotiation phase of a transaction. Statement # 4 seeks to measure the degree of
reciprocity for solving problems that exists among the respondents. While there is a
prevailing favorable view, 24.1% did not agree with the statement. Five (5) of the survey
respondents either skipped the statement or noted they did not have any regional
experience to base an opinion.
The results pertaining to the reputation for cooperation to resolve problems in the
region are underwhelming. Only 3.2% strongly agreed they are confident in the way the
communities come together to handle regional issues. A notable 35.5% indicated they
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lack confidence in the ability of the region’s communities to cooperate and solve
problems. [See table 52].

Statement #4: Working across county boundaries, regional problems
get resolved in a fair and reasonable way.
Answer Options
strongly disagree
disagree
somewhat disagree
somewhat agree
agree
strongly agree
Other (please specify)

Response
Percent

Response
Count

0.0%
13.8%
10.3%
34.5%
31.0%
10.3%

0
4
3
10
9
3
3

answered question
skipped question

29
2

Table 50. Response #4, Miami MSA

Statement #5: I am confident in the way our communities come
together to handle regional issues.
Response
Percent

Answer Options

3.2%
19.4%
12.9%
29.0%
32.3%
3.2%
answered question
skipped question

strongly disagree
disagree
somewhat disagree
somewhat agree
agree
strongly agree

Response
Count
1
6
4
9
10
1
31
0

Table 51. Response #5, Miami MSA

For the element of trust within the context of the negotiation phase, there is a
reassuring 93.6% favorable view reported. In the Miami MSA, there is a lack of
confidence in the capacity of the jurisdiction to achieve an equitable exchange, and the
reputation of the negotiating solutions to regional problems leaves much to be desired,
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but there is no lack of trust in the ability of colleagues to negotiate in good faith. Trust in
negotiations is a promising element of social capital available within the Miami MSA.
The results of Statement #6 are presented in Table 53 presented below.
Statement #6: In discussions about regional issues, my colleagues from
other counties do their best to accurately represent the views of their
community.
Response
Percent

Answer Options

0.0%
0.0%
3.2%
3.2%
9.7%
77.4%
6.5%
answered question
skipped question

strongly disagree
disagree
somewhat disagree
no opinion / non-applicable
somewhat agree
agree
strongly agree

Response
Count
0
0
1
1
3
24
2
31
0

Table 52. Response #6, Miami MSA

6.5.3 The Conclusion Phase
The conclusion phase of any transaction for collective action is the most critical
phase. To the extent social capital can be drawn upon to overcome the empirical threats
to an agreement, an abundance of the social capital elements of reciprocity, reputation
and trust are needed in the conclusion phase of any transaction. It is in this phase that the
Miami MSA appears to come up short relative to the Houston and Atlanta MSAs. In this
series of statements (#7, #8, and #9) that are designed to capture the metrics for each of
these elements, statement #8 pertaining to the reputation of the local officials is perhaps
of greatest concern.
The responses to statement #7 provide an inkling of the difficulty associated with
reciprocity in concluding agreements in the Miami MSA. A lack of confidence in the
capacity of the counties to cooperate and effectively interact is clearly expressed by
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23.3% of the respondents. Only 10% of the respondents strongly agree that the counties
will cooperate if a regional approach is the best way to address a particular situation. The
results of statement #7 are provided in table 54 listed below.
Statement #7: If a regional approach is the best way to address a
particular situation, our counties will cooperate to get the job done.
Response
Percent

Answer Options

3.3%
6.7%
13.3%
0.0%
43.3%
23.3%
10.0%
answered question
skipped question

strongly disagree
disagree
somewhat disagree
no opinion / non-applicable
somewhat agree
agree
strongly agree

Response
Count
1
2
4
0
13
7
3
30
1

Table 53. Response #7, Miami MSA

Statement #8: Once a fair solution to a regional problem has been
found, getting all the officials from the different local jurisdictions to
bless it is relatively easy
Answer Options
strongly disagree
disagree
somewhat disagree
somewhat agree
agree
strongly agree
Other (please specify)

Response
Percent

Response
Count

3.2%
16.1%
32.3%
35.5%
12.9%
0.0%

1
5
10
11
4
0
0

answered question
skipped question

31
0

Table 54. Response #8, Miami MSA

The reputation for cooperation among the local officials in the Miami MSA is not
favorable. Statement #8, found in Table 55, is the only statement that garnered a majority
negative opinion (51.6%) in any of the surveys administered in the three (3) MSAs. The
respondents indicated that it would be difficult to get all the officials from the different
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local jurisdictions to approve an agreement, even after a fair solution to a regional
problem has been found.
Even the results for the element of trust within the context of the negotiation
phase give pause for concern. A solid 10% of the respondents either strongly disagree or
disagree that the local jurisdictions of the region can be trusted to honor any
commitments they make. Another 16.7% expressed similar views by indicating they
somewhat disagreed with the statement. While it may be true that 73.4% of the
respondents trust the local officials to honor commitments, this score is the lowest result
for this question across the three (3) MSAs.
Statement #9: The local jurisdictions of our region can be trusted to
honor any commitments they make
Answer Options
strongly disagree
disagree
somewhat disagree
somewhat agree
agree
strongly agree
Other (please specify)

Response
Percent

Response
Count

3.3%
6.7%
16.7%
36.7%
36.7%
0.0%

1
2
5
11
11
0
0

answered question
skipped question

30
1

Table 55. Response #9, Miami MSA

6.6 The Dependent Variable: Regional Economic Development Cooperation
In this comparative case study, the Miami MSA is a region nearly devoid of
cooperation in the economic development arena. The Miami MSA does not have a
central, regional flagship EDO like Houston, and clearly ranks below Atlanta in terms of
regional institutions supporting local economic development activities across the region.
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To this day, there is no public agenda to formulate a comprehensive economic
development strategy for this MSA.
Each of the three (3) counties of the MSA has an established economic
development agency working on behalf of their respective county. In interviews with
officials from these agencies, there is a uniform recollection of the one instance when a
promotional brochure for the three-county South Florida Region was produced and a joint
marketing mission to Canada was undertaken. The resources for this collaborative
venture were provided by a grant from Enterprise Florida. Once the state grant funds
expired, the formal collaboration ended. Due to the local political concerns, it was only
possible to collaborate regionally if non-local source revenues were being used.
There is only one specific instance of legislation adopted uniformly across the (3)
three counties to memorialize economic development cooperation. The 1999 initiative
was an agreement to only award incentive funds to companies relocating to South
Florida. Any company that simply changes their address from one county to another
within the MSA is not eligible for the incentives. Beyond this single policy of détente in
the award of incentive dollars, not further cooperation has been adopted or codified.
The ongoing initiative spearheaded by the universities and the research
institutions to promote a biomedical research corridor from Palm Beach County to
Miami-Dade is supported by the EDOs of the three (3) counties. In the interviews, this
single topic was alluded to by all of the EDO professionals in the MSA. There has not
been any formal resolution among the county governments to contribute resources to
collectively bolster this initiative.
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The Miami MSA is designated as a unified regional economy by the U.S. Census
Bureau based upon the commuting patterns of the workforce across the region. The
residents and employees of the region, by their behavior, have acknowledged the three
(3) counties function as a regional economy. At this time, however, there is no regional
economic development agreement that calls for the utilization of region-wide economic
data in support of a unified marketing strategy in the Miami MSA.

6.7 Conclusion
Regional economic development cooperation does not currently occur in the
Miami MSA, and is not likely to occur in the immediate future. Though the region is the
least politically fragmented among the MSAs of this study, and the median household
income is effectively homogenous across the three (3) counties of the MSA, there are
other factors that diminish the likelihood of cooperation.
The stacked orientation of the three (3) counties, each with its own urban center,
presents a formidable challenge: there is no central business district to facilitate
coordination throughout the region. Without a cohesive downtown business community
providing a unified voice to articulate a regional perspective, there is only intermittent
agitation to pursue regional interests. This is not an environment that will produce a
robust regional organization similar to the Greater Houston Partnership.
Compounding the problem, each of the three (3) county governments funds their
respective funded economic development organization (EDO) with local tax dollars. As
politically dependent organizations, the EDOs are not able to allocate their resources to
advance regional interests, unless directed to do so by locally elected officials. The
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probability of the public sector launching, on its own volition, a movement for regional
economic development cooperation is highly unlikely.
If a regional movement were afoot in the Miami MSA, the social capital
necessary to achieve an agreement might prove inadequate. Relative to the social capital
findings in the other MSAs, it appears a transaction in the Miami MSA might stumble at
critical moments of the negotiations. The survey respondents indicate that they do not
necessarily hold their colleagues from other counties in high esteem. The ‘reputation’
element of social capital is in limited supply. In the negotiation phase of a transaction,
only 64.5% indicated were “confident in the way our region comes together to solve
problems.” In the conclusion phase of an agreement, only 48.4% believed “getting the
local jurisdictions to ratify a plan is relatively easy.” There is simply not a lot of
confidence among the key stakeholders of the Miami MSA.
The MSA if further challenged by the configurations of the boundaries for the
regional planning councils. The three (3) counties of the MSA largely ignore the
economic development planning work of the two (2) regional councils. The
comprehensive planning documents are used qualify local governments for federal
economic assistance grants, but do not serve as economic development program guides
for the MSA. After more than thirty years, the boundaries of the regional councils merit
attention and modification.
Having evaluated the community profile characteristics, considered the challenges
of the stepladder geographic configuration of the region, and assessed the relatively weak
supply of social capital in the region, I have concluded there is little reason for optimism
that a regional economic development initiative will emerge in Miami MSA.
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CHAPTER 7
CONCLUSION
7.1 Rejecting the Primary Hypothesis
The evidence gathered in this comparative case study of three (3) MSA regions of
the United States does not support the primary hypothesis of my research study. The
hypothesis of this research declared: For regional economic development cooperation to
occur, a reserve of social capital among the stakeholders is essential. It is not possible to
conclude that social capital was essential to the emergence of regional economic
development cooperation, as it is manifested in the Houston and Atlanta MSAs. As such,
it is necessary to reject the hypothesis, and acknowledge a finding that the influence of
legislative actions of the state government upon regional cooperation for economic
development purposes is possibly of relative greater importance.
Social capital may be essential for those agreements that are legally defined and
framed as social dilemmas, but the regional economic development cooperation that has
been identified in this research has occurred without the sacrifice of local autonomy or
the stamp of local government approval. State policies deserve significant credit for the
emergence of regional economic development cooperation in the Houston MSA, as local
governments were effectively sidelined from the process. The State of Georgia has
encouraged the formation of Joint Development Authorities in the Atlanta MSA and
supports the operations of the Georgia Resource Center, both factors that have facilitated
the notable level of economic development cooperation in the Atlanta MSA region.
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Much of this research was conducted based on the flawed premise that public
sector involvement in some form was a prerequisite to regional economic development
cooperation. While local jurisdictions often serve as the authorizing agents for tax
incentives, there is a wide range of economic development functions that do not
necessarily require public sector participation. A private entity, such as the Metro Atlanta
Chamber of Commerce, is quite capable of managing a database to improve the
understanding of the cluster dynamics of a regional economy. Other functions, such as
organizing trade missions to promote the advantages of a region are routinely carried out
by the Greater Houston Partnership, and are probably best handled by the private sector.
These regional economic development services are not matters that require a formal
regional cooperative agreement.
Regional cooperative actions that do not require formal approval or authorization
of local government parties are generally not matters that present a social dilemma. If
there is no social dilemma associated with a particular form of regional cooperation, then
there is no need to utilize a store of social capital to achieve consensus. Had my original
hypothesis been framed to only apply to those forms of regional cooperation that involve
the formal approval of a local government, it may have withstood scrutiny.
On the basis of the current research, it is also necessary to reject the secondary
hypothesis of this research: Regional economic development programming is only
possible if the local public officials and civic leaders reach an agreement to cooperate.
While it may be ideal to have the full and complete support of the elected county officials
of an MSA behind a regional economic development program, it is clearly not necessary.
The downtown business community, if it sees an advantage in regionalizing certain
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aspects of economic development activities, is entirely capable of doing so without the
express approval of public sector leaders.
There was another tangential finding of this research. There appears to be a
principle at work that deserves further research and validation. The principle is this: In
order to advance a regional economic development strategy, the autonomy of each local
jurisdiction to attract and retain employers must be respected. The Greater Houston
Partnership did not attempt to usurp economic development authority from the local
EDOs of the Houston MSA; the GHP approached the sub-regional functionaries as allies.
In Atlanta, the regional economic development programs of the Metro Atlanta Chamber
of Commerce and the Georgia Resource Center occur in partnership with the local EDOs
and Joint Development Authorities of the Atlanta MSA. The autonomy of every local
EDO in the 28 counties of the Atlanta MSA is not threatened by regional cooperation.
In the process of conducting this qualitative research effort, I discovered that
regional economic development cooperation among local jurisdictions is often rooted in
the historic decisions of the State Legislature or the executive directives of a Governor.
Local government officials and local EDO professionals are certainly key participants in
any formal regional collective action, and the business community has demonstrated a
capacity to effectuate regional economic development cooperation even without any
formal cross-jurisdictional agreements. The findings of this study suggests the legislative
and executive decisions of the state government often frame the parameters of any such
endeavor, and therefore have an inordinate influence on the process of regional economic
development cooperation.
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7.2 The Survey Results and Community Profile Attributes
Before expounding on the importance of state legislative intervention, a review
of the findings of this regional economic development study is in order. At the
conclusions of Chapters 4, 5, and 6 an assessment of the degree of regional economic
development cooperation within each region was provided. The relative ranking of the
assessments reveal that the Houston MSA has earned the highest ranking in light of the
institutional manifestation of regional cooperation within the offices of the Greater
Houston Partnership. Regional cooperation also occurs in the Atlanta MSA through the
programming and operations of a number of actors, most notably the Georgia Resource
Center and the Metro Atlanta Chamber of Commerce. The Atlanta MSA benefits from a
cornucopia of state, regional and private institutions that facilitate regional cooperation
among the numerous single-county and multiple-county agencies that provide economic
development services in the 28-county region. The Miami MSA is ranked last among the
three (3) regions, exhibiting a lack of regional coordination among both the business
community and the public sector. There is general indifference to the concept of regional
economic development cooperation by the public officials.
The social capital survey results bear witness to the ranking of the dependent
variable in this qualitative case study. As noted in earlier chapters, the response rate to
this study in the three (3) MSAs was underwhelming. The survey was designed to be
compact and efficient to respect the busy schedules of the targeted recipients [several
respondents confirmed it took less than two (2) minutes to complete]. Advance
notification of the survey was sent, alerting recipients to expect the survey and ensuring
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them it would take but a few minutes to complete. The response rates were truly
disappointing, in the range of 20% at best.
As the table below indicates, the positive responses from the Miami MSA were
notable lower for almost every statement. The Houston MSA had the highest overall
positive response rates, and the Atlanta MSA maintained a secondary rating in response
to most of the statements. Table 55 presented below provides the aggregated positive
response rates to the matrix statements of the survey. A graphic depiction of the positive
responses, illustrating the greater accumulation of social capital reserve in the Houston
MSA region and the Atlanta MSA in contrast to the results for the Miami MSA is
provided in Table 57.
MSA Positive Response Comparisons
#1. Discovery - Reciprocity

Atlanta
87.0

Houston
85.6

Miami
77.4

#2. Discovery - Reputation

89.0

90.5

86.7

#3. Discovery - Trust

90.8

90.5

87.0

#4. Negotiation - Reciprocity

84.7

90.0

75.8

#5. Negotiation - Reputation

84.7

90.4

64.5

#6. Negotiation - Trust

90.7

95.3

93.6

#7. Conclusion - Reciprocity

85.2

90.4

76.6

#8. Conclusion - Reputation

59.2

81.0

48.4

#9.Concluson-Trust

88.7

100.0

73.4

Table 56. Aggregated Positive Survey Responses

Though the results of this survey effort do not withstand the scrutiny of
quantitative research standards, the information is being provided for edification
purposes. As the graph sweeps across the statements associated with the phases of
discovery, negotiation and conclusion, the disparity in the response rates is heightened.
These results comport with the heightened degree of difficulty associated with each
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progressive stage of a collective action transaction, and are consistent with the rankings
of the dependent variable for the respective MSAs. In the graphic depiction, the Miami
MSA responses show an extreme dip on questions 5 and 8. The lack of confidence in the
ability of county leaders to close a cooperative deal does not portend well for future
transactions in the Miami MSA.

Table 57. Aggregated Positive Responses Graph

There is an admitted inability to calculate a reasonable estimation of margin of
error in the sampling inflicted by the low response rate and the unconfirmed number of
recipients due to the distribution methodology imposed by the subject EDOs. The
concept of the survey, a matrix of collective action transaction phases intersecting the
elements of social capital, is original in its design and is offered to the academic
community for future utilization. With sufficient resources to conduct a defensible
quantitative survey, this survey design could possibly yield beneficial findings for further
research on this topic. For this project, it is only possible to note that the survey research
mimics the findings associated with the dependent variable.
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The community profile data, the independent variables that serve as indicators of
the likelihood of cooperation according to the large-N findings by Feiock (2009), did not
align as expected with the dependent variables of this study. This departure in the
expected alignment is likely due to the form of economic development cooperation that
emerged n the subject regions. Initiated and driven by the private sector, the public sector
social dilemmas were largely avoided, or of little consequence. Without the pubic sector
involved, the collective action indicators were less reliable.
Whereas the dependent variable ranking order for regional economic development
cooperation placed the Houston MSA at the top, the Atlanta MSA in the middle and the
Miami MSA at the bottom, the findings for economic heterogeneity provided a different
pattern. From the perspective of least disparity among the annual earnings reported by
county, the Miami MSA is most homogenous, reporting a percentage variation among its
counties of only 19.7%. The Atlanta MSA reports the greatest disparity among its
counties (153% variation), and the Houston MSA is in the middle, reporting a
considerable 91.8% variation. These results are presented in Table 59 listed below.
Economic Heterogeneity
Median Household Income
High-Low Differential by
County
High-Low % Variation by
County

Atlanta

Houston

Miami

$53,997
$88,040$35,835

$55,532
$80,638$42,043

$47,350
$55,538$42,969

153%

91.80%

19.70%

Table 58. Comparative Economic Heterogeneity of the MSAs

In conducting this regional comparison across counties, it must be noted that the
apparent homogeneity of the Miami MSA is due in part to the highly aggregated
reporting that occurs with only three (3) counties constituting the MSA. Similarly, the
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extreme variation in the Atlanta MSA is due in part to the 28 counties reporting median
income data. Overlooking these data assembly distortion factors, the Miami MSA would
appear to be the most likely to cooperate bases upon economic heterogeneity.
Political fragmentation has been identified as a factor that challenges the ability of
a region to cooperate. The premise of this assertion is based on the logic that it is
inherently more difficult to conclude a collective action agreement when a greater
number of parties are engaged in the process. As previous studies have found, the least
fragmented a jurisdiction, the greater the likelihood of cooperation. Again, the findings of
this research were not consistent with these findings. To gauge the relative political
fragmentation of the regions, the population of the MSA was divided first by the number
of counties, and then divided again by the number of municipalities, as illustrated in the
formula below.

MSApopulation

# counties = FragmentationValue
# cities

By this formula, the Fragmentation Value for each MSA can be compared. A
lower Fragmentation Value indicates greater political fragmentation. According to these
results, the Atlanta MSA is the most politically fragmented (18,127 > 4,071 > 1,290) and
the Miami MSA is the least politically fragmented. Again, the findings of the research are
inconsistent with this indicator, as regional economic development cooperation is not
occurring in the Miami MSA.
Relative Political Fragmentation of MSAs
PF Value

Atlanta

Houston

Miami

1,290

4,071

18,127

Table 59. Lower value indicates greater fragmentation
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The diversity of the counties and the MSAs was a topic explored in depth during
this case study. The Herfindahl Index for determining market share was utilized to
measure the relative diversity of the regions. The lower the percentage score, the more
diverse the jurisdiction. As a social capital variable, Feiock has discounted the relevance
of ethnic composition as a factor influencing the likelihood of regional cooperation. To
the extent that there is no direct correlation with the dependent variable in this research,
there is no evidence gleaned to dispute the assertion of Feiock. As table 61 listed below
illustrates, the MSAs of Houston and Miami have the exact same diversity scores, but are
at opposite ends of the spectrum in terms of regional economic development cooperation.
Diversity Ratings for MSAs
HI Score

Atlanta

Houston

Miami

40%

33%

33%

Table 60. Herfindahl Index, Diversity Results for MSAs

The diversity ratings of the member counties within each MSA were calculated to
provide a basis for deeper understanding of the community compositions within the
regions. The HI Scores for counties grouped into regional commissions by the State of
Georgia seemed to present a pattern of similar diversity ratings. However, the review of
the voluntary alignment of Georgia counties as Joint Development Authorities made clear
there was no persistent pattern of association based on the diversity ratings of the member
counties. Race and ethnicity were not found to be influential factors relative to regional
economic development cooperation.
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7.3 The Impact of the State on Regional Cooperation
This research effort has found direct links between the state laws and
administrative decisions of the state government and the current state of regional
economic development cooperation in the MSAs of this study. The influence of state
policies may be of greater import than the measure of social capital or the community
profile attributes of a region. A regulatory framework that creates an economic
development power vacuum, or provides incentives for local EDOs to cooperate, or
reinforces local control by virtue of funding mechanisms, might be the greatest factor to
influence economic development cooperation in a region.
Indeed, the origins of regional cooperation in the Houston MSA seem to be
nestled in the fine print of Texas State Law. Until late in the 20th century, a power
vacuum existed in the economic development arena due to the Constitutional prohibition
on public expenditures for economic development activities. Economic development was
largely a private matter. In the wake of the recession of the 1980s, corporate and civic
leaders filled that void and created the Greater Houston Partnership.
In the wake of the recession of the 1980s, and the prolonged struggle of the U.S.
energy sector, the civic leadership of Houston responded by merging the interests of the
Houston Chamber of Commerce, the Economic Development Council of Houston and the
Houston World Trade Center into the Greater Houston Partnership (GHP). The
responsibility to act fell to the private sector primarily due to the Constitutional ban on
any public dollars being expended to advance private sector development. The public
sector was largely on the sidelines throughout this period of time.
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The GHP simply declared its jurisdiction to be the entire Houston MSA. It
worked to have the Constitution amended to allow for public expenditures, and then
dedicated itself to creating professional capacity within the fledgling city-based EDOs
that subsequently emerged. The GHP is largely supported by the energy sector of the
Houston MSA and is very well financed. The GHP itself pays membership dues to the
other sub-regional EDOs that serve the port businesses and the communities surrounding
the Space Center.
The Constitutional ban that kept the public sector on the sidelines may have been
the key to the success of this flagship regional EDO. Unimpeded by local political
considerations, the GHP has effectively defined the MSA region as its territory. The GHP
sponsors all the major public functions featuring elected and appointed government
officials. Working with its EDO Allies, the GHP drives the economic development
programming for the region.
In the Atlanta MSA, the provision in Georgia law that allows a county authority
to offer an additional $500 Job Tax Credit if it enters into a Joint Development Authority
(JDA) agreement with a neighboring county authority has spurred regional cooperation.
This seemingly innocuous provision in the state law has led every local development
authority to enter into a JDA with at least one neighboring county. As a result of this
incentive to collaborate, broader cooperation among the county authorities has resulted.
Some JDAs jointly invest in industrial parks and others engage in cluster specific
promotional efforts. Several local authorities belong to more than one JDA, which is
further evidence that the cooperation among local EDOs is not simply grounded in
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qualifying for the additional incentive dollars. This incentive for cooperation has proven
to be a key policy tool for advancing regional collaboration in the Atlanta MSA.
There are also other Georgia policy decisions that may partially hinder regional
economic development cooperation in the Atlanta MSA. The decision by the State
Department of Community Affairs to divide the 28 counties of the MSA into five (5)
different regional commissions has not buttressed the cohesion of the economic region.
Each regional commission is also designated as an Economic Development District
(EDD) for purposes of federal economic assistance. The responsibility of the regional
commissions to produce the Comprehensive Economic Development Strategy (CEDS)
for the EDD yields divergent results than is found in the cluster analysis of the entire
Atlanta MSA.
In the Miami MSA, it appears the additional Local Business Tax proceeds and the
General Fund dollars that fund the EDOs of the region have indirectly impacted the
capacity of the public – private partnership organizations to act regionally. The last place
finish for the Miami MSA in terms of regional economic development cooperation may
be rooted in this decision by the State Legislature to allow for the imposition of the
additional Local Business Tax.
The additional Local Business Tax enabled the counties of Miami-Dade and
Broward to stand up countywide EDOs to assist in the recovery from the economic
challenges of the 1980s. During this same time period, Palm Beach County recognized
the Business Development Board of Palm Beach as its official agency. The continuous,
substantial public funding for several decades has created a dependent relationship
between the EDOs and their respective political bodies.
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As noted in Chapter 6, the county commissions of the region have only engaged
in sporadic policy agreements relative to economic development in the region. A formal
détente in 1999 governing inter-MSA incentives was the last known effort. There have
not been any proactive policies adopted by the governing bodies of the region to further
economic development cooperation since then. In the absence of any political cover to
expend resources on regional initiatives, the local EDOs are somewhat constrained in
their capacity to act regionally. The unintended consequence of the decision by the
Florida State Legislature to authorize this additional Local Business Tax has been a
region bereft of economic development cooperation.
In the Miami MSA, the division of the region into two (2) separate State of
Florida planning commission jurisdictions may also be considered an impediment to
regional economic development cooperation. The boundaries for the South Florida
Regional Planning Council and the Treasure Coast Regional Planning Council were set
over 30 years ago. The failure of the State of Florida to update these regional boundaries
has consequences. The opportunity to mend the interests of the economic region through
a collaborative planning process is lost. The impact of this policy should not be
overstated. It truly is more of a lost opportunity than an actual impediment. It is not
recognized as a barrier among the key stakeholders in the region, as many are not aware
of the CEDS documents or the existence of the Economic Development District
boundaries.
In summary, this research effort has resulted in the rejection of the hypothesis and
its corollary. As this research found, regional cooperation for economic development
purposes is manifested in various forms, and formal agreements involving the
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expenditure of social capital accumulated among the public and private key stakeholders
of the region are not always evident. The GHP of the Houston MSA is entirely a private
sector venture fueled by the energy sector and appreciated by the public sector. The
regional cooperation that occurs in the Atlanta MSA, spurred by job tax incentives, is a
concerted effort of the Metro Atlanta Chamber of Commerce, the Georgia Resource
Center, the Georgia Economic Development Association, Joint Development Authorities,
and local development authorities. The lack of regional economic development
cooperation in the Miami MSA is likely a consequence of county-centric EDOs relying
too heavily on public funding from county government sources. The Miami MSA is
further challenged by the lack of a centralized, downtown urban business district; each
county of the region has its own downtown business community.

7.4 Recommendations
In order to effectuate cohesive economic development policies for the
metropolitan regions of the nation, there must be an effort to align the planning and
development efforts undertaken by various local, state and federal agencies. Every tier of
government should agree to common criteria to define an economic metropolitan region.
The static boundaries of planning councils, or changes to the boundaries that do not
prioritize the regional economic factors, only hamper the effort to promote regional
economic development cooperation.
The evaluation by the U.S. Census Bureau of commuting patterns within
metropolitan areas provides a definition of a region that reflects the regional behavior of
the people. This factor should trump most other considerations. Just as the Georgia

183

Legislature defined the boundaries of a county according to the daily commuting distance
of a rider on horseback, the boundaries of an economic region could be similarly drawn
every ten years with the census results to reflect the commuting patterns of the day. To
the extent other factors should be considered, every tier of government should agree to
the common criterion.
By aligning the regional planning council boundaries with the commonly defined
metropolitan economic regions, the planning efforts undertaken by the regional councils
would be much more relevant. If every MSA had a Comprehensive Economic
Development Strategy (CEDS) document, and the economic development organizations
of the region utilized the CEDS as a common source of information, regional economic
development efforts could be more effectively aligned.
To facilitate coordination among the regional EDOs, state policymakers should
review the Joint Development Authority policies of Georgia. By providing an incentive
for cooperation, it is possible to spur local authorities to embrace regional cooperation. If
the condition precedent for a local jurisdiction to grant state approved economic
incentives is voluntary participation with other EDOs in the region, it is reasonable to
expect the local EDOs will partner with another local EDO.
To improve the level of cooperation among the local EDOs in the regional
economies of the United States, state legislatures should consider various incentives to
reward local jurisdictions for participating in regional economic development
programming. In areas with minimal reserves of social capital, the ability to transcend
local concerns may require more than incentives. State coordination of research and state
management of a regional database might help. With common information about the

184

industry clusters and economic advantages of the region, local business leaders may
succeed in engaging local officials in a cooperative regional agreement to facilitate and
promote economic development.
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